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UNWARRANTED PESSIMISM OF THE NEW BEHAVIORAL
ANALYSIS OF LAW
GREGORY MITCHELL*
ABSTRACT

Legal scholars increasinglyrely on a behavioralanalysis of
judgment and decision making to explain legalphenomena and
argue for legal reforms. The. main argument of this new
behavioralanalysisofthe law is twofold: (1)All human cognition
is beset by systematic flaws in the way that judgments and
decisionsaremade, andtheseflaws lead topredictableirrational
behaviors and (2) these widespreadand systematic nonrational
tendencies bring into serious question the assumption of
procedural rationality underlying much legal doctrine. This
Article examines the psychological research relied on by legal
behavioraliststo form this argumentand demonstratesthat this
research does not support the bleak and simple portrait of
pervasiveirrationalitypainted by these scholars.Carefulscrutiny
ofthe psychologicalresearchrevealsgreateradherenceto norms
of rationalitythan that implied by the legal behavioralists,and
the methodological and interpretive limitations on this
psychological research make extrapolation from experimental
settings to real world legal settings often inappropriate.
Accordingly, this Article argues that legal scholars should
exercisegreatercareandprecision in their uses ofpsychological
data to avoid advocatingfurther legal reforms based on flawed
understandingsofpsychological research.
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Within the last few years, ... we have seen an outpouring of
scholarship addressing the impact of behavioral research over a
wide range of legal topics. Indeed, one might predict that the
current behavioral movement eventually will have an influence
on legal scholarship matched only by its predecessor, the law
and economics movement.'

INTRODUCTION

In a series of prominent, recent articles, Jon Hanson and Douglas
Kysar argue that the legal system and legal academia should take
more seriously behavioral research on judgment and decision
making, for this research purportedly reveals that "human
decisionmaking processes are prone to nonrational, yet systematic,
tendencies."2 Hanson and Kysar see this evidence of systematic,
nonrational behavior as having great importance for the law:
"Ultimately, any legal concept that relies in some sense on a notion
of reasonableness or that is premised on the existence of a
reasonable or rational decision maker will need to be reassessed in
light of the mounting evidence that a human is a 'reasoning rather
than a reasonable animal.'"3 Hanson and Kysar predict, moreover,
that this "behavioralism" movement will eventually rival law and
economics in degree of influence on legal scholarship. 4
1. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking BehavioralismSeriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 634 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar,
Behavioralism1] (footnote omitted).
2. Id. at 633. In addition to their 1999 article in the New York University Law Review,
Hanson and Kysar have published two more articles on this theme of taking behavioral
research on decision making more seriously. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
BehavioralisnSeriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV.1420
(1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismII; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar,
Taking BehavioralismSeriously:A Response to Market Manipulation,6 ROGER WILiAMS U.
L. REV. 259 (2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Behavioralism111. Robert Prentice includes
Hanson and Kysar's works among a short list of "important articles ... that demonstrate the
value that behavioral insights bring to legal analysis." Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the
IrrationalAuditor: A BehavioralInsight into Securities FraudLitigation,95 Nw. U. L. REv.
133, 134-35 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
3. Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismI, supra note 1, at 634-35 (footnote omitted).
4. Id. No single, dominant name for this new field has yet emerged, but "behavioralism"
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The prediction of Hanson and Kysar seems well on its way to
coming true.5 With rapidly increasing frequency, legal scholars
employ a behavioral analysis of human judgment and decision

making to critique existing laws and legal theory, especially the law
and economics movement and its assumption of rational behavior.6

and "behavioral law and economics" appear to be the leading contenders. See Hanson &
Kysar, Behavioralism II, supra note 2, at 1425 ("In [the] field [of behavioralism], cognitive
psychologists and behavioral researchers study the decisionmaking processes of individuals,
with an eye toward comparing actual behavior with that of rationalistic ideals."); Christine
Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653,
1653 (1998) ("'Behavioral law and economics'... seeks to bring together 'behavior' and 'law
and economics.'); Cass R. Sunstein, Introductionto BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 9
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (referring to the field as "behavioral law and economics"); see also
Russell Korobkin, Inertiaand Preferencein ContractNegotiation:The PsychologicalPower of
DefaultRules andForm Terms, 51VAND. L. REV. 1583,1585 n.8 (1998) (discussing preference
for the label "law and behavioral science" for the field); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL.L. REv. 1051, 1057 (2000) (referring to this new movement as "law and
behavioral science").
5. Within the last five years alone, five law reviews have conducted symposia addressing
the question of how psychology and behavioral economics may inform legal decision making.
See Symposium, BehavioralEconomicsandLaborLaw,77 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002);
Symposium, Law, Psychology, and the Emotions, 74 CM.-KENT L. REV. 1423 (2000);
Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology: HumanBehavior,BehavioralEconomics,
and the Law, 51 VAND.L. REV.1495 (1998); Symposium, New and CriticalApproachesto Law
and Economics (PartI: BehavioralEconomics,Law and Psychology, 79 OR. L. REv. 1, 23-102
(2000); Symposium, RationalActors or RationalFools? The Implications of Psychology for
ProductsLiability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2000). Professor Cass Sunstein recently
said that the "most exciting work in law schools right now is to try to bring an understanding
of how people actually think in contact with the law." Patricia Cohen, JudicialReasoningIs
All Too Human, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001, at B7. The details of this emerging scholarship
are discussed in Part I.A, and numerous articles in this new field are discussed throughout
the Article.
6. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs.
StandardsRevisited, 79 OR. L. Rsv. 23, 44 (2000) ("Implicit within economic analysis is a set
of predictions about how individuals will respond to law, known generally as rational choice
theory' (RCT).... [A] large body of social science literature demonstrates that [RCT's]
predictions are not always accurate, and that deviations from so-called 'rational' behavior are
often systematic."); Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an ElectronicAge: The
Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASE. U. L.Q. 779, 780 (1997) (reporting comments of
Professor Cass Sunstein to the effect that this new movement will likely become as important
as the law and economics movement); Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within
CorporateAgencyRelationships 1 (Aug. 2001) (University of Southern California Law School,
Olin Working Paper No.00-2,2001) ("In recent years, behavioral law and economics (BLE) has
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Unfortunately, the facile way in which these scholars summarize
and then incorporate psychological research findings into legal
theory ignores important limitations on this research. These
scholars also evince a "pessimism bias" in their work: They tend to
ignore or discount research findings contrary to their view of legal
decision makers as afflicted by numerous judgmental biases and
decision-making errors, while simultaneously interpreting ambiguous research findings as supportive of their pessimistic view of
human rationality. Simply put, the empirical research does not
support the dire pronouncements of legal scholars regarding the
human capacity for irrational behavior. Just as troubling as the
overreaching claims about human cognition that these scholars
make is their uncritical acceptance by others.'
This Article presents the first detailed analysis of legal scholars'
misinterpretations of behavioral decision theory-the body of
risen to prominence within legal scholarship. Its ascension is due (at least in large part) to its
aim ofunifyingtwo historicallydistinct analytic paradigms: economics andpsychology. While
embracing the conventional economic premise that legal rules embody behavior-altering
incentives, behavioral law and economics nevertheless disengages from neoclassical economic
theory by explicitly analyzing incentives through a psychological lens."), availableat http:/
papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=276110.
7. For example, Professor Fanto cites the works of these scholars for the proposition that
the uncertainty and pressure from business competitors and rapid technological change has
led
executives to enter into mega-mergers on the basis of the kind of decisionmaking biases that, according'to behavioral and psychological research, are
typical of human beings reacting in the face of complexity and uncertainty.
People often make decisions from little data, or from data that is exemplary, in
the foreground or available, but that is not statistically representative.
James A. Fanto, Brakingthe MergerMomentum: Reforming CorporateLaw GoverningMegaMergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 288-89 (2001) (footnotes omitted). See Mark A. Lemiey &
Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preservingthe Architecture of the Internet in the
BroadbandEra, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 950 (2001) (stating that "[the 'behavioral law and
economics' literature offers strong reason to believe that at least in certain circumstances,
people don't always do the rational thing. Rather, systematic biases can infect decision
making.") (footnote omitted); see also infra note 46.
Kyron Huigens, in his review of the bellwether book for this new scholarship, Behavioral
Law and Economics,supranote 4 (collecting essays in which the authors apply psychological
research to various legal decision-making topics), accepts the basic contention that "real
people do not behave at all in the way that economists have supposed they do." Kyron
Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy,89 CAL. L. REv. 537,537 (2001)
(book review) (footnote omitted). Professor Huigens criticizes this new scholarship not for
unwarranted empirical claims but rather for maintaining a consequentialist view of behavior.
Id. at 568 ("The difficultyis that they still cling to the tools of consequentialism.").
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empirical research on which this new field so heavily relies.8 An
examination of the empirical evidence on human judgment and
decision making demonstrates that, contrary to the contentions of
Hanson, Kysar, and the other legal behavioralists, this body of
evidence does not prove that experimental subjects-much less realworld legal decision makers-systematically violate norms of
rationality when forming judgments and making decisions. This
Article discusses three sets of limitations on behavioral decision
theory research that the legal behavioralists fail to appreciate,
thereby leading them to incorrect and simplistic conclusions about
human rationality: (1) features of this research that mask
individual and situational differences in rational behavior and
artificially heighten the apparent frequency of irrational behavior;
(2) features unique to the experimental research setting that
intentionally and unintentionally increase the likelihood of finding
irrational behavior and distort perceptions of the frequency of
irrational behavior outside of the laboratory; and (3) features of this
research that diminish its real-world importance and its ability to
provide prescriptive guidance in the law. The Article concludes by
discussing possible explanations for why legal scholars have taken
behavioral research on judgment and decision making too seriously
and too unskeptically, leading to the unwarranted pessimism about
human rationality found in so much recent legal scholarship.
When the full range of empirical research into judgment and
decision making is considered, and when the methodological
assumptions and choices of this research are laid bare, it becomes
clear that this body of research does not present an unqualified
account of pervasive and systematic irrationality. Rather, this
research reveals that some people can be made to appear irrational
under some circumstances while many people can be made to
appear quite rational under other circumstances. A rational review
of the evidence on human judgment and decision making should
8. For a detailed description of behavioral decision theory, see infra notes 52-68 and
accompanying text. In a companion paper, I discuss the growing body of research
demonstrating important individual and. situational differences in rational thought and
behavior-a body of research that further brings into question the strength and coherence of
the behavioral critique of law and economics. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
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lead one to agnosticism rather than empirical certainty on the
matter of the rationality or irrationality of legal decision making.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF LEGAL DECISION THEORY
A. An Assault on the RationalityAssumption
A growing number of scholars assert that legal theory and
doctrine should be reformed in light of the research of psychologists
and behavioral economists demonstrating that the psychological
mechanisms involved in human information-processing often
lead to biases and errors in judgment and decision making.9
9. See, eg., Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismI, supra note 1, at 634 ("Within the last few
years, ... we have seen an outpouring of scholarship addressing the impact of behavioral
research over a wide range of legal topics."); Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismH1,supranote
2, at 1425 ("We argue that, because a multitude of nonrational factors influence individual
decisionmaking, consumers cannot be expected to engage in efficient product purchasing
analyses-regardless whether manufacturers are required to supply product warnings.");
Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1473 (1998) ("Our goal in this article is to advance an approach to the economic analysis of.
law that is informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one that reflects a better
understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings."); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and ContractDefaultRules, 83 CoRNELLL. REV. 608,675 (1998) ("This Article has made
the positive claim that the preference exogeneity assumption, implicit in all law-andeconomics theories of efficient contract default rule selection, is probably false, and the
normative claim that its falsity has important implications for efficiency theory."); Korobkin
& Ulen, supra note 4, at 1059 ('This Article provides an early blueprint for research in law
and behavioral science,' which we hope will help guide the emerging scholarship in this area.
... We conclude with our vision of how this Article might serve as a basis for a substantial
research agenda for the next generation of scholars interested in the confluence of law and
behavioral science.") (footnote omitted); Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and
Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 853 (1995) [hereinafter Langevoort, Ego & Law] ("This Essay will
begin to show how understanding the pervasiveness of egocentric biases can alter our
thinking about questions of law and lawyering."); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics,Skeptics, and CautiousSupporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739,
739 (2000) [hereinafter Rachlinski, New Law & Psychology] ("Recently, legal scholars have
become interested in new theories of human decision making that researchers in psychology
and empirical economics are developing. These new theories promise to predict people's
reactions to law more accurately than either law and economics or traditional legal
scholarship.") (footnote omitted); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 571, 624-25 (1998) [hereinafter, Rachlinski,
Hindsight] ('The story of the hindsight bias in legal judgments has lessons for legal
policymakers. It holds a warning about developing a new area of law that demands a
judgment in hindsight. Any new area will have to make some accommodation for the bias.");
Cass R. Sunstein, HumanBehaviorandthe Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205,206 (2001) ('The
basic purpose of this Article is to bring a better understanding of human behavior, with the
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These scholars contend that proponents of an economic analysis of
legal behavior should pay particular attention to this body of
research, which is often referred to as "behavioral decision theory,"'l
for it purportedly demonstrates that legal decision makers do not
conduct themselves according to the norms of rational behavior
assumed by economic theory."
assistance of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, to bear on the most basic
questions in employment law.") (footnotes omitted).
The most recent articles by no means represent the first efforts to educate legal audiences
about the potential importance of the psychological literature on human informationprocessing for substantive and procedural law and the practice of law. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes,
Principlesin Judgment/DecisionMaking ResearchPertinentto Legal Proceedings,7 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 429 (1989); Craig R. Callen, Hearsayand InformalReasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43
(1994); David Cohen & Jack L. Knetsch, JudicialChoice and DisparitiesBetween Measures
of Economic Values, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 737 (1992); Ward Edwards & Detlof von
Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225
(1985); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critiqueof ClassicalLaw andEconomics, 65 CH.-KENrtL. REV. 23 (1989); JeffreyL. Harrison,
Egoism, Altruism,and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1309 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicyin BankruptcyLaw, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1393 (1985); Karyl A. Kinsey et al., FramingJustice: TaxpayerEvaluationsof PersonalTax
Burdens, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 845 (1991); Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human
InformationProcessingandAdjudication:Trialby Heuristics,15 LAW & SOCYREV. 123 (198081); Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking:An Essay on the
RelationshipBetween Cognitive Illusions and the Managementof Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
329 (1986); Lee E. Teitelbaum et al, Evaluatingthe PrejudicialEffect ofEvidence: CanJudges
Identify the Impact of ImproperEvidence on Juries?, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1147. See generally
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Robert Mauro, Psychology and Law, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 693-717 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (reviewing socialpsychological research on legal decision making); Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald,
Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1127-30, 1131-37 (1991) (reviewing the several
attacks that had already been made by 1991 on the behavioral assumptions underlying law
and economics); Donald C. Langevoort, BehavioralTheoriesof Judgmentand DecisionMaking
in Legal Scholarship:ALiteratureReview, 51VAND. L. REV. 1499,1506-19 (1998) [hereinafter
Langevoort, LiteratureReview] (reviewing past legal works utilizing research and theories
from psychology and behavioral economics); Arlen et al., supra note 6, at 3-4 n.4 (citing
articles bringing behavioral decision theory insights to corporate law issues).
10. I provide an overview of behavioral decision theory below. See infra notes 52-68 and
accompanying text. The field of behavioral decision theory may be described briefly as the
loose collection of psychologists, behavioral economists, experimental economists, political
scientists, and others within the social sciences who concern themselves with developing a
descriptive account of human judgment and decision making, particularly in relation to
normative accounts of good judgment and decision making.
11. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1055 ("There is simply too much credible
experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the
assumptions of rational choice theory.") (footnote omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1194 (1997) ("Economic analysis of law has
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In the view of these "legal decision theorists,"' behavioral
decision theory establishes conclusively that humans systematically
violate principles of rationality when making judgments and
decisions about all sorts of matters in all sorts of domains. 3 Our
proceeded on the basis of inaccurate understandings of decision and choice.").
12. I apply the label "legal decision theorists" to scholars working in this area because the
topic of interest is legal decision making in its various forms and because this label evokes the
notion of behavioral decision theory, the body of research on which so many of these scholars
rely. Most of these legal scholars simply apply findings from behavioral decision research to
legal issues and do not conduct their own behavioral studies (with Professors Chris Guthrie,
Russell Korobkin, and Jeffrey Rachlinski being notable exceptions). Thus, the work tends to
be more theoretical and speculative than empirical in nature. I also use "legal decision theory"
generically to refer to the increasing application of behavioral decision theory research to legal
topics. Of course, not all legal decision theorists will subscribe to every claim made by every
other legal decision theorist, and no single legal decision theory yet exists. To limit confusion
and increase the fairness of my remarks, I attempt to provide as much detail as possible on
who has made what particular claims, including direct quotation of the statements at issue.
Some minor controversy surrounds the two leading names for this new field, behavioralism
and behavioral law and economics. See supra note 4. Professors Henderson and Racilinski
assert that "[tihe term, 'behavioralism,' [as used by Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar] is
inappropriate in this context. The psychological research that Professors Hanson and Kysar
rely on arises from cognitive, not behavioral, psychology. Behavioral psychology can be closely
tied to microeconomic theory, which cognitive psychology can be used to critique." James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The
Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 RoGER WLLiAmS U. L. REV. 213, 218 n.22 (2000)
(citation omitted). That is, Henderson and Rachlinski assert that "behavioralism" may be
confused with "behaviorism," which is most often associated with the works of John Watson
and B. F. Skinner. But see Hanson & Kysar, Behavioralism III, supra note 2, at 264 n.9.
Responding to Henderson and Rachlinski, Hanson and Kysar state that,
although the use of "behavioralism" is arguably inappropriate in light of the fact
that it is cognitive, not behaviorist, psychology that is being integrated into the
legal economic methodology, we take some comfort in the fact that a distinction
is sometimes made between "behaviorism" (without the 'al'), which is the school
of psychology that excludes cognitions from its analysis, and "behavioral
science," which is not necessarily so constrained. In any event, the terminology
at this point appears to be firmly entrenched in the legal literature.
Id. (citations omitted).
Professor Rostain points out that retention of the term "economics" in the appellation
"behavioral law and economics" is problematic, for without a rational behavior assumption
"the project's positive merit comes from the validity of the research about the specifics of
human decision making and behavior, not from an abstract model of strategic reasoning based
on the assumption that people are self-interested maximizers of their preferences." Tanina
Rostain, EducatingHomo Economicus: CautionaryNotes on the New BehavioralLaw and
EconomicsMovement, 34 LAW & SocY REV. 973,982 (2000). In other words, behavioral law
and economics omits the quintessential element of microeconomics.
13. See, e.g., Hanson & KysarBehavioralismII, supranote 2, at 1425-26 ("One significant
and surprising feature of such departures from rationality is that they are consistent and
predictable-that is, they are 'neither rational, nor capricious.") (footnote omitted); Korobkin
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preferences change with normatively irrelevant changes in the
decision setting (e.g., support for a public policy may depend on
whether it is framed in terms of lives to be lost versus lives to be
saved if the policy is implemented, even though the net result
remains constant); we are too sensitive to anecdotal but unrepresentative data in our probability and causation judgments and
not sensitive enough to diagnostic, base rate information or sample
size; we are incapable of ignoring information about the occurrence
and severity of events when judging after the fact whether a
defendant acted negligently (i.e., we fall prey to a certainty-ofhindsight bias); we are overly optimistic about the likelihood of
negative events and overly confident in the correctness of our
factual beliefs-to name only a few of the cognitive errors and biases
to which we are supposedly susceptible. 4 Suffice it to say that legal
& Ulen, supra note 4, at 1085 ("Research in the behavioral sciences has demonstrated that
individuals are systematically biased in their predictions of the probable results of various
events."); Cass R. Sunstein, How Law ConstructsPreferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2637 (1998)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Preferences] ("Decisions are affected by cognitive limitations and
motivational distortions that press choices in unanticipated directions.... [Tihe departures
from rational choice can be described, used, and sometimes even modeled, at least in broad
outline."); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1 ("People are not always 'rational' in the sense that
economists suppose. But it does not follow that people's behavior is unpredictable,
systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary,
the qualifications can be described, used, and sometimes even modeled."); see also Jennifer
Arlen, Comment: The Futureof BehavioralEconomicAnalysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765,
1766 (1998) ("Behavioral economic analysis of law scholars argue that people do not behave
consistently with rational choice theory, and, moreover, that the deviations from rational
behavior are systematic, not random. Most people are likely to exhibit certain biases, they
assert, and thus these deviations from rational choice do not cancel each other out.")
(footnotes omitted).
The definition of the modifier "systematic" is implied rather than explicitly stated by the
legal decision theorists. Within behavioral decision theory, the term is used to indicate that
an error is the result of some purposeful, repetitive process rather than random error or
measurement error. Robyn M. Dawes, BehavioralDecision Making and Judgment, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 9, at 497 (distinguishing systematic errors
from random or unreliable errors). The term "bias" refers to a "source of error which is
systematic rather than random." Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Heuristic andAnalytic Processes
in Reasoning, 75 BRrr. J. PSYCHOL. 451, 462 (1984). Hence, the phrase "systematic bias" is
redundant when used in the judgment and decision-making context, but this phrase may be
employed here at times to ensure the intended meaning.
14. "The sheer number of experiments reporting biases is so great that a sizable number
of books and long survey papers have been writtenjust to review the evidence." John Conlisk,
Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 669, 670 (1996). I discuss specific cognitive
anomalies as appropriate in the remaining sections of the Article. For summaries of the
cognitive biases identified by behavioral decision researchers see SCOTr PLOUS, THE
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decision theorists portray legally relevant judgment and decision
making as seriously flawed.' From this empirical assumption legal

PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 109-88 (Philip G. Zimbardo ed., 1993);

Dawes, supra note 13, at 499-521, 53441; Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismI, supra note 1,
at 643-87; Jolls et al., supra note 9, 1476-1541; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1084-1126;
Langevoort, LiteratureReview, supra note 9, at 1503-06; Hazel Markus & R.B. Zajonc, The
Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 137,
176-97 (Gardner Lindzey & Eliot Aronson eds., 3d ed. 1985). One useful organizing scheme
is provided by the quantitative psychologist Hal Arkes, who divides the anomalies into three
categories based on their costs and benefits:
(1) "Strategy-basederrors occur when subjects use a suboptimal strategy, the extra effort
required to use a more sophisticated strategy is a cost that often outweighs the potential
benefit of enhanced accuracy." Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors:
ImplicationsforDebiasing,110 PSYCHOL. BULL 486,486-87 (1991).
(2) "Association-based errors are costs of [an] otherwise highly adaptive system of
associations within semantic memory. The automaticity of such associations, generally of
enormous benefit, becomes a cost when judgmentaly irrelevant or counterproductive
semantic associations are brought to bear on the decision or judgment." Id. In this second
category Arkes places such anomalies as the hindsight bias, the confirmation bias, and the
overconfidence effect. Id.
(3) "Psychophysicallybased errors result from the nonlinear mapping of physical stimuli
onto psychological responses. Such errors represent costs incurred in less frequent stimulus
ranges where very high and very low stimulus magnitudes are located. These costs are more
than offset by sensitivity gains in the more frequent stimulus ranges located in the central
portion of the stimulus spectrum." Id. at 487. In this category Arkes places such anomalies
as the sunk cost effect, the reflection effect, and the anchoring bias. Id.
15. Legal decision theorists address judgment and decision making in a wide variety of
legally relevant settings. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sony: The Regret
Aversion Theory of LitigationBehavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 61-62 (applying psychology
to litigant judgment and decision making); Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismII, supranote 2
(regarding consumer judgment and decision making); Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1538-41
(regarding criminal judgment and decision making); id. at 1541-44 (discussing limits of
consumer and bureaucratic decision making and possible implications of such limits for the
legal system); Korobkin, supra note 9 (applying psychological theory to the question of how
default terms affect contracting parties); Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously.An
Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1569-97 (2000) (applying psychology to attorney
judgment and decision making); Prentice, supra note 2 (regarding auditor judgment and
decision making); Rachinski, Hindsight, supra note 9 (regarding judgments of judges and
juries made in hindsight); see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1058 ("By borrowing
from psychological and sociocultural theories in addition to economics, the law-andbehavioral-science approach consciously chooses to emphasize its external usefulness in
analyzing legal problems rather than either its internal elegance or universal applicability.
Its ultimate goal, quite simply, is to understand the incentive effects of law better than
modem law and economics is able to do by enlisting more sophisticated understandings of
both the ends of those governed by law and the means by which they attempt to achieve their
ends."); Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2 ("Analysis of law should be linked with what we have
been learning about human behavior and choice. After all, the legal system is pervasively in
the business of constructing procedures, descriptions, and contexts for choice.").
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decision theorists argue that the law should be fashioned to take
account of the systematic irrationality of legal actors.' 6 Conversely,
they argue that proof of systematically irrational behavior makes it
unwise to base laws on economic theories that necessarily assume
rational behavior.' 7
The breadth of legal decision theory's assault on the rationality
assumption cannot be overstated: legal decision theorists
collectively contend that all judgments and decisions of legal
importance-whether made by ordinary citizens or criminals,
litigants or lawyers, judges or jurors-involve imperfect psychological processes that consistently cause irrational judgments
and choices to be made.' s The statements of Hanson and Kysar
16. See Rostain, supra note 12, at 980 ("Much of this [behavioral law and economics]
scholarship is prescriptive."). Professors Korobkin and Ulen offer a series of legal reforms that
they claim flow from the premise that humans in general and legal actors in particular fall
prey systematically to decision-making heuristics and biases, see Korobkin& Ulen, supranote
4, at 1085-1102, 1104-26, as do Professors Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, see Jolls et al.,
supra note 9, at 1522-41; Sunstein, supranote 4, at 2. Professors Hanson and Kysar likewise
state that, "[u]ltimately, any legal concept that relies in some sense on a notion of
reasonableness or that is premised on the existence of a reasonable or rational decisionmaker
will need to be reassessed in light of the mounting evidence that a human is 'a reasoning
rather than a reasonable animal." Hanson & Kysar, Behavioralism I, supra note 1, at 634-35
(footnote omitted).
17. Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1545 ("Traditional law and economics is largely based on
the standard assumptions ofneoclassical economics. These assumptions are sometimes useful
but often false."); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1055-56 ("It follows that the analysis of
the incentive effects of legal rules based on such implausible behavioral assumptions cannot
possibly result in efficacious legal policy, at least not in all circumstances."); Rachlinski, New
Law & Psychology, supra note 9, at 740-41 ("This 'new' law and psychology promises a more
accurate description of human choice than the law otherwise has available, which in turn
should improve both positive and normative legal analysis."). Furthermore, behavioral
decision theory is offered to justify laws that may appear unjustified or inexplicable under a
more traditional economic analysis. Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1546 ("Behavioral economics
offers other sources of potential explanation-most prominently, perceptions of fairness. We
have tried to show that many laws which are seemingly inefficient and do not benefit powerful
interest groups may be explained on grounds ofjudgments about right and wrong."); Edward
J. McCaffrey, Cognitive Theory and Tax, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 4,
at 398, 399 ("My central theme is that cognitive biases can help explain major structural
features of our existing tax system that are otherwise difficult to understand, and that they
must be taken into account in developing any general normative theory of tax.").
18. See Gregory S. AlexanderA Cognitive Theory ofFiduciaryRelationships,85 CORNELL
L. REV. 767, 773 (2000) ("Legal analysis is particularly vulnerable to schemas and other
cognitive biases and heuristics."); Arlen, supra note 13, at 1766 ("Behavioral economic
analysis of law scholars argue that people do not behave consistently with rational choice
theory, and, moreover, that the deviations from rational behavior are systematic, not random.
Most people are likely to exhibit certain biases, they assert, and thus these deviations from

20021

TAKING BEHAVIORALISM TOO SERIOUSLY?

1919

rational choice do not cancel each other out.") (footnotes omitted); Richard Birke, Reconciling
Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209 n.9 (citing personal
communication with the late psychologist Amos Tversky for the proposition that all decision
makers are loss averse); id. at 246 n.132 (citing personal communication with legal decision
theorist Jeffrey Rachlinski for the proposition that criminal defendants are subject to the
same cognitive biases as everyone else); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognitionand
the Limits of Contract,47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 218 (1995) (noting that "within the last thirty
years cognitive psychology has established that real people use certain decisionmaking rules
(heuristics) that yield systematic errors, and that other aspects of actors' cognitive capabilities
are also systematically defective"); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance:Of
Risk, Duress, and Cognition,69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71,161 (1998) [hereinafter Garvin, Of Risk,
Duress,and Cognition] ("Cognitive psychology, dispelling the overly optimistic assumptions
of expected utility theory, thus shows that the promisee is unlikely to evaluate risk accurately
at the time of contracting, and will usually err on the side of underestimating infrequent
risk."); Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionalityand the Law of ConsequentialDamages: Default
Theory and CognitiveReality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339,343 (1998) [hereinafter Garvin, Cognitive
Reality] ("[W]e carry around a good many departures from rational choice theory. For
example, most people tend to undervalue remote risks; overvalue vivid data and undervalue
drab data; take risks to avoid loss, but avoid them to protect gains; and many others."); id. at
395-96 (asserting that cognitive biases and errors are present throughout the population and
occur systematically); Chris Guthrie et al., Insidethe JudicialMind, 86 CoRNELLL. REv. 777,
778 (2001) ("Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, their judgment is affected by
cognitive illusions that can produce systematic errors in judgment."); Stephen D. Hurd,
Introduction,51 VAND. L. REV. 1497,1497 (1998) ("Systematic behavioral deviations from the
predictions of standard economic theory are now well-established in the psychological
literature, making behavioral research an indispensable analytical tool for legal scholars.");
Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1477 ("Even when the use of mental shortcuts is rational, it can
produce predictable mistakes .... Actual judgments show systematic departures from models
of unbiased forecasts, and actual decisions often violate the axioms of expected utility
theory."); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1057 n.19 ("As we show below, the experimental
evidence establishes that the deviations are, indeed, systematic and not randomly distributed
around a (rational actor) mean."); id. at 1059 n.24 ("We posit in this Article that these
anomalies in other social science fields would have been found in empirical legal studies if
such studies were to occur."); id. at 1085 ("Research in the behavioral sciences has
demonstrated that individuals are systematically biased in their predictions of the probable
results of various events."); Langevoort, Ego & Law, supranote 9, at 884 ("Manifestations of
ego-sometimes amusing, other times frustrating, often intriguing-operate pervasively in
settings affected bylaw .... It is very likely.., that researchers will observe some systematic,
nontrivial bias in any settings that are subject to incomplete organizational or market-based
checks."); Rachlinski, New Law & Psychology, supra note 9, at 744 ("[Behavioral decision
theory] certainly suggests that all social institutions, including courts, legislatures, and
administrative agencies, will be subject to cognitive biases."); Cass R. Sunstein, Economics
& Real People, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 397, 398 (2000) ("It is now well-established, mostly through
the pioneering work of psychologists Daniel Kabneman and Amos Tversky, that people make
decisions on the basis of heuristic devices, or rules of thumb, that may work well in many
cases but that also lead to systematic errors. It is also well established that people suffer from
various biases and aversions that can lead to inaccurate perceptions."); Sunstein, supranote
9, at 206 ("Contrary to the conventional wisdom: Workers are especially averse to losses, and
not as much concerned with obtaining gains; ... [and] Workers may well suffer from excessive
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illustrate the general view expressed by legal decision theorists
regarding the pervasiveness of"cognitive illusions": "These cognitive
illusions-sometimes referred to as biases-are not limited to
the uneducated or unintelligent, and they are not readily capable
of being unlearned. Instead, they affect us all with uncanny
consistency and unflappable persistence."'
A reader of legal decision theory scholarship is hard-pressed to
find any clear, much less any theoretically driven, specification of
boundary conditions on the contention that legal judgment and
decision making are subject to numerous systematic defects.20
optimism .... "); see also supra note 15.

19. Hanson &KysarBehavioralismI,supranote 1, at 633 (footnotes omitted). The article
by Hanson and Kysar from which this quote is taken is replete with very pessimistic accounts
of human judgment and decision making of which the following comments are indicative:
[Tjhese biases [in human thinking] reveal a deep misunderstanding of the
nature of scientific judgment and a series of mental crutches awkwardly
constructed to take up the slack. Their cumulative effect is to impair our
appreciation of risk and uncertainty so severely that one commentator has
termed the condition probability blindness. Whether blind or just impaired,
people's sense of scientific and probabilistic judgment is inarguably of doubtful
acuity.
Id. at 645-46 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 662 ("Special attention must be given to the
subject of probabilistic judgment, for this is an area where researchers have uncovered a
veritable fool's gold mine of nonrational cognitive anomalies.") (footnote omitted); id. at 671
(noting that "individuals consistently fail to assess costs and benefits separately, as an
analytic approach to decisionmakingwouldrequire"); id. at 678 ("Both elasticjustification and
motivated reasoning capture ways in which individuals purport to justify' or 'reason through'
their beliefs and decisions, when in actuality their initial impulses have biased the process
all along.").
Later in this article, Hanson and Kysar contend that, even if cognitive illusions turn out
to be rare or unimportant on average, the possibility of firms manipulating consumer biases
makes the cognitive illusions important. Id. at 692-93 ("We will argue that even if cognitive
biases are comparatively rare and insignificant, they assume a special importance in the
consumer product context because consumers are rendered susceptible to bias manipulation
by marketers and manufacturers, however rare or isolated the consumer bias may be.")
(footnote omitted); id. at 747 ("Because individuals are subject to a host of nonrational yet
systematic cognitive phenomena, any party who has control over a decisionmaking context
can influence the perceptions of the decisionmaker."). Hanson and Kysar do not withdraw
their broad assumption of uniformity, pervasiveness, and systematicness in cognitive biases
that supposedly enables prediction by marketing manipulators (for instance, Hanson and
Kysar make no distinctions between types of consumers); they simply argue that even if the
frequency or severity of the biases is less than they contend, the biases still present
considerable opportunity for exploitation by marketers. See id. at 747-48 (offering examples
of marketers' exploitation of consumers).
20. Indeed, legal decision theorists rarely even define the central objects of their
scholarship, the concepts of judgment and decision making, except by example. See, eg.,
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Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismI, supra note 1, at 640-42 (discussing the concept of decision
making by way ofexample without explicit definition); id.at 645-46 (discussing "scientific and
probabilistic judgments" without an explicit definition); Rachlinski, Hindsight,supranote 9,
at 571 (providing examples of judgments made in hindsight but no formal definition).
For present purposes, "judgment" may be defined as the process of perceiving and
cognitivelyintegrating stimuli to form a global evaluation. See Robert P. Abelson &Ariel Levi,
Decision Making and Decision Theory, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra
note 14, at 231, 235 ("Individuals are constantly faced with the need to make judgments-to
combine information from a variety of sources into a global evaluation."); William M.
Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Decision Research:Some HistoricalContext,
in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS,

CONNECTIONS, AND

CONTROVERSIES 3,4 (William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (noting that one
central question in the studyofjudgment is "[hlow do people integrate multiple, probabilistic,
potentially conflicting cues to arrive at an understandingof the situation, ajudgment?"); id.
at 8-9 (describing how research on human judgment"examines people's responses to complex
and/or uncertain sets of information" and "emphasizes the psychological appraisal of
information").
"Decision" may be defined as the expression of a preferential choice. See Abelson & Levi,
supra,at 231 ("[W]e confine our definition of decision to cases in which individuals act in the
service of preferences'); Goldstein & Hogarth, supra,at 4-6 (describing decision research as
primarily the study of preferential choice or the study of the choice of preferred courses of
action). Within behavioral decision theory, "decision" and "choice" are typically treated as
synonymous terms: "A decision is a choice of action-of what to do or not do." JONATHAN
BARON, THINKINGAND DECIDING 6 (3d ed. 2000).
While some see the distinction between judgment and decision as artificial, with both
representing "a process of making a choice among several alternatives," Abelson & Levi,
supra,at 235 (citation omitted), others find the distinction useful because it focuses attention
on different aspects of the decision-making process: "[Rlesearch on judgment tends to focus
on what a person understands, believes, or feels, as opposed to what course of action a person
will choose." Goldstein & Hogarth, supra,at 9. Professors Einhorn and Hogarth note:
[FIrom a psychological viewpoint, it may be more accurate to say that while
judgment is generally an aid to choice, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for
choice. That is, judgments serve to reduce the uncertainty and conflict in choice
by processes of deliberative reasoning and evaluation of evidence. Moreover,
taking action engenders its own sources of conflict... so that judgment may only
take one so far; indeed, at the choice point, judgment can be ignored.
Hillel J. Einhorn & RobinM. Hogarth, BehavioralDecisionTheory: ProcessesofJudgmentand
Choice, 32 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 53, 73 (1981).
I see the distinction as helpful becausejudgments and decisions maybe complementary and
consistent, but not necessarily so. Thus, a juror forms a judgment about a criminal
defendant's guilt and then decides whether to vote for conviction or acquittal in light of this
judgment and other influences within the jury room that may overwhelm the juror's personal
judgment about guilt. Furthermore, the distinction is important because different biases and
errors have been found to be associated with judgments versus decisions.
The process of judgment and decision making involves the perceptual, inferential,
computational, and emotional processes that lead to a judgment about some aspect of the
world and the expression of a decision in the form of an outward statement or action or
internal commitment to a chosen course. See J.St.B.T. Evans et al-, Reasoning, decision
making and rationality,49 COGNITION 165, 165-66 (1993) (noting distinction drawn by some
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Even when legal decision theorists concede the point that surely not
all decision making is irrational, they counter with the assertion
that specific instances of legal decision making, however, will be
particularly prone to irrational tendencies-without clearly
explaining why this should be the case.2 '
This claim that cognitive biases and errors operate uniformly and
pervasively in the population is crucial to the legal decision theory
research program. By arguing pervasiveness, the legal decision
theorists assert the general import of their work and maximize their
comparative advantage relative to standard rational choice theorists
between reasoning processes and actual choices, but also noting that "[i]n real world
situations the distinction between reasoning and decisionmaking is blurred"); see also Philip
N. Johnson-Laird & Eldar Shafir, The InteractionBetween Reasoning and Decision Making:
An Introduction,49 COGNITION 1,1-2 (1993) (describing "folk psychology" distinctions between
reasoning and decision making and noting the "interdependence between reasoning and
decision making" and the "mutually recursive" relationship of the two); Arthur Lupia et al.,
Beyond Rationality:Reason and the Study of Politics,in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION,
CHOICE, AND THE BOUND OF RATIONAL=Y 1, 1 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) ("[Clhoiceis the
product of reason, where reason is the human process of seeking, processing, and drawing
inferences from information."); Lance J. Rips, Reasoning, 41 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 321, 321
(1990) ("Problem-solving, decision-making, learning, and social understanding all obviously
include reasoning. In fact, when we conceive of reasoning in this very general way, it seems
to encompass almost any process of forming or adjusting beliefs and is nearly synonymous
with cognition itself."); Karl Halvor Teigen, Commentay:Decision-Makingin Two Worlds, 65
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 249, 250 (1996) ("The functions of a
decision are to finish the period of vacillation and hesitation and to initiate a course of
action.").
An error may occur at some point in the underlying reasoning process or at the point at
which a judgment or decision is expressed. That is, an apparently erroneous choice may be
the result of faulty means-end reasoning or a mistake in choosing between options when
trying to express a preference or belief. Cf. Robert T. Clemen, Does Decision Analysis Work?
1 (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("Decision analysts are quick to
point out the distinction between decision process and decision outcome, and that even the
best decision process can be derailed by an unlucky outcome.") (citation omitted).
21. See Korbokin & Ulen, supranote 4, at 1085 ("But whether or not the well-documented
collection of heuristics and biases are rational adaptations in a global sense, they have the
consequence of causing actors to make decisions that violate the predictions of rational choice
theory in individual circumstances."). Professors Korobkin and Ulen also state:
Our contention that traditional conceptions of rational choice theory are flawed
in important ways does not suggest that we believe people are "irrational." Most
of the observed deviations from behavior predicted by rational choice theory are
quite sensible and understandable, and many seem quite rational in a "global"
sense, although they result in behavior that violates the predictions of rational
choice theory on the more "local" level on which legal scholarship generally
operates.
Id. at 1144.
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who do not assume pervasive information-processing and decisional

errors. By arguing that errors are systematic and uniform rather
than randomly distributed performance errors-and thus, by
implication, that there is predictability in the flawed ways of the
legal decision maker-legal decision theorists assert that this
erroneous behavior can be modeled and taken into account in the
formation and reformation of the law.2 2
The claim of uniform and widespread irrational behaviors flows
from the legal decision theorists' reading of the psychological
literature to say that all judgment and decision making involves
a set of basic but flawed psychological processes.23 Bias in
22. E.g., Hanson & Kysar, Behavioralism I, supra note 1, at 637 (noting that "the
predictability of biases makes them easy to assimilate into economic models"); Jolls et al.,
supra note 9, at 1545 ("Most of these bounds [on rationality] can be and have been made part
of formal models."). By arguing pervasiveness and systematicness in cognitive biases, and
hence, in judgment and decision errors, the legal decision theorists also attempt to avoid or
rebut the claim of economists that cognitive errors will be distributed randomly throughout
the population and thus will, on average, be corrected by the market. See, e.g., Garvin,
Cognitive Reality, supra note 18, at 395-96 (arguing that such a claim by economists lacks
substance because cognitive errors are systematic and pervasive and thus lead to shifts in the
mean result within distributions); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, MandatoryDisclosure:A
BehavioralAnalysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1035 n.54 (2000) ("It is the systematic nature
of these biases that is critical. Standard economic analysis recognizes that individual decision
makers may depart from rationality, but assumes that such departures come out in the
wash-they cancel each other out so that the average or equilibrium behavior of large groups
will be consistent with rational choice. By asserting that decision makers exhibit systematic
biases, behavioral economics denies that claim.") (citation omitted); Garvin, OfRisk, Duress,
and Cognition,supranote 18, at 163 (arguing that, "[w]hereas random errors may wash out
[in the market], systematic errors probably will not; accordingly, one can model collective
behavior better by using cognitive analysis").
23. See, eg., Korobkin, supra note 6, at 44 ("A variety of heuristics and biases cause
individuals to take actions that do not necessarily maximize their expected utility."); Donald
C. Langevoort, OrganizedIllusions.A BehavioralTheory of Why CorporationsMislead Stock
MarketInvestors (andCauseOtherSocialHarms), in BEHAVIORALLAWAND ECONOMICS, supra
note 4, at 147 ("A well-documented tendency of people who must operate in noisy
informational environments is to adopt heuristic forms of thought. Busy executives process
extraordinarily large amounts of information in both making decisions and deciding what
matters deserve further time and attention. Such processing must necessarily be simplified,
sometimes oversimplified, to make the information manageable, lest the executive be
overwhelmed by data and paralyzed by ambiguity."); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and
Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61 (2000) ("The human
brain is extremely efficient, but it is not a computer. The brain has a limited ability to process
information but must manage a complex array of stimuli. In response to its natural
constraints the brain uses shortcuts that allow it to perform well under most circumstances.
Reliance on these shortcuts, however, leaves people susceptible to all manner of illusions:
visual, mnemonic, and judgmental.") (footnotes omitted); Sunstein, supranote 4, at 3 ("It is
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now well established that people make decisions on the basis of heuristic devices, or rules of
thumb, that may work well in many cases but that also lead to systematic errors.").
An alternative explanation for deviations from perfect rationality is that humans are
capable only of "bounded rationality" due to limited cognitive capacities in the face of
numerous environmental demands. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Alternative Visions of
Rationality,in RATIONAITry IN ACTION: CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 198 (Paul K. Moser ed.,
1990). The cognitive psychologist Steven Sloman compares the bounded rationality view to
that of the imperfect-psychological-process, or "natural assessment methods," view:
Two complementary views of the reason we find systematic error can be
distinguished. The older view, made popular by the seminal work of Herbert
Simon, is commonly referred to as bounded rationality.The idea is that people
make errors because they operate with limited cognitive resources. Our shortterm memories have limited capacity-, we can perform only a limited number of
operations at any time; we have limited energy, indeed, we are limited in every
way. However, many of the problems that confront us are enormously difficult
computationally and sometimes impossible.
... In the early 1970s, the work of Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
made popular a second view of the determinants of systematic error. They
argued that people make errors because they make judgments and decisions
using heuristics (rules of thumb) that are quick and easy for people and that
usually provide reasonable. and adequate answers but fail under particular
conditions. The heuristics they posit draw on the strengths of the human
cognitive machinery, and therefore they refer to these heuristics as natural
assessment methods.
The main difference between the two views of error has to do with the
rationality of the process people are understood to be using when making
judgments. Bounded rationality assumes that people are using a rational
inference procedure; they are just limited in their ability to fully exploit it.
The natural assessment approach assumes that people are using an
arational procedure that approximates rational inference. ... [Elvidence
exists suggesting that people think in different ways, using both rational and
heuristic procedures. Given this multiplicity of thought, the two views of
error are complementary. Bounded rationality explains error in situations in
which people are using a rational procedure, and the natural assessment
approach explains why people also use procedures other than rational ones.
Steven A. Sloman, Rational versus Arational Models of Thought, in THE NATURE OF
COGNITIoN 573, 575-76 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999).
Some legal decision theorists, and some psychologists, at times conflate these two accounts
of error. Compare Korbokin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1075-76 (characterizing bounded
rationality as consisting of intentional trade-offs between costs and benefits of full
information-processing using normative decision rules), with id. at 1069, 1076 (equating
bounded rationality with the unintentional use of cognitive heuristics). See also Korobkin,
supra note 6, at 44 (equating the heuristic and bias view of error with bounded rationality);
Douglas L. Medin & Max H. Bazerman, BroadeningBehavioralDecisionResearch. Multiple
Levels of Cognitive Processing, 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & Rav. 533, 534 (1999) (equating
Simon's bounded rationality view with the cognitive heuristics view). The two perspectives
may, however, lead to different predictions. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein,
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judgment, particularly judgments made under conditions of
uncertainty, supposedly arises from over-reliance on "a limited
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental
operations."'
The heuristics most often cited in this respect are:
representativeness, whereby "the likelihood of an event is
evaluated by the degree to which it is representative of the
major characteristics of the process or population from which it
originated"; availabilitywhich refers to the tendency of subjects
to "assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event
by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought
to mind"; and anchoringandadjustment,which refers to the use
of an initial value (operating as an "anchor") of subjects'
estimations which is adjusted to yield the final answers; the
effect of anchoring is proposed to create insufficient
adjustment."
Thus, rather than mentally applying rules of probability theory,
causal afialysis, or logic to resolve the uncertainties necessary to
form a judgment, people are said to rely on these simpler mental
operations, or cognitive heuristics, to reach their conclusions. While
use of these shortcuts can yield acceptable results,26 overReasoning the FastandFrugalWay: Models ofBounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 650,
651 (1996) (distinguishing bounded rationality from the heuristics and biases approach). For
instance, a proponent of the bounded rationalityview might predict that persons with greater
computational capacity (for example, greater workingmemory capacity) would exhibit greater
rationality, whereas a proponent of the heuristic view would likely predict more prevalent
operation of automatic heuristics leading to biases across persons and situations.
24. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalmeman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURlsIcs AND BIASEs 3 (Daniel Kalneman et
al. eds., 1982).
25. Dina Berkeley & Patrick Humphreys, Structuring Decision Problems and the "Bias
Heuristic," 50 AC'rA PsYcHOLoGICA 201, 235-36 (1982) (citations omitted). The psychologist
Max Bazerman classifies eleven of the most common judgmental biases identified by
behavioral decision researchers as arising from the operation of the representativeness,
availability, and anchoring/adjustment heuristics. See MAX BAZERMAX, JUDGmENT IN
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKIG 39-40 tbl. 2.2 (4th ed. 1998).
26. See, e.g., PLOUS, supra note 14, at 109 ("Normally, heuristics yield fairly good
estimates. The disadvantage of using heuristics, however, is that there are certain instances
in which they lead to systematic biases (i.e., deviations from normatively derived answers).");
Arkes, supra note 14, at 486 ("My goal is to show that the costs of otherwise beneficial
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reliance on or unthinking use of heuristics biases judgment and
leads to error, because the heuristic processing device fails to take
account of some important consideration in the stimulus
environment, overemphasizes some stimuli, attends to irrelevant
stimuli, or skips an important computational step necessary to
perform in accordance with normative principles.'
Decisional errors, particularly the expression of seemingly
inconsistent preferences under conditions of risk or uncertainty
where the decision maker's subjective utility or subjective
probability estimates are involved, are seen as arising from the
"constructive" nature of preference and choice: "[Plreferences for
and beliefs about objects or events of any complexity are often
constructed-not merely revealed-in the generation of a response

cognitive adaptations are the consequence of appropriate responses to environmental
demands.").
27. Distinctions are sometimes drawn between biases arising from cognitive versus
motivational sources. See, e.g., Lee Ross & CraigA. Anderson, Shortcomings in theAttribution
Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT
UNDERUNCERTAXNTY: HEURISTCSANDBIASES,supra note 24, at 129,134-35. Motivated biases
involve an effort to protect one's self-image or existing beliefs, theories, or goals, whereas
cognitive biases involve the flawed operation of cognitive processes without any presumed
directional or self-serving goal. Although cognitive heuristics giving rise to cognitive biases
have received a great deal of attention within behavioral and legal decision theory, biases
arising from motivational sources represent an important origin ofjudgmental error as well.
See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Casefor Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,493 (1990)
("The position that all self-serving biases are due to purely cognitive processes is ... no longer
tenable.... [Uinder the current state of knowledge, the motivational account appears to be
more parsimonious and coherent than the purely cognitive one.") (citation omitted); id. at 495
("Although the mechanisms underlying motivated reasoning are not yet fully understood, it
is now clear that directional goals do affect reasoning."); Medin & Bazerman, supra note 23,
at 535 ("In its early years, [behavioral decision research] focused almost exclusively on
cognitive errors, or errors that have their roots in how we process information. ... Starting
in the late 1980s, research emerged that suggested errors that we make as a result of
motivational biases."); see also Guthrie, supra note 15, at 61-62 ("When confronted with
difficult litigation decisions, like whether to settle a case or go forward with trial, litigants will
likely number-crunch, calculate, and value-maximize ... but they will also feel a range of
actual and prospective emotion that they will incorporate into their decision making. Legal
scholars seeking to understand, describe, and perhaps even modify litigation behavior need
not abandon their elegant, 'calculating theories,' but they need to couple them with richer
theories that take the reality-not just the rationality-of human beings into account.");
Langevoort, Ego & Law, supra note 9, at 856 ("[Motivated biases in cognitive processing
allow individuals unconsciously to distort reality about themselves, substituting a set of
typically healthy illusions-a form of self-deception-to protect the ego from external threats
that might otherwise diminish the functional sense of self-efficacy.") (footnote omitted).
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to a judgment or choice task."' Because people do not have a tidy
rank ordering of stable preferences in their heads ready for access
in any given situation but instead often must form a preference
given the information at their disposal in the choice situation,
preference formation is susceptible to transitory influences that
cause choices to appear contradictory across time and situations.
Thus, elements of the decision situation that are normatively
irrelevant under rational choice theory (for example, whether a
choice is phrased in terms of monetary loss or gain should be
irrelevant because decision makers should evaluate choices in
terms of overall wealth) may be psychologically significant and lead
to differences in choices (for example, one of the most prominent
findings in behavioral decision research is that the framing of a
choice as a loss or a gain can affect choices).29 In short, "[p]references appear to be remarkably labile, sensitive to the way a choice
problem is described or 'framed' and to the mode of response used to
express the preference." 0 This "notion of constructive preferences
means as well that preferences are not necessarily generated by
some consistent and invariant algorithm such as expected value
calculation. It appears that decision makers have a repertoire of
methods31 for identifying their preferences and developing their
beliefs."
28. John W. Payne et al., Behavioral Decision Research. A Constructive Processing
Perspective, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 87,89 (1992) (citation omitted); see also Rachlinski, New
Law & Psychology, supra note 9, at 752 (noting that "people do not possess a fixed set of
preferences that they seek to satisfrwith their choices, as economic models usually assume").
This "constructed preferences" view differs sharply from the standard economic view of
preferences, which holds that "preferences are predetermined in any choice situation[ and
do not depend on what alternatives are available." Daniel McFadden, Economic Choices, 91
AM. ECON. REv. 351,356 (2001).

29. See generally Daniel Kabneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMEs 1, 1-16 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000)

(providing an overview of their seminal research into the effects of decision frames on choices);
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision underRisk, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra, at 17-43 (describing prospect theory, a descriptive
theory of choice under risk where the number of possible outcomes is small); Amos Tversky
&Daniel Kahneman, Advances in ProspectTheory: CumulativeRepresentationofUncertainty,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra,at 44-65 (describing an extension of prospect theory
to risky choices with any number of outcomes and situations involving uncertainty).
30. Paul Slovic, The ConstructionofPreference, 50 AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 364, 365 (1995)
(citations omitted).
31. Payne et al., supranote 28, at 89 (citation omitted).
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In sum, legal decision theorists share the common goal of greatly
qualifying, if not tearing down, the rational behavior assumption
that undergirds the economic analysis of law and replacing it with
what they contend is a more realistic or more descriptively accurate
account of judgment and decision making. 2 This "new scholarship
in law based on behavioral science""a essentially would replace the
"economic miser" metaphor of human behavior with a "cognitive
miser" metaphor. 4 Under this latter view, the economic miser is
32. Professor Jolls notes, for instance, that "[blehavioral law and economics is not a
critique of law and economics .... Its goal is to offer better predictions and prescriptions about
law based on improved accounts of how people actually behave." Jolls, supranote 4, at 1654;
see alsoKorobkin & Ulen, supranote 4, at 1144 ("[We do not argue that the edifice of rational
choice theory, which underlies so much of legal scholarship, be ripped down. Rather, we
suggest that it be revised, paying heed to important flaws in its structure that unduly and
unnecessarily limit the development of a more nuanced understanding of how law affects
society."); Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing PainsofBehavioralLaw and Economics, 51 VAND.
L. REv. 1747, 1748 (1998) ("Behavioral law and economics does not attempt to undo any of the
remarkable accomplishments of law and economics. Rather, it is an attempt to refine.").
33. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1058 n.24. As indicated above in footnote 9, this
"new" scholarship is not particularly new in actuality, but the level of attention presently
being paid to the scholarship is new. As suggested by Professor Langevoort, legal decision
theory's qualifications to the economic analysis of law are a natural result of behavioral
decision theory's qualifications to the economic model of rationality, because legal decision
theory is an outgrowth of behavioral decision theory. See Langevoort, LiteratureReview, supra
note 9, at 1500-02 (discussing the diffusion of behavioral decision theory into legal
scholarship); cf. Amartya K Sen, RationalFools:A Critiqueof the BehavioralFoundationsof
Economic Theory, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 25-43 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (surveying
economists' own long-standing unease with and concern about the foundations of the economic
theory of rationality).
34. The social psychologists Shelley Taylor and Susan Fiske coined the "cognitive miser"
term to portray human decision making as a compromise between accuracy and efficiency
demands necessitated by the considerable time constraints and stimulus complexity
confronting decision makers. See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL
COGNITION 11-12 (1984) ("One name for this is the cognitive miser model. The idea is that
people are limited in their capacity to process information, so they take shortcuts whenever
they can."). The cognitive miser metaphor
is an extension of approaches in cognitive psychology and decision making that
regard human information-processing as generally adaptive but nevertheless
prone to systematic error. According to this view, social judgments and decisions
are guided by a range of heuristics and biases that serve to render the judgment
situation manageable but which also introduce error unintentionally.
Russell Spears & S. Alexander Haslam, Stereotyping and the Burden of Cognitive Load, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STEREOTYPING AND GROUP LIFE 172 (Russell Spears et al. eds.,
1997) (citations omitted). The cognitive miser metaphor is not meant to be entirely pejorative,
because use of heuristic thought devices is often considered adaptive, but one cannot help but
be left with something of a negative impression on reading the phrase given the negative
connotations associated with the term "miser." As the psychologist Peter Suedfeld quips,
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often too myopic, biased, and error-prone to achieve his or her own
selfish goals. Reconceiving people as cognitive misers rather than
economic misers leads to a very different conception of how people
should be treated under the law, with cognitive misers generally
due less responsibility and autonomy and in need of greater
oversight, control, and assistance. 35
B. The Need for GreaterScrutiny of Legal Decision Theory
The conception of the legal actor as predictably irrational urged
by legal decision theorists deserves strict scrutiny not simply as a
matter of knowledge growth and intellectual exchange but also
because the controls on the use of legal decision theory scholarship
as persuasive authority are weak (particularly when the work is
published in non-peer-reviewed journals), whereas the stakes
associated with the use of this scholarship as the basis for judicial,
legislative, and administrative decisions may be very high.36
Unlike other fields where formal peer review serves a gatekeeping function, 7 there are relatively few peer-reviewed legal
within much of psychology "the rational actor has been demoted to a cognitive klutz." Peter
Suedfeld, Cognitive Managersand Their Critics,13 PoL. PSYCHOL. 435, 436 (1992).
35. See Jolls et al., supranote 9, at 1541 ("In its normative orientation,conventionallaw
and economics is often strongly antipaternalistic....[Blounded rationalitypushes toward a
sort of anti-antipaternalism-askepticism about antipaternalism, but not an affirmative
defense ofpaternalism.We also note.., that while bounded rationality may increase the need
for law (if government's failings are less serious than citizens'), bounded self-interest may
reduce it, by creating norms that solve collective action problems even without government
intervention.") (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); Sunstein, supra note 9, at 271 ("Contrary
to the reflexive antipaternalism of many lawyers and economists, workers are likely to have
difficulty in deciding whether to waive their rights, and hence the case for nonwaivable terms,
defended in behavioral terms, is far more plausible than it appears when defended in terms
of simple redistribution.").
36. Cf. Vladimir J. Konetni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity ofResearch in Legal
Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 40 (1979) ("Research in applied disciplines must be
concerned with issues of external validity and generalizability to an unusually high degree.
The criteria for what is a good experiment, when a certain methodology appears sound, and
which results are to be trusted, must necessarily be different and more stringent when
sweeping, costly, and far-reaching changes in public policy and-quite literally in the legal
domain-people's futures and lives, depend on inferences from research results.").
37. See Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy for
Regulatory Decisionmaking,59 U. Prirr. L. REV. 677,693 (1998) ("Peer review, in its broadest
sense, represents the scientific community's effort to police itself and to assure a certain
minimum level of quality so that scieitists and others can rely on the results of reported
scientific research. Any claim that would significantly add to or change the body of scientific
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journals, 8 and the persons accepting and editing articles that
present empirical data or that make claims about empirical
research often have little expertise in, or specialized knowledge
about, the area of inquiry. 9 Other than the informal peer review
that may occur before submission of an article and may be
knowledge is regarded skeptically until it has been subjected to some form of peer scrutiny.")
(footnote omitted); id. at 693-709 (discussing the benefits and shortcomings of the peer review
process); id. at 709 (concluding that "[n]otwithstanding its various shortcomings, editorial
peer review serves a valuable purpose in the publication of scientific research"). But
see Robert J. MacCoun, Biasesin theInterpretationand Use ofResearchResults, 49 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 259, 277-78 (1998) (discussing how peer review may be unreliable and may fail to
serve as an effective screening device and thus should be used in conjunction with other
review and screening devices, such as replication and meta-analysis); Peter J. Spiro,
Globablization,InternationalLaw, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 567, 589
(2000) ("Publication decisions at the law journals are made by student editors; for all the
shortcomings of this system (it is ridiculed in other disciplines) it does eliminate the censoring
possibilities of the peer-review standard found elsewhere.").
38. See Edward J. Conry & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, Meta-Jurisprudence:A Paradigmfor
Legal Studies, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 691, 723 n.169 (1996) ("The American Business Law Journal
is one of the handful of law reviews that employs peer review, blind refereeing, and doubleblind refereeing."); Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment,
76 CHI.-KENT L. RFv. 349, 376 (2000) ('The discipline of law is unique among academic
disciplines in that its professional journals are governed mostly by student-run law review
boards, and with a few exceptions, submissions are not subject to the process of peer review,
or even faculty oversight.") (footnotes omitted).
Although a few student-edited legal journals do regularly employ peer review (e.g., Yale
Journalof Health Policy, Law and Ethics) and some will occasionally seek peer review, it
should not be assumed that all faculty-edited legal journals uniformly employ formal peer
review, blind or otherwise. For example, Professor Epstein has stated that during his tenure
as editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, he did not always seek a referee's opinion on
submissions. Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-EditedLaw Journals,70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 87, 90
(1994) ("In general therefore, my practice was to take the papers I liked, reject the ones I did
not, and to ask for referees' opinions on those on which I could not quite make up my mind.").
39. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of
Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 672 (1996) ("We have already seen that the current law
review system operates with minimal quality control in the generally accepted ('peer review')
sense of that term: there are still very few faculty-edited law journals, and it is at least
questionable whether the second- and third-year editors of the student-run reviews can
consistently make accurate qualitative (as opposed to institutionally, reputationally, or
stylistically related) judgments about submissions other than those dealing with the most
familiar subjects or offering the most familiar (e.g. doctrinal) brands of legal analysis.");
James Lindgren, An Author's Manifesto, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 527, 527 (1994) ("[Law review
editors] often select articles without knowing the subject, without knowing the scholarly
literature, without understanding what the manuscript says, without consulting expert
referees, and without doing blind reads."). This concern applies equally to faculty- and
student-edited journals that do not seek review of submissions from referees with expertise
in psychology or behavioral economics.
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inadequate for a variety of reasons,' an adversarial model of
competing scholarship akin to the "truth-finding" model applied to
American trials is perhaps the best external check on validity
currently available. 4 '
Furthermore, once an article enters the marketplace of legal
ideas, it may be used by persons motivated to extend a scholarly
thesis beyond its intended scope or consumed by persons who
possess little or none of the information or knowledge necessary to
40. Professor Austin rejects informal review of articles by colleagues before submission
to law reviews (or "vetting") as an adequate substitute for formal peer review and notes that
public vetting may in fact be detrimental:
The commentary exchanged in the standard peer review process is an influential
voice in the publication decision and thus is detailed, critical, and seen by both
writer and editor. Whether law review vetting is probing, irrelevant garbage, or
a perfunctory pat on the head by an old friend, makes no difference since the
editor never sees anything-except a list of the names of alleged vetters. Editors
can be misled into assuming that public vetting is traditional peer review and
consequently the piece has been given careful scrutiny. Perhaps editors should
adopt the policy of having authors furnish their vetters' commentary. Along list
of vetters-often as many as twenty or thirty-implicitly gives the impression
of approval, thus puttingmore pressure on the review to accept. Vetting attracts
more attention than footnote density. Moreover, if a well known scholar is listed
as a vetter, what editor wants to reject the article and take a chance on
antagonizing someone into not submitting an article in the future?
Arthur D. Austin, The 'Custom of Vetting' as a Substitute for PeerReview, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
1, 6-7 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
Nor can we count on internal checks on quality control and researcher bias to ensure sound,
fair-minded scholarship. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Liberal and
Conservative Approaches to Justice: Conflicting PsychologicalPortraits,in PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON JusTIcE 234, 234-55 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathon Baron eds., 1993)
(discussing how ideological tunnel vision and initial assumptions about human behavior may
have biased the social-psychological study of lay conceptions of justice). For a discussion of
researcher biases that may make self-scrutiny an inadequate control in the scientific process
see MacCoun, supra note 37, at 267-75.
41. Professor Richard Lempert's close examination of an empirical psychological study
published in the Arizona Law Review illustrates both the dangers of the publication of
empirical research in law reviews and the way in which the present system of legal
scholarship should work in the absence of formal peer review. See Richard Lempert, Juries,
Hindsight,and Punitive DamageAwards: Failuresof a Social Science Case for Change, 48
DEPAuL L. REV. 867 (1999) (critiquing Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What JuriesCan't Do
Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 AIM. L. REV. 901 (1998)). Professor
Lempert's hope was that his commentarywould"substitute in some degree for the peer review
that a study like this would ordinarily receive." Id. at 869 (footnote omitted). For another
example of peer review occurring after publication see Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and
Benefits of Letting JuriesPunish Corporations:Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821
(2000) (commenting on W. Kip Viscusi, CorporateRisk Analysis:A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 547 (2000)).
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examine the article critically." Therefore, for the marketplace of
ideas to function efficiently, consumers need to be given choices
among competing and complementary viewpoints to combat
informational asymmetries and motivated misuses of ideas and
research.
It is not simply a matter of speculation that legal decision
theorists' arguments about the lack of rationality in legal decisions
may be used in support of efforts to influence verdicts, restrict the
role of juries, alter burdens of proof and persuasion, change
substantive legal rights, and set caps on damages.' Indeed, whereas
42. See David L. Suggs, The Use ofPsychologicalResearch by the Judiciary:Do the Courts
Adequately Assess the Validity of the Research?, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 135 (1979) (discussing
the lack of systematic mechanisms in place to test the internal and external validity of
research used by judiciaries and legislatures); see also Robert Rosenthal & Peter David
Blanck, Science and Ethics in Conducting,Analyzing, and ReportingSocialScience Research:
Implicationsfor Social Scientists, Judges, and Lawyers, 68 IND. L.J. 1209, 1211 (1993) ("In
the context of an adversarial process, the problem is that the poorly designed study is likely
to lead to unwarranted and inaccurate conclusions by a fact finder.").
Professor Lempert notes, for example, that Exxon Corporation, which has sponsored
experimental research that supposedly reveals biases in civil juries when setting punitive
damages and which, of course, was subject to averylarge punitive damages verdict as a result
of its Alaskan oil spill, may reasonably be expected to "seek to disseminate the authors'
apparent findings and their conclusions in judicial and political arenas where they will help
to make the case against jury awards of punitive damages." Lempert, supra note 41, at 869;
see also id. at 871 n.16 ("[I]t appears that Exxon is making a concerted effort to build a social
science case for reducing or taking away the jury's discretion in awarding punitive damages
and that the Hastie and Viscusi study is a part of this effort.... Indeed, Exxon has recently
cited the above research in its appeal of the $5.3 billion Exxon Valdez award.") (citation
omitted). For further discussion of Exxon's funding and use of punitive damages research see
Neil Vidmar, JuriesDon't Make Legal Decisions!And OtherProblems:A Critiqueof Hastie et
al. on PunitiveDamages, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 713 (1999); see also Elizabeth Amon,
Exxon bankrolls criticsofpunitives, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1999, at Al, A6. For a reply to the
just-referenced Vidmar article, see Reid Hastie et al., Reply to Vidmar, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 715 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological
Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 481 (1987) ("For a price,
professional psychologists are available to advise lawyers on all aspects of trial advocacy
including what to say, where to stand, how to select a jury, when to object, and what clothes
to wear.") (footnote omitted); J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through
Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration,66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 742 (1988)
(responding to Professor Gold's article and seeking to justify the use of psychological research
on alleged juror bias by claiming that "[t]his collaborative process of identifying
existing barriers to rational decision making and devising strategies to reduce their impact
has improved the chances that juries will understand and consider eachlitigant's case without
bias"); see also, e.g., Richard Lempert, Why Do JuriesGet a Bum Rap?Reflections on the Work
of Valerie Hans,48 DEPAUL L. RaV. 453, 458-59 (1998) ("[Ihe Exxon Corporation, following
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legal decision theorists generally express caution about their
endeavor and note the preliminary nature of much of their work,'
in some areas they seem already to have persuaded themselves of
the correctness of their views and thus have endorsed specific legal
reforms based on their conclusions. 5 Some courts have already
the $5 billion punitive damage verdict against it in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case invested
substantial sums in a series of studies designed to show that juries cannot competently and
fairly set punitive damages. One would not expect them to be less shy about investing in
judicial elections if the demise of the jury system meant more was at stake.") (footnote
omitted). See generally PSYCHOLOGY AND SoCIAL ADVOCACY (Peter Suedfeld & Philip E.
Tetlock eds., 1991) (collecting essays debating the relevance and propriety of the use of
psychological research in various public policy arenas).
Although L. J. Cohen's statement that "[tihe epistemological legitimacy of our liberaldemocratic institutions may... be seen to stand or fall with belief in the inherent rationality
of ordinary people," may sound alarmist to some, his broader observation that "[q]uite a lot
is at stake here" at least seems true, particularly when the rationality debate enters the legal
arena as it does in legal decision theory. L. Jonathan Cohen, Can IrrationalityBe Discussed
Accurately?, 7 BEHAv. &BRAIN SCI. 736,737 (1984); see also Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Benefits
of Legal Psychology: Possibilities,Practiceand Dilemmas, 79 BRIr. J. PSYCHOL. 417, 436
(1988) ("Like it or not, and however they characterize their work, psychologists who work on
legal topics enter a sphere of societal and personal values. As psychologists increase their
influence on law, legal decisions and legal policy, ethical questions loom larger. Research and
practice in legal psychology frequently raises questions of legal ethics, as well as ethical
dilemmas within psychology.").
44. Legal decision theorists generallyexpress caution in the introductions and conclusions
of their articles, often with respect to policy arguments, but seem to abandon this caution at
other points in the same articles and particularly with respect to empirical claims, making
at times very broad, unqualified statements about the scope of research findings. Compare
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1144 ("We present none of these policy implications as
definitive solutions to legal problems. Rather, they are offered as stakes in the ground that,
we hope will serve as starting points for a new generation of legal scholarship...."), with id.
at 1057 n.19 ("As we show below, the experimental evidence establishes that the deviations
are, indeed, systematic and not randomly distributed around a (rational actor) mean."), and
id. at 1086 ("The pervasiveness of the representativeness heuristic can help justify a set of
rules of evidence law frustrating to rational choice theory."). See Sunstein, supra note 9, at
206-07 ("T]raditional understandings of employee behavior and employment law make many
blunders, because they are based on an inadequate sense of workers' actual values and
behavior.... In short, workers are like most people. They behave like homo sapiens, not like
homo economicus.") (footnote omitted); id. at 273 ("Much of my argument here has been for
a degree of agnosticism with respect to positive issues (what people do) and normative issues
(what the law should do). Much more work is necessary on both sorts of issues."). Perhaps, as
the psychologist Phoebe Ellsworth suggests, such exaggeration or exuberance is par for the
course in empirical research generally;, see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Sticks and Stones, 23 LAW
& Hum. BEHAV. 719, 720 (1999) ("Every empirical study has flaws. Almost every author
exaggerates the significance of the problem studied, overstates the implications of the results,
or both."). But of course, compliance with a bad professional norm is not a good justification
for the practice.
45. Perhaps most common have been arguments for legal reforms to address the hindsight
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bias to which jurors are assumed to fall prey when assessing tort liability. See Philip G.
Peters, Jr., HindsightBias and Tort Liability:Avoiding PrematureConclusions,31 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1277, 1289-92 (1999) (surveying various reform proposals advanced by legal decision
theorists and others to counteract an alleged hindsight bias in legaljudgment); see also Arlen,
supra note 13, at 1768 n.11 (citing "[e]fforts to use behavioral analysis as the basis of
normative policy conclusions"). The hindsight bias "refers to the tendency to overestimate the
degree to which one would have been able to predict the outcome of an event or the answer
to a question after one has received feedback about one's prediction or after the event has
occurred." Elizabeth Creyer & William T. Ross, Jr., HindsightBias and Inferences in Choice:
The Mediating Effect of Cognitive Effort, 55 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 61, 61 (1993) (citation omitted); see Ralph Hertwig et al., The Reiteration Effect
in Hindsight Bias, 104 PSYCHOL. REv. 194, 195 (1997) (describing "hindsight bias" as
occurring with respect to memory judgments and the related "knew-it-all-along effect" as
occurring with respect to hypothetical judgments of pre-feedback confidence); id. at 201
(distinguishing further the hindsight bias from the knew-it-all-along effect).
While a few studies report hindsight bias inmockjurors who express individual judgments,
e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post - Ex Ante: Determining Liability in
Hindsight, 19 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 89,99-101 (1995) (noting that though the effect may have
been exacerbated by the manner in which the experiment was performed, researchers did find
evidence suggesting a hindsight bias in some of mock jurors'judgments), there has been little
or no demonstration that mock juries (i.e., jurors making group decisions) evince the bias. Id.
at 100 ("[A]t present the effects of group deliberation on the hindsight bias are unknown").
There are a number of reasons to believe that individual juror judgments may not be identical
tojury judgments. See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: ComparingIndividuals
and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 690 (1996) ("It is not the case ... that groups tend
generally to be more biased than individuals for one type of bias, but less biased for another.");
id. at 713 ("The central question of this paper has been, Thich is more likely to make a biased
judgment, individuals or groups?' Our overview of the relatively small and diverse empirical
literature suggested that there was no simple empirical answer to this question. Even when
we restrict our attention to particular bias phenomena (e.g., framing effects, preference
reversals), there was frequently little consistency in the direction (i.e., sign) and magnitude
of observed relative bias, RB."); John M. Levine et al., Social Foundationsof Cognition, 44
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 600-03 (1993) (discussing how group processes may cause "joint
cognitions" to differ from individual cognitions); see also John C. Brigham & Adina W.
Wasserman, The Impact ofRace, Racial Attitudes, and Gender on Reactions to the Criminal
TrialofO. J. Simpson, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1333 (1999) (illustrating that the details
of a specific case and the race of the observers may be very important to the operation of the
hindsight bias). In fact, though the hindsight bias has rarely been examined in group settings,
one reported study found some attenuation of the hindsight bias in group judgments as
compared to individual judgments under certain circumstances, see Dagmar Stahlberg et al.,
We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 46, 56 (1995) (reporting that groups were as susceptible to hindsight
bias as individuals in some circumstances but that group deliberation attenuated the effect
in other circumstances), but one could argue that a group judgment may show an even greater
hindsight bias than individual judgment in some other circumstances, cf. David Schkade et
al., DeliberatingAbout Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLM. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (2000)
(finding a "severity shift" in mock juries' punitive damage awards as compared to an
averaging of individual jurors' awards). But see James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size
and ProceduralInfluence on Consensual Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage
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endorsed claims made by legal decision theorists.' Despite the
serious implications of the legal decision theorists' contentions, their
work has received little careful scrutiny and even less criticism.' 7
Awards and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 714 (1997) (finding that
deliberating "groups awarded less than preferred by parallel individuals working alone,
although this difference was only marginally significant").
In the end, whether group decisionmaling will show greater or less sensitivity to a
supposed bias or error found in individual jurors will depend on the facts of the case, the
manner in which the case is presented, the specific composition of the jury, and a host of other
possible situational influences. See Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs Bias in Juries:
New Evidence from the SDS Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION

PROCESSES 70, 82 (1999) ("For the jury, our findings confirm what is evident in the empirical
record-that there is probably no general answer to the question 'which is more biased, jurors
or juries?' The answer to this question must be it depends.') (citation omitted); Peters, supra,
at 1303 ("[Tihe jury's group deliberations have a debiasing potential that warrants serious
study"). As of now, we just do not know whether the hindsight bias shown by some individual
mock jurors translates consistently into a hindsight bias in the decisions of mock and/or real
juries on ultimate questions of liability and damages.
46. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 12, at 218 & n.21 (citing cases where courts
seem to be relying on certain legal decision theory arguments in the products liability
domain).
47. Only a few voices have been raised in an effort to encourage greater care and precision
in this new psychological approach to the law. Professors Peters and Rostain discuss serious
concerns about the new scholarship that are complementary to the concerns raised here. See
Peters, supranote 45 (discussingreasons why it would be premature to institute legal reforms
designed to redress the hindsight bias to which jurors allegedly fall prey); Rostain, supranote
12 (discussing the modest success with which social science can predict behavior and why this
new behavioral movement is normatively incomplete). A few other critics raise important
issues of concern regarding this new scholarship but in less detail. See Arlen, supra note 13,
at 1768-69 (expressing concern about the predictive power of legal decision theory because it
lacks a general model of behavior, about the translation of behavioral research to complex
legal environments, and about the lack of clear policy implications to be drawn from legal
decision theory because all legal actors are presumed to be subject to biases and errors);
Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 296-303 (discussing
limits on behavioral law and economics); Robert A. Hillman, TheLimits ofBehavioralDecision
Theory in LegalAnalysis: The Case of LiquidatedDamages,85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 729-37
(1998) (questioning the external validity of behavioral decision research, noting lack of
adequate attention to possible context effects and individual differences, noting that the
errors and biases described by legal decision theorists may lead to conflicting policy
prescriptions or none at all because of the supposed ubiquity of errors and biases in all legal
actors, and noting a lack of normative guidance from legal decision theory); Samuel
Issacharoff, Can There Be a BehavioralLaw and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1734
(1998) (supporting behavioral research but questioning whether many of its findings are
generalizable, of "sufficient magnitude as to systematically undermine predictions of
behavior" from rational choice theory, and "capable of being operationalized to condition the
behavior of all persons subject to specific legal regulation"); Mark Kelman, Behavioral
Economics as Partof a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1577, 1579 (1998) (characterizing behavioral law and economics as an interpretive
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If the policy prescriptions drawn from legal decision theory are
based on faulty assumptions, bad research, or incomplete
understandings of behavior, then unintended results may ensue
following implementation of the suggested reforms and the
intellectual integrity of the field may suffer.48 To avoid such
outcomes, we should subject legal decision theory to much closer
scrutiny, and the legal decision theorists should recognize the need
for greater caution and precision in the drawing of descriptive and
prescriptive conclusions from empirical research on judgment and
decision making.
In the next part, I describe behavioral decision theory and
limitations on its usefulness for the law. In so doing, I survey a
great deal of psychological research that brings into question the
claims of the legal decision theorists regarding the consistent
fallibility ofjudgment and decision making in experimental settings
and qualifies the generalizations that can be safely drawn from this
research. Before proceeding, however, two points should be made.
First, my criticisms of legal decision theory should not be seen as
an argument that human decision makers predominantly act
rationally and only occasionally make computational errors. In fact,
the legal decision theorists, in their rush to portray decision making
as a uniform phenomenon, overlook some important personal and
situational factors that can actually exacerbate the effects of certain
cognitive biases.49 Nor is this Article another attempt to rewrite
rational choice theory to account for the findings of behavioral
trope rather than a falsifiable theory and arguing that behavioral law and economics offers
an approach to data that is ambiguous in its normative implications); Robert E. Scott, The
Limits of BehavioralTheories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1639-46 (2000)
(cautioning against the neglect of contextual determinants ofbehavior); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Growing PainsofBehavioralLaw and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1754, 1756 (1998)
(supporting legal decision theory but suggesting that greater attention needs to be paid to
distinguishing the effects of environmental and structural problems from cognitive limitations
and the "ability of legislative action and ex ante administrative agency regulation to correct
problems of cognitive limitations"). Judge Posner has provided the most explicit defense of law
and economics in the face of the attack by behavioralism advocates, arguing that this new
behavioral movement does not present a new or serious challenge to the economic analysis
of legal behavior. See Richard A. Posner, RationalChoice,BehavioralEconomics, andthe Law,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1551 (1998).

48. See Rostain,supra note 12, at 1002 ("Proponents of behavioral law and economics ...
risk overselling their approach. A proposal's failure to produce the anticipated results can
result in the loss of credibility of law and social science-based approaches more generally.").
49. See Mitchell, supra note 8.
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decision theory.5" Rather, this Article simply provides reasons why

legal decision theorists should refrain from broad statements about
the manner in which all legal actors process information, make
judgments, and reach decisions and why others should be skeptical
of such broad claims.
Second, my criticisms also should not be understood as a rejection
of the psychological analysis of law. This Article arises from a strong
belief in the utility of psychological and other empirical research for
legal analysis and from an equally strong belief that overreaching
in the uses of empirical research serves to undermine the long-term
credibility of the endeavor and may help to unsettle the legal status
quo without adequatejustification but with serious consequences for
legal players."1 Just as the goal of the legal decision theorist is
primarily to qualify rather than overthrow the rational choice
model, much of what I say here is meant to qualify legal decision
50. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler characterize Judge Posner's reaction to the behavioral law
and economics movement, or the legal decision theory movement as I call it, as such an
attempt. See Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posnerand Kelman, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1593,1595 (1998) (replying to Posner, supranote 47). Professors Jolls, Sunstein,
and Thaler note:
Throughout Posner's commentary, he goes through the following ritual. He
discusses one of the phenomena we identify as problematic for economic theory;,
he offers a modification or elaboration on the standard theory that could, in
principle, be consistent with this phenomenon; and then he declares victory.
Posner seems to think that the fact that it is possible to tell a rational choice
story consistent with the data is sufficient to establish that this explanation is
the correct one.
Id; see also Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Economics and Nonrational Organizational
Decision Making, in DEBATING RA17ONAITY: NONRATIONAL ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
DECISION MAKING 53, 55-56 (Jennifer J. Halpern & Robert N. Stern eds., 1998) (discussing
further examples of efforts by positive economists to account for findings from behavioral
economics).
51. I tend to share the cautious view of the psychologists Konedni and Ebbesen toward
legal psychology:
A more cautious point of view, and one that we favor, is that erroneous
information obtained by scientific methods (and therefore having an aura of
truth) is more harmful than no information at all, especially when issues as
sensitive as legal ones are being dealt with, and people's futures are quite
literally at stake.
Konedni & Ebbesen, supra note 36, at 68. The counterpoint view is that existing laws based
on faulty descriptions of behavior or behavioral assumptions should not be given presumptive
validity. The unavoidable problem, of course, is deciding what descriptions and assumptions
are faulty, what descriptions and assumptions should serve as replacements, what weight
social scientific studies on the relevant issues should be given, and what standards of proof
should be required to alter the status quo.
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theory rather than reject it and is meant to point out areas in need
of further investigation and consideration. The legal decision
theorists' assumption of pervasive failures of rational thought is
overbroad, just as the economic theorists' assumption of pervasive
rationality is overbroad. The descriptive truth lies somewhere in
between and is likely found in a closer examination of how features
of the person and situation interact to cause different responses to
different decision tasks.
II. BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY AND ITS INTERPRETIVE LIMITS
The empirical study of judgment and decision making is often
referred to as "behavioral decision theory."52 One of the leading
behavioral decision theorists, Robyn Dawes, describes the field in
the following way:
Basically, behavioral decision making is the field that studies
how people make decisions. Because all types of people are
making all sorts of decisions all the time, the field is potentially
very broad. What has characterized the field both historically
and theoretically is the comparison of actual decision making
with certain principles of rationality in decision making-for
example, that increasing the number of options available to a
decision maker should not increase the probability that a
particular option from the more restricted set is chosen, or that
the way in which identical choices are described ("framed")
should not affect choice. When actual decisions violate such
principles systematically (not just as a result of unreliability or
"error"), this deviation is termed an anomaly-ifthe people who
violate these principles simultaneously accept them as ones that
they believe should govern their decision making.'
52. For recent overviews of behavioral studies of judgment and decision making, see
Dawes, supra note 13; Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 20; R. Hastie, Problemsfor Judgment
andDecision Making, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 653 (2001); B. A. Mellers et al., Judgment and
Decision Making, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 447 (1998).
53. Dawes, supra note 13, at 497. For a more detailed classification of the various
approaches to the study ofjudgment and decision making, see Abelson & Levi, supranote 20,
at 236 (drawing a distinction between "behavioral decision theory" and"psychological decision
theory," with both approaches examining departures from normative decision theory but with
the latter providing a cognitive account of the departures). For another discussion of the
meaning and origins of the phrase "behavioral decision theory," see Rachlinski, New Law &
Psychology, supra note 9, at 740-41.
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As this description indicates, the defining feature of behavioral
decision theory is the comparison of actual judgment and decision-

making behavior with normative models of rational behavior.
The norms that serve as the criteria for rational behavior in
behavioral decision theory emphasize the internal coherence and
logical consistency of decisions and judgments.5 4 The norms used to
evaluate preferential choice derive from game theory and models of
expected utility (the primary source of "rational choice theory"
within economics55 ) and accordingly emphasize internal consistency
Some object to the label "behavioral decision theory" on the grounds that this body of
research does not represent a unified theory of behavior but rather only a collection of results
and mini-theories. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 47, at 1552. But see Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship,79 OR. L. REV. 147, 156 (2000) (suggesting
that Herbert Simon's bounded rationality theory presents a unified descriptive theory of
economic behavior and decision making). Although this objection is valid to some extent (and
is accepted by proponents of behavioral decision theory as a valid but not fatal criticism, see
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1071-73), I consider the "theory" label acceptable for two
reasons: (1) this body of research shares important assumptions about, and methods for the
study of, judgment and decision making, and (2) the term "behavioral decision theory" has a
long tradition within psychology that renders its meaning readily recognizable within the
field. With respect to the latter point, consider that the Annual Review ofPsychology has been
publishing reviews of judgment and decision-making research and theory under the label of
"behavioral decision theory" since 1961. See Gordon M. Becker & Charles G. McClintock,
Value: Behavioral Decision Theory, 18 ANN. REV. PSYcHOL. 239 (1967); Ward Edwards,
BehavioralDecision Theory, 12 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 473 (1961); Einhorn & Hogarth, supra
note 20; Paul Slovic et al., BehavioralDecision Theory, 28 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1 (1977). An
alternative name sometimes used for the field, which omits the "theory" label, is simply
behavioral decision making. See, e.g., Gideon Keren, Perspectives of Behavioral Decision
Making: Some CriticalNotes, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 169

(1996).
54. See Mellers et al.,supranote 52, at 449 ("In the rational choice framework, rationality
is expressed as internal coherence and logical consistency within a system of beliefs and
preferences."). Numerous definitions of rational behavior exist within the social sciences. For
a sampling of the diverse definitions see Lupia et al., supra note 20, at 3-8; see also Jack
Feldman & Michael K. Lindell, On Rationality,in ORGANIZATION AND DECISION THEORY 83,
83-91 (Ira Horowitz ed., 1990) (discussing the treatment of rationality within judgment and
decision making research); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1060-66 (discussing "thin"and
"thick" conceptions ofrationality thatvary along a continuum ofspecificityin their predictions
about human behavior); Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational,Normative and
Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 475-84
(contrasting instrumental, moral, and cognitive accounts of decision making). For the
distinction between decisions and judgments, see sources cited supra note 20.
55. See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWAND ECONOMICS 790, 791-93 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest
eds., 2000) (discussing formal and informal definitions of "rational choice theory," with the
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ofrevealed preferences and maximization of utility; the norms used
to evaluate judgments derive from systems of logic, probability
theory and statistical theory, principles of causal analysis, and
sometimes conventions such as legal rules, with the emphasis being
on following prescribed rules in the consideration of evidence and
the drawing of inferences or conclusions.5 6 The success of a course
of behavior in achieving any goal other than fidelity to these
normative principles is typically irrelevant in behavioral decision
research.57
formal definition being drawn from expected utility theory axioms); see also Korobkin &Ulen,
supranote 4, at 1062-64 (discussing the expected utility version of rational choice theory).
56. See, e.g., RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGiES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 8 (1980) ("The formal inferential rule system followed

by professional scientists is the standard against which the layperson is compared throughout
this book."); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Study of StatisticalIntuitions, 11
COGNITION 123, 124 (1982) ("The presence of an error of judgment is demonstrated by
comparing people's responses either to an established fact (e.g., that the two lines are equal
in length) or to an accepted rule of arithmetic, logic or statistics."); Kerr et al., supra note 45,
at 688 ("The concept of biased judgment assumes that one can specify a non-biased standard
of judgment against which actual human judgments can be compared. The basis of that
standard, the normative model of judgment, may be some formal logical system (e.g.,
syllogistic logic, probability theory, game theory, rational choice models). However, the
normative model may also be based on convention. Good examples of the latter types of
standards are the common law rules of evidence that proscribe jurors' use of certain
information (e.g., a defendant's race or gender or physical appearance)."); Gordon F. Pitz &
Natalie J. Sachs, Judgment and Decision: Theory and Application, 35 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL
139, 140 (1984) ("[Tlhere may exist no criterion for determining whether a single choice or
judgment is correct, since the response is based in part on personal opinions or preferences.
Itis possible, however, to impose a mathematical or logical structure on the task that defines
the consistency of a set of responses. The prescriptions for consistent behavior are generally
derived from formal probability theory and from Expected Utility (EU) theory, a prescriptive
model of choice founded on axioms proposed by von Neumann &Morgenstern.") (citations and
footnote omitted).
One may argue that treating even principles derived from statistics or logic as norms of
rational behavior in fact reflects the convention or intuition that those principles provide the
best way to solve problems given limited information or provide the best way to organize
preferences, thus giving rise to debate about whose intuitions and conventions should control.
For discussion of this issue, see the target article by L.J. Cohen, the open peer commentaries
on Cohen's article, and Cohen's response to the commentaries in volume 4 of Behavioral and
Brain Sciences. L. Jonathan Cohen, Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally
Demonstrated?,4 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 317-31 (1981); Open Peer Commentary, id. at 331-59;
Author'sResponse, id. at 359-70.
57. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment and Choice:
Toward a Social Contingency Model, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331,335
(1992). Professor Tetlock notes:

Subjects in laboratory studies of cognitive processes rarely feel accountable to
others for the positions they take. They function in a social vacuum (or as close
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Application of these normative principles provides a logical or
coherent answer within the closed universe of the information
available to the decision maker and given the expressed preferences
of the decision maker, but application of these principles does not
necessarily lead to an empirically accurate or socially adept
answer."8 For instance, one may reach a logically correct conclusion
an approximation to a social vacuum as can be achieved) in which they do not
need to worry about the interpersonal consequences of their conduct ("How will
others react if I do this? How effectively can I justify my views if challenged?").
Such issues are simply seen as irrelevant to the explanatory goals of the
[behavioral decision theory] research program.
Id.
58. See Kenneth R. Hammond, Coherence and CorrespondenceTheoriesin Judgment and
DecisionMaking, in JUDGMENTAND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 53,53

(Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
The goal of a correspondence metatheory is to describe and explain the process
by which a person's judgments achieve empirical accuracy. The goal of a
coherence metatheory of judgment, in contrast, is to describe and explain the
process by which a person's judgments achieve logical, or mathematical, or
statistical rationality...
It may come as a surprise to the reader that rationality does not directly
imply accuracy and vice versa, but brief reflection shows that this is the case.
Rationality always operates in a closed system; given the premises, certain
conclusions always follow if a rational reasoning process is followed. When the
reasoning process satisfies a logical test, the system is termed coherent, and that
is all it is and all it claims to be.
Id.; see also J.St. B.T. Evans, Bias and Rationality, in RATIONALITY. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 7-15 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (comparing
"rationality of purpose" and "rationality of process" in cognitive research); Herbert A. Simon,
Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
ECONOICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 27 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986)
[hereinafter RATIONAL CHOICE] ("The rational person of cognitive psychology goes about

making his or her decisions in a way that is procedurally reasonable in the light of the
available knowledge and means of computation.").
A coherence account of rationality
does not specify any particular goal as humanly universal. ... In the rational
choice model, ... there is no particular goal. Rather, there is a set of possible
goals that must be ordered.... It is ... important to point out that whether the
goals in the set are good or evil or neither is irrelevant, as long as the
participants order them.
William H. Riker, The PoliticalPsychology ofRational Choice Theory, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 23,
24-25 (1995). Many economic models of rationality assume that people are motivated by
selfish interests (or by utility functions), and that people make choices and take actions
designed to realize their selfish interests consistently and to the greatest extent possible, but
the content of these selfish interests is generally unspecified. Arlen, supra note 13, at 1766
("Conventional law and economics assumes that people exhibit rational choice: that people are
self-interested utility maximizers with stable preferences and the capacity to optimally
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based on reasoning from false premises, but this logical conclusion
may be nonsensical or demonstrably false in relation to conditions
in the real world.5 9 Thus, in behavioral decision theory, the
touchstone of rationality is either (1) consistency in the face of
normatively irrelevant features of the decision situation or (2)
appropriate change in judgments and decisions as normatively
relevant features of the situation change. 60
accumulate and assess information.") (footnote omitted); Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and
Fallof Self-Interest in the Explanationof PoliticalLife, in BEYOND SELF-INTFREST, supranote
33, at 12 ("Shortly after its inception the rational choice school evolved a set of practitioners
who did not require the self-interest assumption but only the assumption that rational actors
would act consistently and maximize whatever ends they preferred. Yet the version of rational
choice that restricted its modeling to self-interest predominated at the start."). Much debate
about economic models of rationality concerns not whether people are good at maximizing
their selfish interests but rather the proper meaning of utility or selfishness. E.g., Linnda R.
Caporael et al., Selfishness examined: Cooperation in the absence of egoistic incentives, 12
BEHAv. & BRAIN Sci. 683, 683 (1989) (examining the empirical basis for the assumption that
"human nature is basically selfish and individualistic").
Of greatest interest to the legal decision theorists has been the procedural aspect of
rationality. See Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms 3 (Mar. 2001)
(Georgetown UniversityLaw Center, WorkingPaper No. 265902) ("[C]ontemporarychallenges
to the rational selfishness model of human behavior tend to focus far more on the first
adjective-the assumption of rationality-than on the second-the assumption of
selfishness"), availableat http'/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-jd=265902. Some
legal decision theorists, however, also consider the motivational component. For instance,
Professors Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler touch on the motivational aspect of rational choice
models in their discussions of "bounded willpower" and "bounded self-interest." See Jolls et
al., supra note 9, at 1479; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1126-43 (considering
"deviations from self-interest").
59. See BARON, supra note 20, at 55 ("Rationality is ... not the same as accuracy, and
irrationality is not the same as error. We can use good methods and reach erroneous
conclusions, or we can use poor methods and be lucky, getting a correct answer.").
60. See Evans, supra note 58, at 16 ("Interest focuses on tasks which are normally
sufficiently simple in structure that there is a tacit agreement that subjects 'ought' to be able
to solve them. When subjects' responses deviate from the answer which is prescribed by
standard logic or by some other normative system ... then subjects are typically reported as
making errors. A 'bias' is usually defined as systematic attention to some logically irrelevant
features of the task, or systematic neglect of a relevant feature."); Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment and Decision Making: A Personal View, 2 PSYCHOL. SCL 142, 143-44 (1991) ("A
salient characteristic of current research in judgment and decision making is its emphasis on
anomalies that violate normative standards of belief or choice. A common strategy is to
identify a factor that should not affect judgment or decision, then design an experiment in
which it does. Thus, an uninformative message can produce anchoring, subjects exposed to
different anchors will make different estimates of, say, the population of Turkey or the likely
selling price of a house. Similarly, the framing of outcome statistics in terms of mortality or
survival can affect the attractiveness of medical treatments: 10% mortality is more
frightening than 90% survival. In these cases and in many others, subjects are influenced by
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"[T]he existence of a single correct answer is a necessary
assumption" in behavioral decision theory research,6 1 because
"[e]rrors are always defined relative to a normative framework that
makes assumptions about human goals."6 2 If the "rational" solution
to a decision problem is indeterminate, then conclusions about the
rationality of behavior cannot be uncontroversially drawn.
Using this internal coherence/logical consistency approach to
rationality, behavioral decision researchers have identified a great
number of apparent anomalies in judgment and choice, instances
where observed conduct deviates from that predicted by one of
the normative principles of rationality.63 Evidence of these
cognitive biases, or "cognitive quirks" as Richard Posner somewhat
dismissively calls them,6 brings into question the descriptive
accuracy of a view of human behavior as perfectly rational.65
Behavioral decision theory thus offers a descriptive account of
judgment and decision making that stands in stark contrast to an
ideal conception of judgment and decision making derived from
norms of procedural rationality.
Behavioral decision theory's portrait of the fundamentally flawed
decision maker is not sharply drawn, however, and presents a
compelling picture of pervasive nonrational behavior only when
viewed from a distance (or, more precisely, behavioral decision
theory's claims are most compelling when stated only in the most
general terms without appropriate qualifiers). When one examines
more closely the details of the portrait painted by behavioral
a factor that they would wish to ignore, or in some way fail to meet a standard that, upon
reflection, they would accept.").
61. GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., THE EMPIRE OF CHANCE: How PROBABILITY CHANGED
SCIENCE AND EVERYDAY LIFE 227 (1989); see also id. ("A bias is defined as the deviation from
a normatively correct answer, and this makes the assumption of a single correct answer
essential.").
62. Mellers et a., supra note 52, at 449.
63. See supra note 14.
64. Posner, supra note 47, at 1553 ("The cognitive quirks that set bounds on rational
maximizing include the availability heuristic, overoptimism, the sunk-cost fallacy, loss
aversion, and framing effects....").
65. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framingof
Decisions,in RATIONAL CHOICE, supranote 58, at 68 ("We argue that the deviations of actual
behavior from the normative model are too widespread to be ignored, too systematic to be
dismissed as random error, and too fundamental to be accommodated by relaxing the
normative system .... We conclude from these findings that the normative and the descriptive
analyses cannot be reconciled.").
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decision theorists and the tools used to paint the portrait, one sees
that the portrait is unfinished in many areas and that the tools used
are blunt and at times inappropriate to the task.
Nevertheless, many legal decision theorists present behavioral
decision theory as compelling grounds to adjudge all legal decision
makers fundamentally flawed, for whom norms of rational behavior
are inappropriate models of behavior. Consider, as an example of
unwarranted pessimism drawn from selected behavioral decision
studies, the claim made by some legal decision theorists that people
consistently fail to take proper account of base rate information
when judging probabilities.' As Jonathan Koehler's review of baserate studies demonstrates, this pessimistic view of base-rate
reasoning is unjustified and misleading: "Not only is there little
evidence that base rates are routinely ignored, but a critical review
of the recent literature shows that base rates usually influence
judgments and often do so in reasonable ways." 7 Koehler does not
deny that base-rate information is sometimes neglected, but, in a
statement that applies with equal force to claims made by
psychologists and legal scholars, asserts that "the ubiquitous
summary statements of base rate neglect distort the empirical
literature. "6S

66. E.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1085 ("To accurately predict the probability
of future events, actors must consider the statistical probability that an event will occur and
'update' (adjust) this base rate' with any available particularized information about a specific
situation. There is significant evidence, however, that actors systematically underuse base
rates when making probability predictions, or ignore them altogether.") (footnote omitted);
Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 119 ("People tend to be
insensitive to the sample size, to misunderstand the phenomenon of regression to the mean,
to have excessive confidence in their own judgments, and to misunderstand the effect on
probability of base-rate frequency.") (footnote omitted).
67. JonathanJ. Koehler, The BaseRateFallacyReconsidered:Descriptive,Nornative,and
Methodological Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 1, 2 (1996); see id. at 5 ("In sum, there is
little evidence either from the lawyer-engineer problem or from the stereotype literature to
support the strong claim that base rates are routinelyignoredwhen individuatinginformation
is made available. Indeed, when care is taken to develop an appropriately individualized
criterion, even weaker forms of the base rate fallacy do not receive clear and convincing
support.").
68. Id.; see also Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supranote 9, at 233 ("While these studies
generally supported the existence of a base rate fallacy, they also showed that base rates are
sometimes taken into account: when the link betweeri base rate and target event is causal,
when base rates appear relevant, when the base rates related to individuating information,
and when both diagnostic and base rate information are essentially statistical.").

20021

TAKING BEHAVIORALISM TOO SERIOUSLY?

1945

As this first example suggests, and as we will see is the case in
many other instances, legal decision theorists fail to appreciate or
fail to report the qualified nature of many of behavioral decision
theory's claims. In the following sections, I discuss three categories
of limitations on behavioral decision theory that counsel against the
rush to pronounce legal decision makers as predictably hobbled by
pervasive and unavoidable cognitive biases and errors. When these
limitations on behavioral decision theory are taken into account, a
foggier but in many ways less dire picture of human rationality
emerges.
A Featuresof BehavioralDecision Theory That Mask Individual
and SituationalDifferences in RationalBehavior and Distort
Perceptionsof the Prevalenceof IrrationalBehavior
Rarely, if ever, does behavioral decision research find uniform
results across all experimental subjects. 9 In fact, when one
examines the actual data gathered by decision researchers rather
than just summary presentations of the data, one finds that at
least a significant minority and often a significant majority of the
subjects provided the "right," or rational, answer to the judgment
or decision problem under consideration.70 Yet because of the way
that behavioral decision research is conducted and reported, this
69. It is standard usage nowadays in experimental psychology to refer to experimental
"participants" rather than subjects. See AMERICAN PsYchOLOGIcAL ASS'N, PUBLIcATION
MANUAL oF THE AMERICAN PsYcHoLOGIcAL ASSOcIATION 49 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter APA
MANUAL] ("Replace the impersonal term subjects with a more descriptive term when
possible-participants,individuals, college students, children, or respondents, for example
(subjectsand sample are appropriate when discussing statistics)."). Nevertheless, here I will
usually refer to experimental subjects rather than participants because a legal audience is
likely to better understand the meaning of the former.
70. See Riker, supranote 58, at 36 ("None of the experiments displaying inconsistencies
in choice portray all subjects as inconsistent. For experimenters to recommend the
abandonment of expected utility theory when the experiments themselves show that many
people-often well over half, as in the preference reversal experiments-are indeed expected
utility maximizers is to ignore the evidence that the experimenters have themselves
created."); Richard F. West & Keith E. Stanovich, The Domain Specificity and Generality of
Overconfidence'IndividualDifferencesinPerformanceEstimationBias,
4 PSYCHONOMICBULL.
& REV. 387, 387 (1997) ("Despite this overall finding of overconfidence on many tasks,
performance across a sample of participants is almost always characterized by enormous
variability. It is almost always the case that some participants show no global bias toward
overconfidence").
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variability in responses and the presence of normative behavior on
the part of some or many of the subjects is often neglected or
downplayed. Indeed, a mythology of decision making as rampantly
and fundamentally flawed has developed through the repeated use
of standard research paradigms that are designed to show biased
behavior and through the use of statistical methodology that stacks
the decks in favor of finding biased behavior without concern for the
practical importance of the behavior outside of the laboratory and,
perhaps most surprisingly, largely without documenting that any
particularindividualsactuallyacted irrationallyin the experiments.
The end result of this lack of attention to how behavioral decision
theory tests for irrationality is that findings from aggregated-data
experiments-in which no particular individuals may be shown
to act irrationally and in which the findings are of statistical
significance but no demonstrated practicalsignificance-are being
improperly used as the basis for generalizations about the conduct
of all legal actors across legal settings.
1. Between-Subjects Designs and Emphasis on the 'Average
Judge"
Behavioral decision theory research focuses on percentages and
averages. 7" Did a statistically significant percentage of experimental
subjects fail to make the "rational" choice? Did an experimental
manipulation that should not affect behavior according to rational
actor theory (such as stating the choice options in terms of
willingness to pay versus willingness to accept) lead to a statistically significant difference between the mean responses of
the experimental groups on the dependent variable? Whether
individuals within experimental groups predictably differed in their
reasoning and choices and, if so, why, has been of little traditional
concern to most behavioral decision researchers.72 Instead,
71. See Keith E. Stanovich, Individual Differences in Cognitive Biases: Commentary on
Krueger on Social-Bias, 9 PSYCOLOQUY 11, 7 (1998), at httpA/www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/psycbinlnewpsy?9.75 (noting that "proponents of the heuristics and biases approach (and equally
their critics) have focused entirely on the central tendency of responses (usually the mean or
modal performance tendency)").
72. Earlybehavioral decision theory acknowledged theimportance ofpersonalityvariables
in decision making, see Edwards, supra note 53, at 487-88 (reviewing studies of personality
variables in decision making), and researchers have shown some continuing interest in the
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researchers usually concern themselves with differences in average
responses across experimental conditions:
A research strategy that emphasizes individual differences in
cognitive and perceptual judgments is at variance with more
classical research approaches. In the tradition of experimental
psychology, the judgments obtained are summarized by
averaging across all experimental subjects. Should individual
differences among judges emerge, these differences would be
treated as error and an "average judge" would be considered the
most meaningful summary of all the judges. That approach has
the advantage of ensuring generalizability to other judges,
similar to the ones being studied, at the expense of ignoring
individual differences. It is assumed that the mean judgment is
representative of all the judges in the sample, or alternatively,

role of risk attitudes and risk perceptions in risky choice behavior, see Mellers et al., supra
note 52, at 451-53 (reviewing behavioral decision research into risk attitudes and
perceptions). But with the ascendancy of cognitive psychology in the middle to latter half of
the twentieth century, along with its attendant search for fundamental cognitive processes
to explain behavior, an individual differences/correlational approach tojudgment and decision
making received little attention for many years. See Alan Page Fiske et al., The Cultural
Matrixof SocialPsychology, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supranote 9, at 918
("Until recently, the cognitive view that has dominated the discipline ofpsychologyin the last
four decades typically adopted a mechanistic metaphor, describing the mind as a machine or
computer that is the same in all times and places, while only the raw materials processed by
the machinery or the data in the computer vary."); Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West,
ReasoningIndependently of PriorBelief and IndividualDifferences in Actively Open-Minded
Thinking,89 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 342, 342 (1997) ("Although investigators have observed group
trends indicating belief-bias effects in the literatures of both social psychology and cognitive
psychology, only recently have they turned their attention to individual differences in these
effects.") (citations omitted); Elke U. Weber & Christopher K Hsee, Models and mosaics:
Investigatingcross-culturaldifferences in risk perceptionandriskpreference, 6 PSYCHONOMIC

BULL. &REV. 611, 614 (1999) ("Within experimental and cognitive psychology, the study of
individual differences has been relatively ignored, in favor of attempts to establish universal
processes."). For a discussion of the development of cognitive psychology and the "cognitive
revolution" see ERNEsT R. HnaD, PSYCHOLOGY INAmEmIC A HIsrOPicAL SURVEY 221-67
(1987). For a discussion of the development of the subfield of social cognition within social and
cognitive psychology see Hazel Markus & R. B. Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspectivein Social
Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 9, at 137-41. This trend
regarding attention to individual differences seems to be changing. Indeed, ten years ago
Herbert Simon, one of the pioneers of behavioral economics, called for greater attention to
individual differences in information-processing and decision making. Herbert A. Simon,
Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REv. PSYcHOL. 1, 14-16 (1990) (discussing the
potential insights from greater attention to individual differences across task domains,
particularly with respect to differences between experts and novices).
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that the judges are replications of one another within error of
measurement.73
Therefore, rather than examine individual variation in judgment
and choice, behavioral decision theorists typically assume that,
"to a first approximation, the thought processes of most uninstitutionalized adults are quite similar,"' and any variation in
subjects' responses is attributed to measurement or random error."
Consistent with this focus on average responses and with the
assumption of substantial similarity in mental processing, many
behavioral decision-making studies use "between-subjects" comparisons rather than "within-subjects" comparisons.7 6 Thus, rather
than examine how individual decision strategies or behaviors shift
depending on the experimental manipulations, the averageresponses
of different groups of individuals under different experimental
manipulationsare compared. As Professor Dawes notes, however,
"[wihen discussing anomalies, we are referring to inconsistencies
that occur within individuals." v7 The between-subjects comparisons
73. Nancy Wiggins, Individual Differences in Human Judgments: A Multivariate
Approach, in HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 110 (Leon Rappoport & David A.

Summers eds., 1973); see also Simon, supra note 72, at 15 (noting that experimental studies
of cognition "thattake averages over sets of subjects" are not receptive to studies of individual
differences).
74. Dawes, supra note 13, at 498 (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, StrategicPolicy Preferences:
A BehavioralDecision Theory Perspective,39 J. Soc. IssuEs 133, 135 (1983)). Dawes adds that
this assumption could be extended to all individuals, institutionalized or not. Id.
75. See Earl Hunt & Marcy Lansman, Cognitive Theory Applied to IndividualDifferences,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LEARNiNGAND COGNTIVE PROCESSES 81, 107 (W.K. Estes ed., 1975) ("In
the past, many psychologists have seen individual differences as sources of error variance to
be eliminated through the use of efficient experimental designs. The complexity of the causal
chain between stimulus and response has forced them to turn their attention away from
individual data to group means.").
76. In a between-subjects design, the experimenter examines whether the mean, or
average, response of one group of subjects exposed to one experimental condition differs
significantly (in a statistical sense, where the likelihood of a difference being due to chance
is estimated) from the mean response of a different group of subjects exposed to a different
experimental condition. Alternatively, hypotheses may be tested using a within-subjects (or
repeated-measures) design, in which individual subjects participate in each of the
experimental conditions (or, less commonly, repeat trials within conditions) and then
variations in behavior across conditions are examined, or using a mixed design, in which some
independent variables of the experiment are examined between subjects and some are
examined within subjects.
77. Dawes, supra note 13, at 503; see also Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 20, at 82
(stating that "while group data may indicate large effects unless sufficient stimuli are
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only allow us to infer that contradictions occur within individuals
based on mean group scores.78 That is, in a between-subjects design,
no individual is actually shown to be inconsistent because no
individual participates in all experimental conditions, but instead,
individual inconsistency in judgments or choices is inferred if there
are differences between the average responses of the different
sampled, no single individual can be shown to exhibit the bias"). But see Daniel Kahneman,
A psychologicalpoint of view: Violations of rationalrules as a diagnosticof mental processes,
23 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 681, 682 (2000).
The between-subjects test of coherence is much stricter. It requires respondents
to be disposed to produce the same judgments of probability, regardless of
whether the questions about the week or the year are asked together or
separately. Furthermore, coherence requires choices and beliefs to be immune
to variations of framing and context. This is a lot to ask for, but an inability to
pass between-subjects tests of coherence is indeed a significant flaw. Knowing
rules and being able to apply them is good, but not sufficient, because much of
life resembles a between-subjects experiment. Questions about preferences and
beliefs arise one at a time, in variable frames and contexts, and without the
information needed to apply relevant rules. A perfect reasoner whose judgments
and choices are susceptible to framing and context will make many errors in the
game of life.
Id- Some decision-making roles within the legal system would seem to resemble the role of
subjects in repeated-measures/within-subjects designs (e.g., prosecutors, judges), whereas
other roles seem closer to subjects in single-measure/between-subjects designs (e.g., juries,
many civil litigants).
78. Dawes, supra note 13, at 503 ("Often ... we can only test different people with
different questions and infer contradictions within people."). To be sure, between-subjects
designs may provide a good examination of "average judge" performance on one-shot decision
tasks and arguably provide "a clean test of the hypothesis that subjects rely on a given
heuristic" by avoiding contextual effects arising from exposure to multiple experimental
conditions. Daniel Kalneman & Amos Tversky, On the Reality of CognitiveIllusions, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 587 (1996); see also Gideon B. Keren & Jeroen G. W. Raaijmakers- On
Between-Subjects versus Within-Subjects Comparisons in Testing Utility Theory, 41
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUMa. DECISION PROCESSES 233 (1988) (arguing that within-

subjects designs are often inappropriate in tests of expected utility theory). Where a deviation
from rationality implies a violation of some rule of internal consistency, however, such as with
loss/gain framing effects (equivalent expected utilities are judged differently depending on
framing as a loss or gain) or the hindsight bias (where the probability of an event is judged
greater after the outcome is known than before the outcome is known), between-subjects
designs can only provide indirect evidence of deviations from rationality. See Kalneman &
Tversky, supra, at 587 (discussing direct versus indirect tests of rational choice through
within- and between-subjects designs); see also John C. Hershey & Paul J. H. Schoemaker,
ProspectTheory's Reflection Hypothesis:A CriticalExamination,25 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. PERFORMANCE 395 (1980) (comparing between-and within-subject approaches to the
study of prospect theory's postulates). Furthermore, between-subjects designs do not allow
researchers to examine how "conflicts between rules and heuristics are resolved" within
individuals. Kahneman & Tversky, supra, at 587 (footnote omitted).
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treatment groups. For instance, in a test of context effects on
preferences, if a majority of subjects in experimental group A
chooses option x from option set {x,y} but a majority of subjects in
experimental group B chooses option y from option set {x,y,z}, then
the behavioral decision theorist will claim that the subjects in this
experiment exhibited irrational preference reversals (because the
addition of option z should not alter the dominance of option x over
optiony), even though no individual subjects actually reversed their
preferences between the two option sets (because no individuals
made choices from both sets).
Given this practice ofinferring individual irrationality from group
differences, "there is a real danger that the laws revealed by these
mean scores are not true of any individual subject, but are the result
of averaging two or more distinct, nonmodal patterns of behavior.""
Moreover, "aggregating over attributes across individuals makes it
hard or impossible to find some psychological regularities. This is so
although the psychological process may be regular across subjects,"
for "different choices can result from the same regular decision
process.""0
When individuals are tested in within-subjects experiments, in
which individual inconsistency can actually be assessed, one finds
that true intra-individual contradictions are not as prevalent nor as
automatic as the legal decision theorists assume."1 For example,
79. Hunt & Lansman, supra note 75, at 107; see also Joachim Krueger, Individual
Differences and Pearson'sr: Rationality Revealed?, 23 BEHAv. & BRAIN Sd. 684, 684 (2000)
("Group-level analyses not only ignore systematic variations among people, they also work
against the vindication of human judgment.") (citation omitted).
80. Ola Svenson, Decision Making and the Search for Fundamental Psychological
Regularities:What Can Be Learnedfrom a ProcessPerspective?,65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 252, 260-61 (1996). Svenson recommends that
future [process] research should attempt to avoid confounding interindividual
differences in goal elicitation and goal mapping with decision making processes
as performed by single individuals and attempt to use within subjects designs
whenever feasible. Otherwise we run the risk of only understanding processes
about decision problems in which everyone agrees about values and the
mapping of values (and of getting confused when there is a variety of goal
representations).
Id.
81. Evidence of errors and biases found in between-subjects designs is often attenuated
in experiments using within-subjects designs. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 78, at
586-87. For example, Stapel, Reicher and Spears found that using a within-subjects design
for Kalmeman and Tversky's "famous names" study, instead of the between-subjects design
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Robyn Dawes discusses a within-subjects experiment in which
alteration in the framing of a decision problem led to a statistically
used by Kahneman and Tversky, led to order effects in the operation of the availability
heuristic, such that performance showed less evidence of bias over trials. Diederik A. Stapel
et al., Contextual determinants of strategicchoice: Some moderatorsof the availabilitybias,
25 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 141, 144-47 (1995) (from Study 1). These authors emphasize the
ability of subjects to adapt to the judgment task:
Our explanation for this progressive change is that, on the initial trial, there is
a discrepancy between the task implied in the instruction to 'listen attentively'
to the tapes and the actual task of estimating frequencies of men and women.
As subjects became aware of the actual nature of the task, uncertainty is
reduced, theyadopt more appropriatejudgmental strategies and the availability
bias disappears.
Id. at 147.
When attention is drawn to independent variables or when subjects are given a chance to
detect and correct possible errors, performance often moves toward the normative response.
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 78, at 587; see also Michael H. Birnbaum & Barbara
A. Mellers, BayesianInference: CombiningBase Rates With Opinions of Sources Who Vary in
Credibility,45 J. PERsoNALTrY& Soc. PSYCHOL 792,796 (1983) (findingless than ten percent
of subjects in single-judgment task using base rate information, but finding great majority of
subjects using base rate information in multiple-judgment task); Baruch Fischhoff et al.,
Subjective SensitivityAnalysis, 23 ORGANIzATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 339, 35657 (1979) ("On a theoretical level, the contrast between within-subject and between-subject
designs clarifies the conditions under which various kinds of information are used. Although
effectively ignored when embedded in the context of other information, both base-rate and
validity information elicit somewhat appropriate responses when varied systematically (for
most subjects). Of course, there is an implicit demand not to respond the same way each time.
But the differences in responses would not be properly ordered if subjects did not know (or
were not able to figure out) the meaning of that information for their inferences."); Carol A.
Varey et al., Judgments of Proportions,16 J. ExPERIENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 613, 623 (1990) (The interpretation of base rate 'neglect' is based on the
finding that in between-subjects comparisons, the effect of base rate is too small. In withinsubjects comparisons, however, subjects use the base rate, and the evidence for a 'fallacy'
disappears.") (citations omitted). In short, "byignoring the nature of situational transitions,
between-subjects designs can be misleading unless it is specifically desired to generalize to
situations where judgments and choices are made in unique circumstances." Robin M.
Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional Aspects of Judgmental
Heuristics,90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 197, 212 (1981).
On the other hand, the use of within-subjects designs may amplify biased or erroneous
responses where the test is focused on determining the influence of irrelevant information on
judgment and choice. In a within-subjects design, the implicit demand to use irrelevant but
varying information will be greater because the salience of the irrelevant information will
increase as this information is varied across within-subject conditions (e.g., individuating
information that changes across conditions may become more salient and presumably more
important than base rate information held constant across the conditions). See NORBERT
SCHWARZ, COGNrION AND COMMUNICATION: JUDGMENTAL BIASES, RESEARCH METHODS, AND
THE LOGIC OF CONVERSATION 23 (1996) ("In many base-rate studies, the apparent relevance
of individuating information is further enhanced by the use of a within-subjects design.").
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significant difference in choices across conditions, yet the
statistically significant difference was attributable to only fifteen
percent of the subjects changing their choices (i.e., only fifteen
percent violated the normative principle that choice options with the
same expected utility should be treated the same regardless of how
the options are framed).8 2 Although this fifteen percent of the
population may be a statistically significant number of respondents
displaying inconsistency or "error" (i.e., we may have a high degree
of confidence that this percentage was not simply the result of
random error but rather the result of some psychological process at
work in this subset of subjects), should we in this instance label the
normative principle descriptively incorrect on the basis of this
rather small, internally inconsistent minority?'
Additionally, between-subjects designs present difficult interpretation problems because they allow subjects to impose their own,
uncontrolled contexts onto the different tasks. As psychologists
Michael Birnbaum and Barbara Mellers explain:
It is difficult to interpret the effect or lack of effect of variables
that have been manipulated between subjects. The problem is
82. Dawes, supranote 13, at 503-04. An example of a gain/loss framing that should not
affect choice under rational choice theory would be the presentation of a medical treatment
program as saving 200 of 600 lives or as losing 400 of 600 lives, as in Kahneman and
Tversky's well-known "Asian disease problem." See Michael J. Zickar & Scott Highhouse,
Looking Closer at the Effects of Framingon Risky Choice: An Item Response Theory Analysis,
75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 75, 75-76 (1998) ("Most framing
items are a variation on the classic 'Asian disease problem' of Tversky and Kahneman....")
(citation omitted).
83. In between-subjects designs, one always finds some subjects who provide the
normative response, even on the "hard" versions of the tasks where there have been no
situational modifications designed to naturalize, clarify, or simplify the decision environment.
See Keith E. Stanovich & Robert F. West, IndividualDifferences in RationalThought, 127 J.
EXPERimENTAL PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (1998) ("What has largely been ignored is that-although
the average person in these experiments might well display an overconfidence effect,
underuse base rates, choose P and Q in the selection task, commit the conjunction fallacy,
etc.-on each of these tasks, some people give the standard normative response."). Often the
actual percentage of normative or correct responses in any given between-subjects decisionmaking experiment constitutes a substantial minority and, sometimes, even a majority of the
responses given. See id. at 164-65 ("Unlike the case of the contrary-to-fact syllogisms task and
statistical reasoning task, whereby a substantial number of people give the normative
response, the gap between the descriptive and normative for the abstract selection task is
unusually large. Less than 10% of the participants give the normative response on the
abstract version."); see also supra note 70.
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that when different subjects experience different stimulus
contexts, responses cannot be compared without taking the
different contexts into account. For example, by comparing
judgments between subjects, it has been found that the number
450 can be judged greater than the number 550; however, one
need not conclude that 450 actually seems greater than 550,
because when judgments are compared within subjects, one
finds that 550 is indeed judged greater than 450."
In other words, "b]etween-subjects comparisons confound the
stimulus and the context by allowing the stimulus to evoke its own
context."' The lack of a uniform context paired with the averaging
of results in between-subjects designs can lead to obvious contradictions that single individuals would not make if tested in all
experimental conditions, such as Birnbaum and Mellers' example
where the number 450 is judged greater than the number 550 in a
between-subjects setting because the relative magnitude of the two
numbers is never directly compared by the same individuals.
Therefore, "one should be extremely cautious when drawing
inferences from between-subjects comparisons ofjudgments."86 The
averaging of results from between-subjects designs may mask
important differences in the conduct of subjects and may cloud the
84. Birnbaum & Mellers, supranote 81, at 800. Berkeley and Humphreys make a similar
point in their discussion of the importance of sources of uncertainty in decision problems:
[In general it is almost impossible to write descriptions of "real life" decision
making situations which guarantee that all subjects will locate the problem
within the same small world.
Comparisons of outputs from the formal model and the intuitive model of the
decision problem may then reflect differences in problem structuring and
decomposition, or different scaling of inputs, or use of different composition
rules, the existence of incoherence, or any mixture of these.
Berkeley & Humphreys, supra note 25, at 225-27. Within-subjects designs present different
context effect concerns. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Within-Subjects Designs: To Use or Not
To Use?, 83 PSYCHOL. BULL. 314,316-18 (1976).
85. Varey et al., supra note 81, at 623.
86. Id.The cognitive psychologist Ralph Hertwig likewise expresses strong concern about
the inferences drawn from between-subjects designs: "Between-subjects designs are strange
animals. They can lead to paradoxical, even absurd inferences." Barbara Mellers et al., Do
Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial
Collaboration,12 PSYCHOL. Sci. 269, 273 (2001) (citation omitted). Again, this is not to say
that between-subjects designs are necessarily inappropriate-indeed, they may be the
preferred design in some instances-but one must be cautious about the inferences drawn
from them.
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fact that often a good number of subjects act rationally in the very
experiments that are cited by the legal decision theorists as proof of
pervasive irrationality.
2. Emphasis on Null Hypothesis Significance Testing:
Statistical Significance o PracticalSignificance
The mission of most behavioral decision theorists is to test
hypotheses rather than estimate the prevalence of cognitive biases
and errors within any given population:
[Behavioral decision research] is concerned with people in
general.The studies are designedto demonstrate some effect ....

Then further studies are done to analyze the effect. All that is
required for these studies is some group of subjects who show
the effect in question. Most researchers are not very interested
in the prevalence of the effect.8"
To test their hypotheses, behavioral decision theorists employ
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), in which acceptance of
the null hypothesis (which occurs when there is no statistically
significant difference between the behavior of the control and
experimental groups) is equated with rational behavior and a
rejection of the null hypothesis (which occurs when there is a
statistically significant difference between the behavior of the
control and experimental groups) is equated with irrational
behavior. Equating rationality with the null hypothesis in this way
stacks the deck in favor of finding deviations from rationality.
Performing the rituals of [NHST], investigators stake their

substantive claims about bias on appeals to statistical
significance. The theoretical notion of rational or unbiased
reasoning assumes the feeble status of a point specific null
hypothesis, whereas bias lies in any significant departure from
this point. [Subjects] have ample room to err, but only one place
to be correct. Not surprisingly, NHST reveals that [subjects]
"significantly" miss the point of no bias. With this asymmetric
testing, there is a growing conviction that people are cognitively
87. BARON, supra note 20, at 45-46.
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limited or miserly. Investigators demonstrate bias by detecting
it. They rarely attempt to detect rational judgment. In the
typical study, the detectability of bias increases with improved
apparatus, the application of robust statistics, and sheer
statistical power. These methodological improvements can
dignify even tiny effects with the predicate of statistical
significance.'
As with the use of between-subjects designs, the great emphasis
on NHST in behavioral decision research makes it difficult to
determine the frequency and breadth with which irrational behavior
occurs, because rejection of the null hypothesis (by a finding of a
statistically significant difference between experimental groups)
provides little information about the prevalence or strength of any
given cognitive bias for three reasons: (1) when comparing group
means in a between-subjects experiment, the ostensibly biased
behavior of a fairly small number of participants may be the
difference between the rejection of, and the failure to reject, the null
hypothesis (as in Dawes' example discussed above, where
inconsistent conduct by only fifteen percent of the subjects led to
rejection of the null hypothesis); (2) even rather minor deviations
from the rational choice prediction can lead to rejections of the null
hypothesis depending on the sensitivity of the scales and other
methodological features of the experiment; and (3) the level of
statistical significance obtained (the "p value") depends on both
treatment magnitude and sample size and therefore does not
provide a true estimate of effect size (although both psychologists
and legal decision theorists at times seem to forget this)., 9 In short,
88. Joachim Krueger, The Bet on Bias: A Foregone Conclusion?, 9 PSYCOLOQUY 1, 1 4
(1998), at http-//www.cogsci.soton.ac.ukcgi/psycnewpsy?9.46; see also Reid Hastie, A Review
from a High Place: The Field of Judgment and Decision Making as Revealed in its Current
Textbooks, 2 PSYCHOL. ScL 135, 138 (1991). Professor Hastie notes:
Many researchers also exhibit a detrimental tendency to plan empirical research
to test the null hypothesis that human behavior is optimally rational, which
frequently diverts research from the most important psychological issues. After
all, precise null hypotheses are almost always refutable, with large enough
samples of subjects or detailed enough measures of single subjects' behavior. The
obsession with the rational null hypothesis has yielded a large harvest of
"significant," but unimportant "proofs" that humans are irrational.
Id
89. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Null Hypothesis SignificanceTesting: A Review
of an Old and ContinuingControversy, 5 PSYCHOL. METHODS 241 (2000) (explaining concepts
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relating to null hypothesis significance testing and critically reviewing controversies
surrounding such testing). As Nickerson explains,
the value of p obtained from a null hypothesis statistical test is not the
probability that [the null hypothesis] is true; to reject the null hypothesis at a
confidence level of, say, .05 is not to say that given the data the probability that
the null hypothesis is true is .05 or less. Furthermore, inasmuch asp does not
represent the probability that the null hypothesis is true, its complement is not
the probability that the alternative hypothesis ... is true.
Id. at 246.
All too frequently, we find researchers comparing an F test that is significant at
p < .00001 with one that is significant atp < .05 and concluding that the first
experiment represents an impressive degree of prediction while the second
experiment commands only passing interest. The problem with such a
comparison of F statistics is that the size of the F ratio is affected by other
factors in addition to the size of the treatment effects, the most obvious of which
is sample size. Thus, a large F may imply that treatment effects are large, or
that sample size was large, or that both factors are contributing to the observed
value ofF.
GEOFFREYKEPPEL, DESIGN & ANALYSIS: A RESEARCHER'S HANDBOOK 89 (2d ed. 1982); see also

APA MANUAL, supra note 69, at 18 ("Neither of the two types of probability values reflects the
importance or magnitude of an effect because both depend on sample size."); David Bakan,
The Test of Significance in PsychologicalResearch, 66 PSYCHOL. BULL. 423, 428 (1966) ("A
common misinterpretation of the test of significance is to regard it as a 'measure' of
significance."); E. Rae Harcum, The Highly Inappropriate Calibrations of Statistical
Significance,44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 964, 964 (1989) (noting that it is inappropriate to describe
empirical results as "highly significant" because "(a) [tihe convention in psychology is to
dichotomize results as significant or nonsignificant, and (b) [speaking in such terms]
substitutes the probability of an effect for a measure of the size or importance of the effect");
Nickerson, supra,at 257 ("The value ofp is not a reliable indication of the magnitude of an
effect .... "); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in A
HANDBOOK FOR DATA ANALYSIS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 341,

348 (Gideon Keren & Charles Lewis eds., 1993) ("The emphasis on significance levels tends
to obscure a fundamental distinction between the size of an effect and its statistical
significance. Regardless of sample size, the size of an effect in one study is a reasonable
estimate of the size of the effect in replication. In contrast, the estimated significance level
in a replication depends critically on sample size.").
Like psychologists, legal scholars (including legal decision theorists and adherents to law
and economics) often inappropriately describe a statistical test as yielding not just a
statistically significant result but a "highly significant" or a "highly statistically significant"
result, ostensibly to imply some special reliability or magnitude that may well not exist and
that cannot properly be assessed with only a test of statistical significance. For some
examples of the use of such inappropriate terminology in recent legal articles see Jean-Claude
Bosch et al., The CompetitiveImpact of Air Crashes:Stock Market Evidence, 41 J.L. & ECON.
503,514 (1998); Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, FeudalismUnmodified:Discourseson Farms
and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 428 (1997); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Xenophilia in American Courts,109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1131 (1996); Guthrie, supra note 15,
at 75; Korobkin, supra note 9, at 639; S. Raja Krishnamoorthi, MakingLocal School Councils
Work: The Implementation of Local School Councils in ChicagoPublic Elementary Schools,
29 J.L. & EDUC. 285, 298 (2000); George L. Priest, PrivateLitigantsand the Court Congestion
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a "statistically significant" experimental result is not synonymous
with a "practically significant" finding.' °
Most behavioral decision research provides little guidance to
practical significance because of the predominance of NHST:
Many studies in the judgment literature merely indicate
whether a bias exists according to a particular statistical level
of probability. This knowledge, however, is not adequate
information for a practitioner deciding whether to be concerned
about a bias. Any attempts by a practitioner to correct or
compensate for a bias invariably requires the investment of
time, energy, and/or financial expenses-costs which the
practitioner would prefer to expend only when it was likely that
they would be exceeded by the benefits generated from the
correction. This cost/benefit analysis faced by the practitioner is,
by definition, situation-specific and subjective in nature. It
depends upon the decision maker's utilities. There is no uniform
index of practical significance.9 '
Problem, 69 B.U. L. RsV. 527, 556 (1989); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the
Psychology of Litigation,70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113, 154 (1996).
90. Rather, a finding of statistical significance indicates only that there is a less than one
percent or five percent probability that the observed difference between groups as compared
to the null hypothesis of no difference would likely occur by chance in samples randomly
drawn from the same population. See KEPPEL, supra note 89, at 54 (noting that social
scientists most commonly employ a .05 level of significance as the decision criterion for
rejection of the null hypothesis); ROBERT ROSENTHAL ETAL., CONTRASTS AND EFFECT SIZES IN
BEHAviORAL RESEARCH: A CORRELATIONAL APPROACH 4 (2000) ("A result that is statistically

significant at conventional levels is not necessarily 'practically significant' as judged by the
magnitude of the effect."); Fred S. McChesney, Statistics:The Languageof Science (PartII),
9 KAN. J.L. & PUB.PoLY 75, 84 (1999) ("Statistically 'significant' ...does not necessarily
translate into Important.' It is a term of art and it simply means, at a relevant level of
confidence, we can exclude the possibility of a value of zero being attached to whatever
phenomenon is of interest....").
Paul Meehl bluntly evaluated psychology's fetish for NHST: "[Tihe almost universal
reliance on merely refuting the null hypothesis... is a terrible mistake, is basically unsound,
poor scientific strategy, and one of the worst things that ever happened in the history of
psychology." Paul E. Meehl, TheoreticalRisks and TabularAsterisks: Sir Karl, SirRonald,
and the Slow Progressof Soft Psychology, 46 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 806, 817
(1978).
91. Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The HindsightBias: A
Meta-analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 149 (1991)

(citations omitted); see also John Ruscio, Applying What We Have Learned: Understanding
and CorrectingBiased Judgment: Commentary on Kruegeron Social-Bias,9 PSYCOLOQUY 7,
2 (1998), at http:/www.cogsi.soton.ac.ukicgi/psyc/newpsy?9.69 ("Researchers in the area of
judgment and decision making have generated impressive lists of specific biases or cognitive
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If the deleterious effects of cognitive biases found in the laboratory
are not substantial or widespread, then little justification exists for
system-wide reforms to address these biases.92 To assess practical
significance, we must pay greater attention to the size of the effects

errors observed in human judges. The limitation of null hypothesis significance testing
(NHST) in this field, as in many others, is that it makes a fairly unimportant, categorical
decision regarding the presence or absence of a phenomenon while failing to provide an
important, quantitative estimate of its magnitude."); cf Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 102
("Absent an accurate quantification of the size of the bias that representativeness heuristic
creates relative to the normative influence of statistical forensic evidence, a court could not
be certain that withholding such evidence might do more to undermine the accuracy of the
process than admitting such evidence. Likewise, without quantification of the size of the
hindsight bias, it is not clear that withholding the fact of subsequent remedial measures is
appropriate.").
92. Cf. James P. Byrnes, Analyzing Perspectiveson Rationalityand CriticalThinking: A
Commentary on the Merrill-Palmer Quarterly InvitationalIssue, 39 MERPJLL-PAL2MERQ. 159,
167-68 (1993).
[Riesearchers need to consider what would happen if someone fell prey to
decision-making biases, failed to make fully correct conditional inferences, failed
to reason like a working scientist, or failed to exhibit the dispositional
tendencies of a good thinker. The point is that there is nothing to worry about
if an unimportant skill is typically carried out in a suboptimal way, and there
is no reason to expend a great deal of effort to try to improve this skill.
It would seem that in order to answer that "what would happen if" question,
one would need to introduce two notions: (a) the frequency with which some fell
prey to biases, failed to make conditional inferences, and so on; and (b) the
frequencies of these behaviors that are minimally required for a given
environment.
Id. Using Monte Carlo simulations, McKenzie examined the frequency and degree of error
associated with use of intuitive judgment strategies in covariation assessment (assessing
relations between variables) and Bayesian inference (updating of beliefs in light of new
evidence). See Craig R. M. McKenzie, The Accuracy of Intuitive Judgment Strategies:
CovariationAssessment and Bayesian Inference, 26 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 209 (1994). He
concluded that, among other things: (1) "When examined under the general conditions of the
simulations, all the apparent intuitive strategies performed much better than chance," id. at
228, (2) "The simulation results also show that most of the intuitive strategies' accuracy is
strongly influenced by some simple environmental variables.... Conclusions regarding the
accuracy of intuitive judgment strategies appear incomplete without taking environmental
conditions into account," id. at 229 (citations omitted), and (3) "[Slubjects usually cope with
covariation assessment and Bayesian inference by evaluating a single hypothesis, but that
they compare two hypotheses when that is the perceived task. Although considering the
alternative hypothesis does not entail using a normative strategy, it can lead to using
intuitive strategies that appear relatively simple and are accurate across environments. Using
these strategies may be the most efficient means of ensuring highly accurate judgments in
these important tasks." Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
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associated with particular cognitive biases and the parameters
under which the biases most reliably appear."
Moving behavioral decision theory research into the real world
therefore necessitates a greater emphasis on assessing the actual
impact of cognitive biases and errors on behavior and less emphasis
on statistical significance. Factors having small but statistically
significant effects in the laboratory may pale in comparison to the
force of other factors in real world settings. Conversely, it may be
possible to isolate those particular situations in which cognitive
biases exert considerable negative causal force on particular people,
even if the effect size appears small. 4 Until we have a better grasp
on the level of unwanted influence of cognitive biases and errors
relative to other factors in decision-making settings, it is difficult to
determine whether the benefits of interventions aimed at averting
or avoiding the effects ofcognitive biases outweigh the costs of these
interventions and reforms.
Meta-analytic reviews of experimental data are particularly
useful in determining the known parameters and effect sizes
associated with behavioral phenomena,9 5 and meta-analyses provide
93. "An effect size estimate denotes the size of an effect in standard units. It provides a
first step toward evaluating the practical importance of a finding." Kathleen McCartney &
Robert Rosenthal, Effect Size, PracticalImportance,and Social Policyfor Children,71 CHILD
DEv. 173,174 (2000). There are a variety of effect size indicators that may be used depending
on the data in question. For discussion of various effect size indicators see id. at 174-75;
Kenneth 0. McGraw & S. P. Wong, A Common LanguageEffect Size Statistic,111 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 361, 361-65 (1992); R. Rosenthal & M. R. DiMatteo, Meta-Analysis: Recent
Developments in QuantitativeMethods for LiteratureReviews, 52 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 59, 7077 (2001). See generallyROSENTHAL ETAL., supranote 90,passim.
94. Cf. ROSENTHALET AL., supra note 90, at 4 (claiming that "even if the effect size were
considered quantitativelyunimpressive, itmight still have important practical implications").
McCartney and Rosenthal assert that
neither experienced researchers nor experienced statisticians have a good
intuitive feel for the practical meaning of common effect size estimates. As a
result, most effects are labeled small or trivial, which is a discouraging
conclusion; it is also a mistaken one. This state of affairs needs to be rectified
not only with respect to policy analysis but also more generally.
McCartney & Rosenthal, supranote 93, at 174.
95.
Meta-analysis is more than a statistical technique; it is a methodology for
systematically examining a body of research, carefully formulating hypotheses,
conductingan exhaustive search and establishinginclusion/exclusion criteria for
articles, recording and statistically synthesizing and combining data and effect
sizes from these studies, searching for moderator and mediator variables to
explain effects of interest, and reporting results.
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a better means for assessing the real-world importance of such
phenomena than do ordinary literature reviews. 6 In fact, metaanalytic review of research may reveal that the performance of
experimental subjects over many studies is largely consistent with
the proper utilization and processing of information from a legal
standpoint, contrary to conjectures that might be drawn from data
in any given individual study.97 Unfortunately, only a small number
of meta-analyses of behavioral decision research are available. As
discussed below, the available meta-analytic data indicate, however,
that the effect sizes associated with certain of the cognitive biases
are small to moderate, as so often is the case with social science
research.98
Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 93, at 62.
96. No experimental study can assess practical significance, but meta-analyses tend to
provide better information for use in this assessment. See Christensen-Szalanski & Willham,
supra note 91, at 149 ("Given the subjective nature of practical significance, neither metaanalysis nor testing for statistical significance can determine whether an observed effect is
practically significant. However, meta-analysis can provide a measure of the size of the effect:
information that is more useful than the indication that a bias exists according to a particular
statistical level of probability."); see also Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 93, at 63-68
(discussing advantages and criticisms of meta-analysis). Reliance on non-meta-analytic
reviews of behavioral decision research for information about alleged errors and biases can
be particularly misleading because such reviews are
usually based on the statistical tests reported in the original articlessignificance or nonsignificance-with little or no attention paid to the patterns
of the results or to the degree of support provided by the different experiments.
As a consequence, potentially important information contained in the primary
research literature is generally disregarded in the review process.
KEPPEL, supra note 89, at 77.
97. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgmentsof"Responsibility":
AMeta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYcHOL. 2575,2602-03 (2000). Robbennoltnotes:
The results of the present study are of interest in relation to assumptions on
which the legal system is based. While the severity of the injury resulting from
an action is legally relevant to some judgments that must be made by jurors,
including damage-award judgments and the assessment of punishment, the
legal system is structured such that injury severity should be largely irrelevant
to other legal determinations, such as civil liability or criminal guilt. The results
presented here indicate that decision makers may use information about the
severity of an injury to inform both those decisions for which this information
is relevant and those for which this information is not relevant. However, it
appears that for those decisions in which outcome information should not play
a role, the strength of the influence of outcome severity is weaker and is
relatively small.Id.
98. See infrasections II.A.2.a-.b (discussingmeta-analyses offramingeffect andhindsight
bias research); see also Rostain, supra note 12, at 989 ("[Tlhe best empirical social science
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a. FramingEffects
Rational choice theory holds that presenting risky choice options
in different but formally equivalent terms should not affect choice,
because people should evaluate options in terms of overall wealth or
utility. One of the chief claims of legal decision theorists drawn from
behavioral decision theory is that people do not evaluate choices in
terms of overall wealth or utility but rather in terms of losses and
gains around reference points, thus asserting that the rational
choice account is descriptively incorrect. Legal decision theorists
contend that the manner in which a risky choice is presented, or
"framed," in relation to the status quo or some other reference point,
has a large impact on what choices are made. The presumption is
that there is a widespread tendency toward risk aversion for
positively framed decisions and toward risk seeking for negatively
framed decisions. 9 Thus, if presented with the choice between a
models cannot explain most of the variation seen in the variable under investigation."). The
convention associated with one of the most common measures of effect size, the Pearson
product moment correlation (r), is that "an r of .10 is small, .30 moderate, and .50 large."
McCartney & Rosenthal, supra note 93, at 175. Within the social sciences, researchers rarely
obtain rs reaching the .50 level associated with a large effect size, but this may be due in part
to weak power in the experimental test rather than weakness of the effects. Id. at 175 (noting
that "researchers examining the association between two variables seldom obtain rs as large
as .50"); id. at 176 ("Not surprisingly, better measurement, design, and method all tend to
produce larger effects."); see alsoMark A. Mone et al., The Perceptionsand Usageof Statistical
PowerinAppliedPsychology andManagementResearch,49 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 103,113-18
(1996) (finding low statistical power in sample of studies published in seven leading applied
psychology and management journals, which leads to an increased chance of failing to detect
a significant effect size). But see Bakan,supranote 89, at 425-28 (discussing"a priori reasons
for believing that the null hypothesis is generally false anyway," discussing problems with too
great a reliance on significance testing, and stating that "[tihe fact of the matter is that there
is really no good reason to expect the null hypothesis to be true in any population") (emphasis
omitted).
99. E.g., Hanson & Kysar, Behavioralism I, supra note 1, at 685 ("Throughout these
[framing effect] studies, subjects have shown a remarkable proclivity to exhibit different
preferences based solely on the manner in which the options are presented."); Hanson &
Kysar, BehavioralismII, supranote 2, at 1572 ("We do know... that consumers perceive the
product differently depending on the manufacturer's use of a non-substantive information
frame."); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, at 1104-05 ("When decisions options are perceived
as "gains' relative to the reference point, individuals are risk averse; that is, they prefer more
certain options to gambles with the same expected value. But when decision options are
perceived as 'losses' relative to the reference point, the same individuals will be risk-seeking;
that is, they will prefer a gamble to the certain option when both have the same expected
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sure gain of $240 versus a 25% chance to gain $1000 and a 75%
chance to gain nothing, most people will supposedly take the sure
gain. Yet, if presented with a sure loss of $750 versus a 75% chance
to lose $1000 and a 25% chance to lose nothing, most people will
supposedly take the gamble."0 0
Despite the portrayal of framing effects as pervasive and
powerful, a recent meta-analysis of 136 framing-effects studies
found evidence of a framing effect across studies, "but this effect
[was] of only small to moderate size." 1 ' Even this small to moderate
effect size associated with framing effects may be overestimated

value.") (footnote omitted); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accountingfor Greed: Unravelingthe Rogue
TraderMystery, 79 OR. L. REv. 301, 319 (2000) ("A growing body of evidence indicates that
individuals are loss averse, meaning that they tend to be risk averse to positively framed
problems and risk seeking to negatively framed problems."); Prentice, supra note 2, at 156
("One of the most pervasive influences on human judgment is framing.... [Pireferences
reverse completely depending on whether the chance is framed as a potential gain or a
potential loss."); Rachlinski, New Law & Psychology, supra note 9, at 744 (stating that
"plaintiffs, who regularly choose among gains, are risk-averse, while defendants, who
regularly choose among losses, are risk-seeking").
100. This example is taken from Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values, andFrames,supra
note 29, at 6.
101. Anton Kiuiberger, The Influence of Framingon Risky Decisions:A Meta-analysis, 75
ORGANIZATIONAL BFHAv. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 23,42,47 (1998) (examining 230 single
effect sizes and reporting a between-conditions mean effect size of d = .31).
Another meta-analysis by Kiihberger of the subset of framing studies that involve some
version of Kahneman and Tversky's "Asian-disease" decision problem found significant
bidirectional framing effects. These framing effects were found, however, in only
approximately sixty percent of the subjects across all experiments and not in all subjects or
even the vast majority of subjects as accounts of the framing research might lead one to
believe. Anton Kifhberger et al., The Effects ofFraming,Reflection, Probability,and Payoff
on Risk Preferencein Choice Tasks, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
204, 219 (1999). The authors note:
The present meta-analysis found significant bidirectional framing effects.
Presenting problems as gains leads participants to choose predominantly in a
risk-aversive manner (about 60%of all participants chose the sure gain and only
40% chose the risky gain). With losses, risk seeking predominates (about 40%
of the participants chose the sure loss, while 60% chose the risky loss).
Id. Furthermore, this finding of an effect for sixty percent of the participants does not mean
framing manipulations exert a large or determinative effect in any given situation (as noted
above, Kifberger's larger meta-analysis found a small to moderate effect size). In fact, risk
preferences on these Asian-disease types of problems "depend on the size and quality of the
payoffs used." Id. at 227. Moreover, this finding does not necessarily mean that sixty percent
of participants would individually change preferences across different frames of the disease
problem.

2002]

TAKING BEHAVIORALISM TOO SERIOUSLY?

1963

because the reported studies may not be a representative sample,
given the bias toward reports of successful replications. 2
What this means is that the influence of gain/loss framing on
choice as a determinative factor may be fairly infrequent and,
furthermore, that framing effects may be easily overwhelmed by
other factors in the decision situation. Indeed, there is a "growing
body of literature indicating that framing effects often are not as
pervasive or robust as had once been considered.""0 ' The tenuous
nature of framing effects is illustrated, for example, by the finding
that simply adding pertinent social context information to standard
framing-effect questions can greatly reduce or even eliminate
framing effects. 4 To sum up, we find that the legal decision
theorists overstate the certainty with which we can expect decision
frames to influence choices.
b. The HindsightBias
Another prominent claim of the legal decision theorists is that
legal actors often fall prey to the hindsight bias, which "causes
decision makers to overestimate ex post their ex ante prediction

102. Kohberger et al., supra note 101, at 47; see also infra section H.A.3.
103. David R. Mandel, Gain.LossFramingand Choice: SeparatingOutcome Formulations
from DescriptorFormulations,85 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 56,
70 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Jerwen Jou et al., An InformationProcessingView of
FramingEffects: The Role of CausalSchemas in DecisionMaking, 24 MEMORY & COGNITION
1, 10 (1996) ("The results ... suggest that framing effects in real life may not be as prevalent
as some decision studies have led us to believe.").
104. See James N. Druckman, Using CredibleAdviceto Overcome FramingEffects, 17 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 62 (2001). Druckman found that adding information about political party
endorsements to the program options that subjects must choose between in the Asian disease
problem and a variant on this problem greatly affected the likelihood of finding framing
effects. I& at 66-73 (reporting methods and results of Experiment 1); id. at 74-77 (reporting
methods and results of Experiment 2). Druckman concludes:
The experimental results demonstrate that the availability of credible advice
dramatically decreases, and sometimes eliminates, framing effects. Instead of
basing their preferences on arbitrary question wording, people tend to rely on
what they believe is credible information. Moreover, it seems plausible that
outside of the laboratory, people do in fact access and use advice from others,
especiallyin situations where they have ill-informed preferences. Manyprevious
framing effect experiments ignore this possibility, and as a result, overstate the
pervasivendss of framing effects.
Id. at 77.
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about the likelihood of an event taking place." ° Jeffrey Rachlinski,
one of the leading legal decision theorists who has written
extensively on the hindsight bias and its relevance for the legal
system,l" 6 asserts that "[elvery published empirical test of the
hindsight bias replicates the phenomenon."' 7 The artful wording of
this claim is itself interesting, in light of the fact that the hindsight
bias has not been found under all experimental conditions in which
it could have appeared.' 8 More to the point, Professor Rachlinski
fails to provide information about the overall effect size associated
with the bias, moderating variables, or the likely practical
significance of this bias-despite the fact that, to support his claim
that "[pisychologists have conducted nearly 130 experiments
demonstrating the existence of the hindsight bias using a variety of
different methods, materials, and subjects,"0 9 Professor Rachlinski
cites a meta-analytic study that provides just such information."0
When we look at the conclusions of this meta-analysis of over 120
hindsight experiments, we see why Professor Rachlinski may have
omitted this information. This meta-analysis reveals that the
hindsight bias is not necessarily the juggernaut that Professor
Rachlinski and other legal decision theorists portray it to be:
The results of this meta-analysis revealed that the overall effect
size (r = .17; corrected r = .25) of the hindsight bias is not large.
This does not mean that the bias should be ignored since,
depending upon the costs and benefits of making a correct and
incorrect decision, effect sizes much smaller than this can still
be of practical significance. At the same time, given the small
observed effect size of the hindsight bias, its effect will more
likely be washed out by the random error inherent in the real
105. Korobkin, supra note 6, at 48; see also supra note 45.
106. E.g., Rachlinski, Hindsight, supra note 9; Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 66-82, 94-96;
JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Regulatingin ForesightVersus JudgingLiability in Hindsight:The Case
of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REV. 813 (1999).
107. Rachlinski, supranote 23, at 67.
108. E.g., David Wasserman et al., Hindsight and Causality, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BuLL. 30,33 (1991) (subjects in the "chance explanation" condition did not show the
hindsight bias). The assertion is particularly odd in light of Rachlinski's earlier
acknowledgement of studies reporting a "reverse hindsight bias," though he did criticize these
studies and downplay their results. See Rachlinski, Hindsight,supra note 9, at 580 n.31.
109. Rachlinski, supranote 23, at 67.
110. Id. at 68 & n.31 (citing Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, supra note 91, at 150).
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world than would have occurred had the effect size been larger.
Consequently, before issuing warnings to correct for the
hindsight bias one needs to examine closely its potential impact
for the specific situation of concern.
This study also showed that people who retrospectively claim
that they "knew-all-along" what would occur are not necessarily
exhibiting the hindsight bias.... [Miany people faced with a
dichotomous choice (e.g., act, not act), who retrospectively claim
to have known all along that the observed outcome would occur,
might have acted the same way even in foresight.
The magnitude of the hindsight effect can be moderated by
the type of outcome information provided and the person's
familiarity with a task ...
In addition to these moderating variables, the location of the
foresight probability estimate in respect to the threshold
probability can affect the impact of the hindsight bias. ...
Depending upon the familiarity of the task and type of outcome
information presented, anywhere from a minimum of 0% to a
maximum of 7-27% of the population may make different
decisions because of the hindsight bias."'
Although Professor Rachlinski cites this very study, he does not
provide the above information, does not suggest that the reader
examine the above information, nor does he qualify or explain for a
lay audience his broad statement that the hindsight bias is a "robust
phenomenon.""' It seems apparent that inclusion of the abovequoted information inside Professor Rachlinski's article would
detract from the legal importance assigned to the hindsight bias by
Professor Rachlinski and would, at a minimum, counsel the reader
to examine more closely claims assigning determinative causal force
to the hindsight bias in the decisions of judges and juries."3
111. Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, supra note 91, at 162 (citations omitted).
112. See Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 68.
113. In another article, Professor Rachlinski contends that the hindsight bias "gives an
average of a 15 percent 'boost' to the assessed probability in foresight-easily enough to
enable the plaintiff to surmount the 50 percent threshold needed to establish liability in a

close case." Rachlinski, Hindsight, supra note 9, at 606 (footnotes omitted). Professor
Rachlinski does not specify his methodology for this estimation, nor does he cite any
particular source to support the estimate. Perhaps Professor Rachlinski's estimate on
probability alone is correct-though it seems bold in light of the Christensen-Szalanski and
Willhammeta-analytic results and given the great complexity ofbehavior-but at a minimum
the reader should be provided with more information about his estimation methodology or
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3. The File DrawerProblem
The perception that experimental subjects are hopelessly prone
to error may be further heightened by the phenomenon known as
the "file drawer problem":
Both behavioral researchers and statisticians have long
suspected that the studies published in the behavioral sciences
are a biased sample of the studies that are actually carried out.
The extreme view of this problem, the "file drawer problem," is
that the journals are filled with the 5% of the studies that show
Type I errors, while the file drawers back at the lab are filled
of the studies that show nonsignificant (e.g., p >
with the 95%
11 4
.05) results.
There is evidence that psychologists are reluctant to submit and
referees are reluctant to accept for publication articles failing to
reject the null hypothesis.' 15
other bases for the claim (for example, what is the justification for extrapolating from
hindsight bias studies of individual judgment to the context of group judgments by juries? See
supranote 45). A full disclosure of the findings of the meta-analysis would have provided the
reader with a more balanced view of research on the hindsight bias.
114. Robert Rosenthal, The 'File Drawer Problem" and Tolerance for Null Results, 86
PSYCHOL. BULL. 638, 638 (1979) (citations omitted); see also ROBERT ROSENTHAL, JUDGMENT
STUDIES: DESIGN, ANALYSIS, AND META-ANALYSIS 223-25 (1987) (providing an analytical tool
for estimating "the degree of damage to any research conclusion that could be done by the file
drawer problem").
115. Donald R. Atkinson et al., Statistical Significance, Reviewer Evaluations, and the
Scientific Process: Is There a (Statistically)Significant Relationship?, 29 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 189, 192 (1982) ('The results of this study tend to substantiate that, other things
being equal, a research manuscript reporting statistically significant findings is more likely
to be recommended for publication than is a manuscript reporting statistically nonsignificant
findings."); Steven Kerr et al., Manuscript CharacteristicsWhich Influence Acceptance for
Management and Social Science Journals,20 ACA. MGMT. J. 132, 141 (1977) (finding that
"a number of characteristics were considered to seriously impair publication chances,"
including "results which are statistically insignificant"); Michael J. Mahoney, Publication
Prejudices: An Experimental Study of Confirmatory Bias in the Peer Review System, 1
COGNITIVE THERAPY & RES. 161, 173 (1977) (finding that "referee evaluations may be
dramatically influenced by such factors as experimental outcome"); James Rotton et al.,
PublicationPracticesand the File DrawerProblem:A Survey of PublishedAuthors,10 J. Soc.
BEHAv. & PERSONALITY 1, 9 (1993) (finding in a survey of behavioral scientists that the most
frequently cited reason for deciding against publication was "the results were nonsignificant
or unimpressive').
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If studies failing to reject the null hypothesis are published less
frequently than studies rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., if
these former studies remain in the "file drawer"), then we see a
disproportionately low number of studies reporting rational
behavior, because a finding of rational behavior is typically equated
with a failure to reject the null hypothesis. n 6 So long as social and
cognitive psychology maintains a "negativistic paradigm" that
focuses on finding bias and error while assigning rationality to the
easily rejected null hypothesis," 7 we can expect the file drawer
problem to bias publication against reports of rational behavior.
4. Summary: The Aggregation-GeneralizationFallacy
When decision researchers and legal scholars treat a statistically
significant result from a between-subjects experiment (i.e., a finding
that group means differ significantly) as if it were a finding of a
general effect of practical significance (e.g., that virtually all juries
will fall prey to the hindsight bias), they commit what may be called
the "aggregation-generalization fallacy": confusing findings drawn
from aggregate data with generally applicable findings or findings
showing constant effects across individuals." "A general-type
propositionasserts something which is presumably true of each and
116. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
117. Krueger, supra note 88, 1 ("Much of the social psychological research effort has
concentrated on the shortcomings of everyday behavior and thinking. Although topics such
as attraction, altruism, and accuracyin person perception have also been of interest, the bulk
of these findings and the interpretation of these findings reflect a negativistic paradigm."); see
also Ralph Hertwig & Peter M Todd, Biases to the Left, Fallaciesto the Right: Stuck in the
Middle with Null Hypothesis Significance Testing: Commentary on Krueger on Social Bias,
11 PsYcOLOQUY 20, 3 (2000), at http'/www.cogsi.soton.ac.uk/psyc-bin/newpsy11.028
("[Pisychology's way of testing hypotheses stacks the deck in favor of rejecting predictions
derived from normative principles (i.e., the null hypothesis). In other words: Asymmetric
hypothesis testing has a built-in bias to find biases.').
118. "Effects that are identical for all may be said to be constant, whereas those that vary
with individuals may be said to be variable."David Sohn, Experimental Effects: Are They
Constant or Variable Across Individuals?, 9 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 625, 626 (1999). Legal
decision theorists are not unique: "What frequentlyhappens is that the scientist uses research
findings about means, which... are aggregate propositions, to support scientific propositions
ofthe generalvariety. 'the data are treated as aggregates [i.e. means] while the experimenter
is trying to infer general propositions.'" Id. at 627 (citation omitted); see also RAYMOND S.
NICKERSON, REFLECTIONS ON REASONING 126 (1986) ("A common reasoning fallacy that is
encountered in everyday life is that of over generalization, or what might be called the
problem of imputing to a class the characteristics of one or a few of its members.").
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every member of a designable class. An aggregate-typeproposition
asserts something which is presumably true of the class considered
as an aggregate."119 General-type propositions do not necessarily
follow from aggregate-type propositions. Similarity in aggregate
responses by two or more population subgroups does not mean that
the effects of a manipulation are constant within, or general to, all
members of the subgroups, much less that the aggregate and
individual responses of other identifiable subgroups will be the
same.
The legal decision theorists' strategy of inferring generalized
patterns of behavior from aggregate data is ironic given this
strategy's similarity to the economists' strategy of arguing that the
effects of cognitive biases and errors will "wash out" when aggregate
market behavior is examined (i.e., competition will weed out the
irrational in the aggregate).1 20 Legal decision theorists rebut
economists' "errors wash out in the aggregate" argument by
asserting that cognitive biases and errors are systematic and
pervasive, rather than randomly occurring, and therefore, the
influence of these nonrational behaviors persists even in the
aggregate.1' Yet to support this claim that cognitive biases and
errors are systematic and pervasive, legal decision theorists rely on
aggregate data from between-subjects experiments that says very
little about the strength, pervasiveness, and systematicness of
cognitive biases and errors. In the end, this leaves legal decision
theorists making an argument that mirrors that of the economists:
119. David Bakan, The General and the Aggregate: A Methodological Distinction, 5
PERCEPrUAL & MoToR SKILLS 211,211 (1955); see also Bakan, supra note 89, at 433. Bakan
asserts:
One of the most unfortunate characteristics of many studies in psychology,
especially in experimental psychology, is that the data are treated as aggregates
while the experimenter is trying to infer general propositions. There is hardly
an issue of most of the major psychological journals reporting experimentation
in which this confusion does not appear several times; and in which the test of
significance, which has some value in connection with the study of aggregates,
is not interpreted as a measure of the credibility of the general proposition in
which the investigator is interested.
Id.; see also Sohn, supra note 118, at 628 ("Psychologists seem to be content with statements
of findings or propositions of the form that A affects B or an independent variable has an
effect on a dependent variable. Such statements leave the reader in the dark about the
characteristics of effects, whether they are constant or variable.").
120. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
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We should not be concerned with the fact that some individuals
make normatively correct judgments or choices because, in the
aggregate, these rational responses "wash out." Both the economists'
and the legal decision theorists' arguments raise unanswered
empirical questions about the real-world significance of the bias and
error research.
Inferring generalizations about behavior from aggregated data
may be a defensible, if imprecise, practice, but only when this
inferential leap and its basis are made clear.u2 Virtually all of the
claims of the legal decision theorists are general-type propositions
inferred from aggregate-type propositions without explication as
such, and without any discussion of how findings of statistical
significance alone can support the generalizations."2 One finds, at
most, linguistic hedges, such as the data "suggest" some effect or
some effect "generally" occurs, but not outright admissions that
legal decision theory is founded on generalizations that are shakily
inferred from aggregated data in between-subjects experiments.
The point here is not to assert that important anomalies in
judgment and decision making never occur-they clearly do for
some subjects, even in within-subjects designs' 4-- but rather to
emphasize that subjects vary widely in their approaches to, and
success on, behavioral decision-making tasks and to argue that
generalizing from the conduct of the "average judge" composed from
between-subjects experiments can be very misleading. The
immediate danger of behavioral decision (and hence legal decision)
theory's focus on the "average judge" is twofold: (1) this approach
122. Cf. Bakan, supra note 119, at 212 ("The distinction between [general-type and
aggregate-type] propositions does not preclude the possibility of using one type of proposition
as a basis for inference with respect to the other type.").
123. See section lA (documenting the broad and pessimistic claims regarding human
cognition made by legal decision theorists).
124. The conjunction fallacy (e.g., judging the likelihood of some person being a feminist
bank teller to be greater than the likelihood that the person is simply a bank teller, which is
logically more likely given that the latter set includes the former subset) is an example of an
anomaly that may persist even in within-subjects designs. See Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning:The ConjunctionFallacy in Probability
Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REv. 293, 299-300 (1983) (reporting significant percentages of
subjects continuing to commit the conjunction fallacy even when presented with both response
options in the "Linda problem" in an attempt to make the problem more transparent).
However, commission of the conjunction fallacy maybe quite dependent on how the problem
is phrased and presented. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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implies incorrectly that no important or consistent individual
differences are associated with different reasoning skills or decision
tendencies2 and that few subjects provide the correct responses in
behavioral decision research; and (2) tests for statistical significance
between treatment means or tests of the significance of different
frequencies of responses between experimental groups-without the
reporting of treatment magnitudes, and without detailed discussion
of the absolute numbers of subjects getting the "right" versus the
"wrong" answers and moderating or mediating variables-may lead
one to overestimate the scope and importance of an experimental
manipulation, and thus, the prevalence and systematicness of the
anomaly being studied.
Because the bulk of behavioral decision research involves
conclusions about average judges in between-subjects designs
without estimates of the magnitude or prevalence of effects,2 6 legal
decision theorists should exercise much greater care in the
generalizations drawn from behavioral decision theory research.
The ultimate danger of this lack of care and precision in the claims
being made about the irrationality of legal behavior is that "simple
and general statements about a literature can become more
authoritative than either the existing data or the claims made about
the data by the original authors. "'27
125. See generally Mitchell, supra note 8.
126. See, e.g., Albert Erlebacher, Design and Analysis of Experiments Contrastingthe
Within- and Between-Subjects Manipulationof the Independent Variable, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL.
212,212 (1977) ("Most experiments in personality or social psychology tend to be performed
with a between-subjects design."); Paul A. Klaczynski et al., Goal-OrientedCriticalReasoning
andIndividualDifferencesin CriticalReasoningBiases,89 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 470,472 (1997)
("Research on the biased application of reasoning strategies has typicallybeen conducted with
between-subjects designs. Reasoning biases are demonstrated when one group readily
assimilates the enhancing information to their existing beliefs and a second group uses
complex reasoning to reject threatening information.") (citations omitted).
127. Jonathon J. Koehler, The Base Rate FallacyMyth, 4 PsYCOLoQUY 1, 914 (1993), at
http'J/www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?4.49.
Once in print, generalizations and bold claims take on a life of their own. Koehler analyzes,
for instance, how "the 'base rates are ignored' misperception" survives in the heuristics and
biases literature, and he notes that the base rate literature "has been simplified,
misinterpreted, and selectively cited by observers, researchers, and reviewers alike," and that
"the ubiquitous summary statements of base rate neglect distort the empirical literature."
Koehler, supra note 67, at 5. Likewise, Vicente argues that
proponents of the heuristics and biases view have a thesis that they wish to
promote vigorously-that human decision making is flawed. As a result, they
mayhave inadvertently reconstructed the findings of seminal studies in the base
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B. Featuresof BehavioralDecision Theory That Increase the
Likelihood of IrrationalBehavior in Experimental Settings
Certain features of behavioral decisioi theoiy research increase
the likelihood that experimental subjects will provide the nonnormative, or "irrational," response. Like the features just
discussed, which mask the variation in behavior among experimental subjects and thus distort the perception of the
prevalence of irrational behavior, this next set of features, by
causing irrational behavior to be oversampled, also distorts the
perceived frequency of irrational behavior.
1. ExperimentsDesigned to ElicitNon-normative Responses
The large number of behavioral decision theory experiments
that demonstrate irrational behavior should not be particularly
surprising when one realizes that many of these experiments are
designed specifically to elicit error. That is, many experiments have
been designed and refined with an eye towards presenting subjects
with situations and problems likely to cause at least some subjects
to provide the normatively incorrect response.

rate literature in such a way as to be consistent with their thesis. In doing so,
they have created yet another 'virus" of miscitations of a well-known body of
psychological research.
Kim J. Vicente, The Perils of Reconstructive Remembering and the Value of Representative
Design, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 40, 40 (1996). For additional discussion and examples of
distortion ofresearch findings in secondary sources see James T. Todd & Edward K Morris,
CaseHistoriesin the GreatPowerofSteady Misrepresentation,47 AMM PSYCHOLOGIST 1441
(1992); Kim J. Vicente & William F. Brewer, Reconstructive remembering of the Scientific
Literature,46 COGNITION 101 (1993); cf.Cass R. Sunstein, On Academic Fads and Fashions,
99 MIcH. L. REv. 1251 (2001). Sunstein states:
The cautionary note is that in law and many other academic fields, ideas may

spread and prosper, not because they are good, but because dozens, hundreds,
or even thousands ofimperfectly informed people have fortified the very signals
by which they have been influenced. Whether bad ideas can prosper for a long
time is another matter. Frequently good arguments and good evidence will
puncture them, at least when there is agreement about the underlying criteria.

But if the account here is correct, longevity, even for bad ideas, is hardly out of
the question.

Id&at 1264.
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[DIemonstrations of judgmental fallibility need careful
interpretation lest they be seen as broad indictments of
reasoning in general. In particular, it must be recognized that
many of these demonstrations rely upon a narrow range of
conditions that purposely are designed to highlight fallibility,
and that their success in doing this does not necessarily mean
that the demonstrated errors will occur in less contrived
circumstances.'
The leading proponents of the heuristic and bias view of cognitive
error, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, forthrightly
acknowledged that in their study of the conjunction fallacy, for
example, they used word problems that they believed would elicit
error regardless of whether the features of such problems were
representative of problems in the real world: "Our problems, of
course, were constructed to elicit conjunction errors, and they do not
provide an unbiased estimate of the prevalence of these errors." 9
This strategy is justifiable because Kahneman and Tversky, like
many other behavioral decision theorists, sought to elicit errors to
illuminate underlying psychological processes rather than
30
determine the prevalence of irrational behavior.'
128. Lee Roy Beach et al., AssessingHuman Judgment: Has it Been Done, Can it Be Done,
Should it Be Done?, in JUDGmFNTAL FORECASTING 49 (George Wright & Peter Ayton eds.,
1987). Jepson, Nisbett, and their colleagues make a similar point:
It seems likely... that the universality of the errors demonstrated to date is
simply a result of the fact that subjects have been presented with problems for
which the investigators themselves felt drawn to the erroneous line of reasoning.
If one is simply seeking to demonstrate errors, this is an efficient strategy. But
normatively correct principles ofreasoning applynot only to hard problems, that
is, those that investigators themselves have difficulty with, but also to easy
problems.
Christopher Jepson et al., Inductive Reasoning: Competence or Skill?, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI.
494, 495 (1983).
129. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 124, at 311 (emphasis added); see also Daniel
Kahneman, supra note 60, at 142 (characterizing many of the heuristic and biases problems
as "challenging brain teasers").
130. See Kabneman &Tversky, supranote 78, at 582 ("[T]he study of systematic error can
illuminate the psychological processes that underlie perception and judgment."); Kahneman
& Tversky, supra note 56, at 124 ("There are three related reasons for the focus on systematic
errors and inferential biases in the study of reasoning. First, they expose some of our
intellectual limitations and suggest ways of improving the quality of our thinking. Second,
errors and biases often reveal the psychological processes and the heuristic procedures that
govern judgment and inference. Third, mistakes and fallacies help the mapping of human
intuitions by indicating which principles of statistics or logic are non-intuitive or counter-
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One danger of a research strategy focused on error elicitation, of
course, is that it may lead to a belief that normative errors are more
common than they really are. Recall that the use of cognitive
heuristics is adaptive, for heuristic processing often leads to the
same result as does more systematic information-processing that
requires greater effort or resources." Indeed, heuristic processing
1 32
may lead to the normative result with a high degree of frequency.
Because the use of a cognitive heuristic does not ensure normative
error, researchers who seek to examine or demonstrate deviations
from rationality must utilize experiments that sample those
potentially unrepresentative situations in which the result given by
a cognitive heuristic departs from the normative result.
A second danger is that the results from these more difficult or
trickier problems may hold little or no relevance for other types of
decision problems. The social psychologist and behavioral decision
theorist Reid Hastie candidly commented on this point a few years
ago:
I am struckbythe unexceptional quality of the research thathas
been conducted by psychologists who focus on the goal of proving
expected utility theory wrong. The economist's armchair
"paradox" has been adopted as a replacement for the carefully
controlled, labor-intensive experiment. The texts are filled with
too many theoretical overgeneralizations and unconvincing
interpretations of naturally-occurring behavior, based on
intuitive."); id at 125 ("Errors and biases in judgment under uncertainty are the major source
of data for the mapping of the boundaries of people's statistical intuitions."); Tversky &
Kalmeman, supra note 124, at 313 ("Our studies of inductive reasoning have focused on
systematic errors because they are diagnostic of the heuristics that generally governjudgment
and inference."); see also Kahneman, supra note 77, at 682 ("Contrary to a common perception,
researchers workingin the heuristics and biases.., mode are less interested in demonstrating
irrationality than in understanding the psychology of intuitive judgment and choice. The
purpose of studying deviations of human judgments and choices from standard rational
models ... is to develop diagnostics for particular psychological processes."); supra text
accompanying note 87.
131. See, e.g., BAzERMAN, supra note 25, at 7 ('The availability heuristic can be a very
useful managerial decision-making strategy, since instances of events of greater frequency
are generally revealed more easily in our minds than events of less frequency. Consequently,
this heuristic will often lead to accurate judgment."); Arkes, supra note 14, at 487-92
(discussing the adaptive nature of simplified information-processing approaches); see also
supra note 26.
132. See supra note 92.
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responses to 60-second brainteaser problems. (The brainteasers
do serve a valid function in the rhetoric of scientific discourse;
they have been remarkably effective at illustrating some of the
cognitive processes that underlie decision making, and they have
energized a field that was in the doldrums at the end of the
sixties. But, I think it is time to move on to more substantial
empirical analyses.)183

The context-dependent nature of reasoning and choice argues
against the assumption that performance on one type of problem
will necessarily be the same on another type of problem:
It has been demonstrated that many adults do not have
generally valid intuitions corresponding to the law of large
numbers, the role of base rates in Bayesian inference, or the
principles of regressive prediction. But it is simply not the case
that every problem to which these rules are relevant will be
answered incorrectly, or that the rules cannot appear compelling
in particular contexts.
The properties that make formally equivalent problems easy
or hard to solve appear to be related to the mental models, or
schemas, that the problems evoke.... It appears that the actual
reasoning process is schema-bound or content-bound so that
different operations or inferential rules are available in different
contexts. Consequently, human reasoning cannot be adequately
described in terms of content-independent formal rules."

133. Hastie, supra note 88, at 138; cf. Ward Edwards, Unfinished Tasks: A Research
Agenda for Behavioral Decision Theory, in INSIGHTS IN DECISION MAKING: A TRIBUTE TO
HILLEL J. EINHOPN 47 (Robin M. Hogarth ed., 1990) ("It does not seem reasonable to me to
expect that the same processes and outputs will be found in personal decisions made casually,
perhaps with trivial stakes, in highly sophisticated decisions made after intensive financial
analysis and staff study, or in decisions made by committees.").
134. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 56, at 129-30 (citations omitted); see also William
M. Goldstein & Elke U. Weber, Content and Discontent:Indications and Implications of
DomainSpecificity inPreferentialDecisionMaking, in RESEARCH ONJUDGMENTADDECISION
MAKING, supra note 20, at 566-617 (discussing the importance of content domain to
preferential decision making); David A. Rettinger & Reid Hastie, ContentEffects on Decision
Making, 85 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 336, 356 (2001) ("In
summary, the content of a decision problem plays a major role in determining the information
processing that participants usedinmaking choices. Content domain affectedjudgments, selfreported decision strategy, mental representations of the decisions, and the ultimate choice.").
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Therefore, even if all types of people responded identically across
a variety of behavioral decision-making tasks (which they do not),
we would still have to assess the "psychological realism" of this
research to determine whether the processes operative in these
tasks are likely to be operative on other experimental and realworld tasks. Psychological realism refers to "how well an experiment
captures psychological processes like those occurring in everyday
life,"1 35 and is similar to the notion of construct validity. In social
psychological research, construct validity concerns the extent to
which the constructs of theoretical interest are validly
operationalized in the research setting. 6
Given the interest in finding error rather than studying
naturalistic decision making, often little effort is made to assess
whether the mental operations primed in behavioral decision
experiments are the same operations primed in real-world
settings."s7 Consider, for instance, that ifwe force subjects to rate on
a continuous scale their confidence in the accuracy of their answers
on a general knowledge test, we can expect to find poor calibration
of accuracy in a fair number of subjects on this continuous scale
135. ELLIoTARONSON ETAL., SOcIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE HEART AND THE MIND 58 (1994).
136. LoUISE H. KIDDER & CHARLES AL JUDD, RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 28

tbl.2.1 (5th ed. 1986) (construct validity directs one to the question of't]o what extent are the
constructs of theoretical interest successfully operationalized in the research?"). For a more
detailed discussion of construct validity see THOMAS D. COOK& DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASIEXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETINWGS 59-70 (1979).
137. See Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konedni, On the External Validity of DecisionMaking Research. What Do We Know About Decisions in the Real World?, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 21, 25-36 (Thomas S. Wallsten ed., 1980)
(reviewing evidence that counsels against the assumption that simulations capture well realworld decision making); Hastie, supra note 52, at 664 ("Far more is known about the
consequences of alternative decision problem representations (e.g. gain vs loss frames and
summary vs unpacked event descriptions) than is known about the determinants of the
representations. Thus, one key problem is understanding the determinants of decision frames
and event descriptions and the impact of these differences on evaluations and judgments
when a person is uncertain.") (citations omitted); George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as
Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL BULL. 267, 267 (2001) ("Many choice theorists are deliberately
agnostic about the psychological processes underlying the patterns ofchoice that their models
predict."); see also Lola L. Lopes, Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Risk, in
RESEARCH ONJUDGMENTAND DECISION MAKING, supra note 20, at 716 ("Theories that attempt

to explain all of risky choice in the narrow terms of purely perceptual or purely cognitive or
purely motivational mechanisms will necessarily miss much of what impels people toward or
away from particular risks. The factors that influence human risk taking range from
psychophysics to society and from fear to fun. So too should the psychology of risk.").
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(with subjects tending to overestimate the percentage of correct
answers). If people in the real world internally judge their
confidence more categorically (e.g., high versus low confidence in
their accuracy), however, then we may find that this less finegrained calibration leads to a more realistic assessment of
confidence for behavioral purposes."' Thus, something as simple as
the response scale used in the research may drastically alter our
view of the competence of the decision maker. Given the complexity
of the real world and decision making in it, and particularly given
behavioral decision theory's emphasis on finding deviations from
rationality norms, we simply cannot assume that results in
behavioral decision research easily translate to conduct outside the
laboratory.
Behavioral decision theorists, and consumers of their work, must
resist two curses described by Baruch Fischhoff. First is the "curse
of context": "We would like to interpret [subjects'] responses as
reflecting deep-seated values, of the sort that come from a lifetime
of intense involvement with real-world decisions. Yet, we set
138. The overconfidence effect occurs when subjects provide answers to questions, typically
general knowledge questions, and then provide estimates, or probability judgments, of the
likelihood that their answers are correct; "over a wide range of conditions, subjects' average
probability judgments exceed the proportions of items they answer correctly." J. Frank Yates
et al., Beliefs about Overconfidence, Including Its Cross-National Variation, 65
ORGANIzATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 138, 138 (1996). Whether people are

irrationally overconfident in their ability on judgment and decision-making tasks or whether
this "overconfidence" is simply the artifact of an improper approach to the assessment of
judgmental confidence is the subject of serious debate among behavioral decision theorists.
See generallyLyle A. Brenner et al., Overconfidence in ProbabilityandFrequencyJudgments:
A CriticalExamination,65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISIONPROCESSES 212 (1996);

Robyn M. Dawes & Matthew Mulford, The False ConsensusEffect and Overconfidence: Flaws
in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 201 (1996); Dale W. Griffin & Carol A. Varey, Towardsa Consensuson
Overconfidence, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 227 (1996); see also

Thomas S. Wallsten,AnAnalysis ofJudgmentResearchAnalyses,65 ORGANIZATIONALBEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 220 (1996) (discussing different approaches to the study of
overconfidence).
Consider, as another example, a study in the context of risk assessment that examined
respondents' subjective meaning in choosing the fifty-percent option on response scales.
Rather than an assessment that there is a fifty-percent probability that a risky event will
occur, the choice of the fifty-percent option may mean that the respondents simply have no
good idea of the odds. See Baruch Fischhoff & Wiindi Bruine de Bruin, Fifty-Fifty = 50%?, 12
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 149, 160 (1999) ("It appears, thus, that the availability of the
common phrase 'fifty-fifty' affects the use of the 50 response as an expression of epistemic
uncertainty.").
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minimalist problems before subjects and expect them to resist the
temptation to impute a context."'39 Second is the "curse of
cleverness": "We pride ourselves on devising just the right tasks for
evaluating competing theories of human behavior, tasks that our
predecessors were unable to concoct. Then, we expect subjects
immediately to discern the structure of these tasks and decide what
response is right for them."' When students of judgment and
decision making fall prey to these two curses, they see themselves
as too smart and their subjects as too dumb.
2. Lack of Feedbackand Learning Opportunities
One of the clearest ways in which many behavioral decision
experiments differ from many decision settings in the real world is
in the lack of feedback or learning opportunities provided to
subjects. This lack of feedback and learning is a natural
consequence of the frequent use of between-subjects designs in
behavioral decision experiments, in which subjects participate in
only one experimental condition expressing typically only one choice
or judgment. This lack of feedback and learning opportunities
increases the likelihood that irrational responses will be found, for
it denies subjects the opportunity to understand the larger context
in which their decisions are being made (contrary to subjects who
participate in repeated-measures designs) and to determine the
success of a course of behavior.""
Experimental economists have been particularly critical of
behavioral decision theory's emphasis on one-shot decision
situations that fail to test for feedback, learning, and market
interaction effects. Experimental economists argue that, while
studies using between-subjects designs may "have relevance to
measuring people's preference attitudes," such studies "provide no
basis for extrapolation to behavior in markets." 4 ' This failing is
serious, at least when behavioral decision theorists seek to describe
139. Baruch Fischhoff, The Real World: What Good Is It?, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. &
Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 232,245 (1996).

140. Id
141. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
142. Peter Knez et al., IndividualRationality,Market Rationality,and Value Estimation,
75 AMER. ECON. REv. 397,398 (1985).

1978

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1907

behavior in repetitive markets, because "[m]ost (but not all)
experimental markets show some learning effects over time with
equilibrium behavior quite different from start-up behavior."'4
Accordingly, experimental economists emphasize the study of
behavior in experimental markets rather than responses to simple
gambles or single word problems as so often found in psychological
studies of judgment and choice. 4
143. Id.; see also id. at 400-O1 (reporting decreased disparities inwilling-to-payandwillingto-accept prices over time in repeated-measures design); Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the
Laboratory,8 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 113, 118 (1994) (noting "tendency for rational behavior
to emerge in the context of a repetitive market institution" and that "[iln many experimental
markets, poorlyinformed, error-prone, and uncomprehending human agents interact through
the trading rules to produce social algorithms which demonstrably approximate the wealth
maximizing outcomes traditionally thought to require complete information and cognitively
rational actors") (footnote omitted); Vernon L. Smith, Theory, Experiment and Economics, 3
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 151, 165 (1989). Smith claims:
I think we economists need to accept these replicable empirical results [from
behavioral decision theory] as providing meaningful measures of how people
think about economic questions. For their part, psychologists need to accept the
dominating message in experimental research on the performance of a wide
variety of bidding, auctioning and customer (posted price) markets: markets
quite often "work" in the sense that over time they converge to the predictions
of the economist's paradigm.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Can Small Deviations
from RationalityMake SignificantDifferences to EconomicEquilibria?,75 AMEp- ECON. REV.
708, 708 (1985) ("This paper constructs a number of examples which show that small
deviations from rationality can have first-order consequences in microeconomic analysis.");
Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive
Markets, 75 AmRp. ECON. REv. 1071, 1081 (1985) ("The notion that individual irrationalities
will disappear in the aggregate must be rejected."); Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler, The
Relevance of QuasiRationality in CompetitiveMarkets:Reply, 77 AMER. ECoN.REV. 499 (1987)
(reporting correction to their 1985 paper).
144. See Richard H. McAdams, ExperimentalLaw and Economics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 55, at 540-41 ("The idea of creating a market in the
laboratoryhelps to distinguish experimental economics from a similar experimental literature
in social and cognitive psychology. ... Psychologists tend to ask their subjects questions....
By contrast, economic experimenters employ conditions that create different incentives for
behavior and then observe how subjects react."); Vernon L. Smith, ExperimentalEconomics:
Reply, 75 Amp- ECON. REv. 265, 267 (1985) (Advancing the hypothesis that "subjects are
more rational (in the sense of received decision theory under uncertainty) in the context of
laboratorymarkets, than when responding to questionnaire choices amongprospects, because
of Heiner's conjecture that 'Exchange environments also enable agents to interact with each
other in an organized and often repeated fashion.'"). But see Medin & Bazerman, supra note
23, at 536 ("Experimental economics is filled with demonstrations of performance
improvement through multiple trials-with convergence on the economically rational
solutions. In contrast, we suggest that much of experimental economics consists of contrived
experiments created in order to show convergence. In fact, many [behavioral decision
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Legal decision theorists have recognized this problem but have
sought to head it off as a criticism by arguing that "effective"
feedback and learning opportunities are probably rare or hard to
obtain.'4 Yet even this qualified defense is based on mixed evidence,
and its advocates must acknowledge that "learning can overcome
some cognitive biases, at least for some tasks."' The evidence
showing the beneficial effects of feedback and training supports the
view that single-decision settings differ in important ways from
repeated-decision settings and thus counsels against an assumption
that behavior is the same in both settings.
3. ConversationalCues and Demand Characteristics
Implicit conversational cues and demands in experimental
settings also lead subjects to provide normatively incorrect
responses that they otherwise would not provide. A great deal of
research in the last ten years has shown that subjects often provide
non-normative responses in behavioral decision-making experiments not because the subjects are incapable of acting rationally but
because the experimental situation indicates, or communicates, that
the non-normative response is the correct or desired answer under
the circumstances.
As early as 1982, Kahneman and Tversky noted the importance
of the interaction between subject and experimenter in evaluating
the behavior of subjects in behavioral decision research:
The presence of an error of judgment is demonstrated by
comparing people's responses either to an established fact (e.g.,
that the two lines are equal in length) or to an accepted rule of
arithmetic, logic or statistics. However, not every response that
appears to contradict an established fact or an accepted rule is
a judgmental error. The contradiction could also arise from the
research] results do live through shockingly high levels of feedback and multiple trials.")
(citations omitted).
145. For instance, Professor Garvin acknowledges that "some studies have shown quite
substantial learning effects." Garvin, Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, supranote 18, at 168.
But then he asserts that "[s]till, effective learning is far from common." Id. Professor Garvin
at least acknowledges the evidence on both sides of the issue and doses on an equivocal note,
which is rather uncommon for legal decision theory scholarship. See id. at 168-70.
146. Id. at 170.
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subject's misunderstanding of the question, or from the
investigator's misinterpretation of the answer. The description
of a particular response as an error of judgment therefore
involves assumptions about the communication between the
experimenter and the subject. ... The student of judgment

should avoid overly strict interpretations, which treat
reasonable answers as errors, as well as overly charitable
147
interpretations, which attempt to rationalize every response.
Later in the same article, Kahneman and Tversky emphasized that
we cannot safely assume that "experimental conversations" in
which subjects receive messages and answer questions will
simulate the inferences that people make in their normal
interaction with the environment. Although some judgments in
everyday life are made in response to explicit questions, many
are not. Furthermore, conversational experiments differ in many
ways from normal social interaction.'
To address these concerns, Kahneman and Tversky suggested a
research program focused on the investigator-participant
interaction:
We conclude that the conversational aspect ofjudgment studies
deserves more careful consideration than it has received in past
research, our own included. We cannot always assume that
people will or should make the same inferences from observing
a fact and from being told the same fact, because the
conversational rules that regulate communication between
people do not apply to the information that is obtained by
observing nature. It is often difficult to ask questions without
giving (useful or misleading) clues regarding the correct answer,
and without conveying information about the expected
response.'4 9
This "experimental conversations" research program focused on the
heuristics and biases research did not begin in earnest until several

147. Kahneman & Tversky, supranote 56, at 124.

148. Id. at 132.
149. Id. at 135.
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years after the appearance of Kahneman and Tversky's article," 0
but this research program has now revealed that many of the
experimental subjects' responses labeled as evidence of cognitive
bias or error were actually reasonable responses to conversational
cues contained in the experimental stimuli. 15 1
Norbert Schwarz concludes his important earlier review of this
experimental conversations research program in the following way:
In essence, social cognition researchers have conceptualized the
judge as doing his or her cognitive work in social isolation. In
many instances, the obtained findings provided a less than
flattering portrait of our respondents. Apparently, people are
happy to offer meaningless opinions on nonexistent issues and
150. Study of conversational influences in attribution and person perception processes
preceded the study of conversational influences in the heuristics and biases literature. See
Norbert Schwarz, Judgment in a Social Context: Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of
Conversation,26 ADVANCED EXPERiMENTAL Soc. PsYcHoL. 123,123-24(1994). Schwarz states:
On close inspection, it seems that much of what we consider to reflect biases in
human judgment, artifacts in attitude measurement, and so on, may actually
reflect researchers' ignorance regarding the conversational context of human
judgment, rather than serious shortcomings on the side of our subjects.
Accordingly, social cognition research may greatly benefit from a fuller
consideration of the social context in which humans conduct much of their
thinking about social as well as non-social stimuli....
At present, social cognition researchers have primarily paid attention to
conversational aspects of human judgment in exploring attribution processes
and the impact of different audiences on the encoding and recall of person
information.
Id. (citations omitted). By the mid-1990s, the research program remained nascent. See Denis
J. Hilton, The Social ContextofReasoning: ConversationalInference and RationalJudgment,
118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 248, 249 (1995) ("Although many researchers have noted that widely
shared assumptions about cooperative communication may license interpretations of the
experimental task that the experimenter may not have intended, work on this topic remains
fragmentary and underdeveloped in nature.") (citations omitted).
151. See Norbert Schwarz, Social Judgment andAttitudes: Warmer,More Social, and Less
Conscious, 30 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 149, 152 (2000) (noting that "a growing body of research
demonstrates that many of the apparent biases and shortcomings of human judgment are
attenuated or eliminated when this basic misunderstanding [about the nature of
communication in a research setting] is taken care of") (citations omitted); Ben R. Slugoski
& Anne E. Wilson, Contributionof Conversation Skills to the Production of Judgmental
Errors,28 EUV.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 575,576 (1998) (noting that"a sizeable body of research has
now accumulated to demonstrate that much of what we once considered to reflect 'hard-wired'
information processing mechanisms in human judgment (e.g., cognitive biases, attitudinal
shifts, causal attributions) actually reflects the operation of communicative goals and
strategies that people habitually rely upon in order to comprehend and generate meaningful
conversation") (citations omitted).
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are biased by irrelevant material such as the numeric values of
a rating scale or the response alternatives of a frequency
question. Moreover, they are apparently more willing to use
worthless personality information and to ignore meaningful base
rates, or to draw strong dispositional inferences despite obvious
situational pressures, and so on. As soon as we conceptualize the
assessed judgments as part of an ongoing conversation, however,
the often dramatic findings seem less surprising. Rather,
research participants seem to do what they would rightly be
expected to do in any other conversation: They assume that our
utterances as researchers are meaningful, that we do not ask
questions about things that don't exist, that we do construct
meaningful rather than arbitrary scales, and so on. Moreover,
they try to make sense of our utterances and of our research
instruments on the basis of these assumptions.
The apparent biases and errors that subjects commit by
relying on conversational maxims are less likely to result in
mistakes in everyday contexts where communicators try to
conform to conversational norms, provide information that is
relevant to the judgment at hand, and make the task one that is
clear rather than ambiguous-and in which recipients are indeed
expected to use contextual cues to disambiguate the
communication, should the communicator not live up to the
ideal. Thus, the behavior that may lead to errors in the
152
experimental context may be adaptive in everyday settings.
In other words, when we examine cognitive processes in artificial
or contrived settings in which ordinary rules of conversation do not
apply unbeknownst to the experimental subjects, we should not be
surprised to find that the operation of these cognitive processes
appears biased or appears to lead to error.'5 3 However, when we
152. Schwarz, supra note 150, at 154-56.
153. The rules of communication that behavioral decision researchers are typically accused

of violating are the conversational maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner, as
explicated by Paul Grice. See H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation,in THE LOGIC OFGRAMMAR
64, 67 (Donald Davidson &Gilbert Harman eds., 1975); see also Slugoski &Wilson, supranote
151, at 576 (stating that "researchers have come to rely on Grice's (1975) well known model
of cooperative conversational exchanges delineating the obligations falling on speakers and
expectations held by hearers in order to achieve common understanding") (citation omitted).

The maxim of quantity prescribes: "(1) 'Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange),' and possibly (2) 'Do not make your contribution
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restore conversational sense to the questions and possible answers
or when we make clear to the subjects that ordinary norms and
conventions of communication do not apply, we find improvement
in subjects' performance on tests of rational thinking-sometimes
substantial improvement." 4
Thus, "[w]hen participants are aware that the usual 'guarantee
of [conversational] relevance' does not hold, they prefer baserate
information over nondiagnostic individuating information; are
less likely to show the fundamental attribution error; and are less
likely to be influenced by misleading questions in eyewitness
testimony." 5 Similarly, conversational cues paired with ambiguities in the questions may explain the behavior of a significant
percentage of experimental subjects who ostensibly commit
more informative than is required.' Grice, supra,at 67. The maxim of quality prescribes: "Try
to make your contribution one that is true,' and two more specific maxims: (1) 'Do not say
what you believe to be false' [and] (2) 'Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.Id. The maxim of relation simply prescribes: "Be relevant.- Id. The maxim of manner
includes the supermaxim: "'Be perspicuous' and various maxims such as (1) 'Avoid obscurity
of expression'[;] (2) 'Avoid ambiguity'[;] (3) 'Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)'[; and] (4)
'3e orderly.'" Id. These maxms flow from the overarching "Cooperative Principle," which
prescribes: "'Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which
it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.'"
Id. Norbert Schwarz discusses these maxims and how they may be violated in research
settings. See Schwarz, supra note 150, at 124-27; see also Hilton, supranote 150, at 249-54
(discussing "[piroperties of conversational inference"); Robert M. Krauss & Chi-Yue Chiu,
Languageand SocialBehavior,in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supranote 9, at
41, 42-48 (contrasting four different paradigms or conceptions of interpersonal
communication, including the intentionalist paradigm into which Grice's approach falls).
154. See Hilton, supranote 150, at 264. Hilton notes:
[Ulndermining the assumption of intentionality [in communication in
experimental settings] reduces biases in such diverse tasks as Piagetian
conservation tasks, the engineers-and-lawyers task of Tversky and Kahneman,
and the leading questions paradigm of Loftus and Palmer. Another example is
the similar kinds of experimental demands created by juxtaposing questions
comparing specific and general quantities in tasks involving conservation, object
naming, probability judgments, and survey judgments of life satisfaction.
Conversational inference thus has general features that emerge in a wide range
of tasks.
Id (citations omitted).
155. Schwarz, supra note 151, at 152 (citations omitted); see also Schwarz, supra note 150,
at 128-34 (discussing conversational influences in base rate and causal attribution studies);
Slugoski & Wilson, supra note 151, at 579 ("Taken together, these studies strongly suggest
that participants' pragmatic assumptions play an important role in the interpretation of
'relevance' in the experimental setting and hence their likelihood of producing the so-called
'base-rate error.') (citation omitted).
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conjunction errors, commit the fundamental attribution error (a bias
to favor dispositional explanations of behavior and ignore
situational explanations), show primacy effects (giving greater
weight to early items in a sequence), show framing effects, perform
poorly on the Wason selection task (a test of conditional reasoning),
show overconfidence in judgments about the accuracy of their own
performance, and exhibit the "dilution effect" (in which providing
nondiagnostic information "dilutes" the impact of diagnostic
information in person perception tasks). 6 Hence, we see
participants responding quite reasonably to information given to
them as they try to figure out exactly what the investigator wants
of them: Surely the investigator would not suggest that Linda is a
feminist bank teller unless Linda is a feminist bank teller, as
unlikely as that may otherwise seem."
156. See Anton Kiihberger, The Framingof Decisions: A New Look at Old Problems, 62
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 230, 231-36 (1995) (discussing the

possible role of missing information in framing effect problems and presenting evidence that
more complete descriptions of problems may reduce or eliminate framing effects); Slugoski &
Wilson, supranote 151, at 579-81 (discussing research showing that conversational influences
in the experimental setting may lead subjects to exhibit conjunction errors, dilution effects,
primacy effects, and errors on the Wason selection task); Edward F. Wright & Gary L. Wells,
Is the Attitude-Attribution ParadigmSuitable for Investigating the DispositionalBias?, 14
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 183, 188 (1988) ("The results of this study supported the
hypothesis that subjects' attributions in experiments employing the attitude-attribution
paradigm are influenced by procedure-generated pressures.... The modified procedure
mitigated, but did not eliminate the dispositional bias.... [Tihe magnitude of the bias effect
obtained with the traditional attitude-attribution paradigm has probably been exaggerated
by the violation of the cooperativeness rule."); Ilan Yaniv & Dean P. Foster, Precision and
Accuracy of Judgmental Estimation, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 21, 30-31 (1997)
(discussing how expressions of overconfidence on some scales may be the result of subjects
seeking to resolve a trade-off between judgmental accuracy and communicative
informativeness); see also Deborah Frisch, Reasons for FramingEffects, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 399, 421 (1993) (discussing reasons behind different
responses to different versions of the framing problems, including that some framing effects
arise "because changes in the way a situation is described affect subjects' responses even
though the subjects themselves agree that the two versions are equivalent"); Hilton, supra
note 150, at 255-57, 259-61 (discussing conversational processes in studies of the use of base
rate information, studies of the dilution effect, and studies of the conjunction fallacy).
157. See Norbert Schwarz, CommunicationinStandardizedResearchSituations:AGricean
Perspective, in SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 39,
40 (Susan R. Fussell & Roger J. Kreuz eds., 1998). Schwarz notes:
Having no reason to assume that a researcher would ask a question about a
nonexistent issue, would present a scale that is haphazardly designed, or would
provide useless information, research participants are likely to search for
meaning in a researcher's contributions. Little do they know that researchers
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4. Use of Ecologically Suspect Formats
An alternative critical perspective on behavioral decision research
methodology likewise sees overestimation of the frequency of
cognitive error and bias in many behavioral decision experiments,
but attributes such error inflation not to demand characteristics but
to the decontextualized, abstract, or unnatural nature of the
research setting and research task. This critical perspective predicts
that representations of problems in ecologically valid terms will lead
to improved performance on a range of heuristic and bias tests. 1' 58 In
violate everynorm of conversational conduct that theywouldbe likely to observe
outside the research setting by providing information that is not relevant,
informative, truthful, or clear.
Id.; see also Schwarz, supra note 150, at 134 ("In fact, [when explicitly asked, participants
usually seem] aware that the normatively irrelevant information is of little informational
value. Nevertheless, they typically proceed to use it in making ajudgment" because the sheer
fact that it has been presented renders it conversationally relevant in the given context.)
(citation omitted).
The reference in the text to "Linda the feminist bank teller" alludes to Kalneman and
Tversky's famous "Linda problem" used to test for the conjunction fallacy. See Tversky &
Kahneman, supranote 124. After reading a description ofa "Linda," some subjects will judge
it more likely that Linda is both a feminist and a bank teller rather than just a bank teller,
ostensibly in violation of the conjunction rule that the frequency of an item in a subset cannot
be more likely than the frequency of an item in the larger set. Hertwig and Gigerenzer discuss
how the standard phrasing of the Linda problem and other word problems used by Kabneman
and Tversky may lead to a number of responses that look like conjunction errors but may be
in actuality logical responses in light of the language used. See Ralph Hertwig & Gerd
Gigerenzer, The 'Conjunction Fallacy' Revisited: How Intelligent Inferences Look Like
ReasoningErrors,12 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 275 (1999); see also Gerd Gigerenzer, On
NarrowNorms andVague Heuristics:A Reply to Kahnemanand Tversky (1996), 103 PSYCHOL.
REV. 592, 593 (1996). But see Kabneman & Tversky, supra note 78, at 585-87. Hertwig and
Kahneman engaged in an "adversarial collaboration" designed to arbitrate this dispute at
least in part, but the collaboration did not yield definitive results. See Mellers et al., supra
note 86, at 273-75 (discussion of results by Hertwig and Kahneman); id. at 275 ("In our case,
Hertwig acknowledges that the semantic ambiguity of 'and' is only one factor that contributes
to conjunction effects in the frequency format. Kahneman acknowledges that the experiments
have identified conditions under which the representativeness heuristic is overridden, and
that there may be more to be discovered."). Of course, as a simple matter of probability, it
must be more likely that Linda is a bank teller rather than both a feminist and a bank teller.
The real question is whether there is a reasonable explanation for why the mathematically
less probable answer is chosen: are people simply poor or lazy mathematicians, are they
falling prey to a bias by-product of the representativeness heuristic, or are they being
understandably duped into the mathematically wrong answer by conversational cues?
158. In explicating this view, evolutionary psychologists Brase, Cosmides, and Tooby note
a paradox: Why have so many studies of human judgment and decision making over the last
several years presented "human reasoning faculties [as] riddled with crippling defects,"
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support of this view, we find that performance on several decision
tasks does improve across subjects, often dramatically, when these
tasks are presented in less abstract and more realistic terms or
when the response options are given in formats that are more
familiar to the subjects.
To first illustrate the ecological validity critique, consider
performance on abstract versus contextualized versions of the
Wason four-card selection task, which is used to test conditional
reasoning performance.
The four-card selection taskis one ofthe more widelyresearched
deductive reasoning tasks, primarily because of the surprising
nature of the results. The task is deceptively simple. [In abstract
versions of the task, the subject] is given a rule, "Ifa card has a
vowel on its letter side, then it has an even number on its
number side," and is shown four cards face up: A, K, 18, 5. The
subject has to decide which card(s) must be turned over to prove
the truth or falsity of the rule. This task corresponds to the
material-implication rule of the form, "If p then q." The cards A
and K represent the antecedents (p and -p, respectively), and the
cards 18 and 5 represent the consequents (q and -q). The
solution is to turn over A and 5 (p and -q), because the rule is
violated only by cards pairing a vowel with an odd number. Most
studies have found that only about 10% of the subjects can solve
abstract forms of the problem.'5 9
whereas, during the same time period, studies of nonhuman animal behavior show that
"animals with truly minuscule nervous systems, such as bumblebees, make judgments under
uncertainty during foraging that manifest exactly the kind of well-calibrated statistical
induction that the human brain was widely thought of as 'too limited' to perform"? Gary L.
Brase et al., Individuation, Counting,and StatisticalInference: The Role of Frequency and
Whole-Object Representations in Judgment Under Uncertainty, 127 J. oF EXPluhENTAL
PSYCHOL. 3, 4 (1998) (citations omitted). Surely it cannot be that bumblebees are "more
rational" than humans. Brase, Cosmides, and Tooby believe the answer lies in the
methodology: "Bumblebees appeared rational while humans did not because they were tested
under ecologically valid conditions. When one does the same for human subjects, they too
perform like good intuitive statisticians." Id. (citation omitted); see also Jou et al., supranote
103, at 10 ("Our conclusion is in agreement with other reasoning and judgment studies in
which it has been concluded that people are more likely to make judgments and decisions in
accord with the normative rules when a problem is presented in a familiar and realistic
context.") (citations omitted).
159. Stephen J. Hoch & Judith E. Tschirgi, Logical Knowledge and Cue Redundancy in
Deductive Reasoning, 13 MEMORY & COGNITION 453, 453 (1985) (citations omitted); see also
Jonathan St. B.T. Evans & David E. Over,Rationality in the Selection Task: Epistemic Utility
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Whereas performance on abstract versions of the selection task
is usually quite poor across subjects, when the selection task is
presented in a format in which subjects are asked to test the
conditional relation between stimuli whose relations are more
natural or familiar, a majority of subjects usually make the correct
selections. For instance, the great majority of participants asked to
assume the role of an authority figure monitoring for violation of a
drinking rule select the proper cards to test the conditional relation
in the following version of the selection task:
Rule: If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 18
years of age.
The cards below have information about four patrons in a restaurant.
Each card represents one person. One side of the card tells you the age of the
person, and the other side of the card tells you what that person is drinking in
the bar.
Indicate only the card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of
these people are violating the rule. [Cards with the following information faceup are presented to subjects:]
Coke

Beer

16

22

Thus, most subjects properly indicate that the "Beer" and"16" cards
should be turned over in this version of the task."6 Many other
Versus UncertaintyReduction, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 356,356 (1996) (1he Wason selection task
has become the single most investigated problem in the psychology of reasoning. The
psychological interest in it reflects the fact that although the problem is apparently simple
to present and understand, the great majority ofadults fail to solve it logically in its standard
form.") (citation omitted).
The task is often called the "Wason" selection task after the first researcher to report its
use, Peter Wason. See P. C. Wason, Reasoning,in NEW HORIZONS INPSYCHOLOGY 135 (Brian
M. Foss ed., 1966). Wason interpreted errors on his task as evidence of a "confirmation bias":
"Wason described the hypothesis testers as 'seeking confirmation' because they looked
predominantly at cases that fit their hypothesized rule for targets .... Joshua Ilayman &
Young-Won Ha, Confirmation,Disconfirmation, and Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94
PSYCHOL. REv. 211, 213 (1987). Klayman and Ha provide an excellent discussion of the
broader positive test strategy that humans seem to employ (and that encompasses the
"confirmation bias") and of why this may well be the most appropriate general strategy. See
id. at 225 ("Our review suggests that people use the +test strategy as a general default
heuristic .... Our theoretical analyses indicate that, as an all-purpose heuristic, +testingoften
serves the hypothesis tester well.").
160. See Richard A. Griggs & James R. Cox, The Elusive Thematic-MaterialsEffect in
Wason's Selection Task, 73 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 407, 414-17 (1982) (describing Experiment 3);
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variations on the selection task lead to large improvements in
performance as well. 6 ' One prominent explanation of this
improvement is that conditional reasoning comes more naturally on
deontic versions of the task (such as the drinking rule version
above), where participants are testing for violations of social
contracts, but exactly why these changes in the presentation of the
selection task lead to such improvement is still under debate. 6 2
However, the demonstrated improvement for thematic versions of
the task rather than abstract versions of the task is not disputed."a
id. at 415 ("Seventy-three per cent of the subjects made the correct selection for the drinkingage problem while no one did so for the abstract problem."). As compared to the abstract
version of the test where cards representing p and -q should be selected to test the if-then
relation, the "Beer" card represents the "p"card and the "16" card represents the "-q" card.
161. Sea Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater, A Rational Analysis of the Selection Task as
Optimal Data Selection, 101 PSYCHOL. REv. 608, 612-24 (1994) (reviewing results across a
wide variety of versions of the selection task).
162. Almor and Sloman, for instance, argue that deontic contexts are sufficient to improve
conditional reasoning but not necessary. See, e.g., Amit Almor & Steven A. Sloman, Is Deontic
ReasoningSpecial?, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 374,378-79 (1996) (showingimprovement by altering
the thematic context of the rule tested but using nondeontic domains and suggesting that it
is beliefs about dependence relations rather than deontic relations that necessarily lead to
improvement on the task). For an array of views on why performance improves on different
versions of the task see Woo-kyoung Ahn & Loranel M. Graham, The Impact ofNecessity and
Sufficiency in the Wason Four-CardSelection Task, 10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 237 (1999); Almor &
Sloman, supra; Amit Almor & Steven A. Sloman, Reasoning Versus Text Processing in the
Wason Selection Task: A Nondeontic Perspective on Perspective Effects, 28 MEMORY &
COGNION 1060 (2000); Evans & Over, supra note 159; Jerry Fodor, Why We Are so Good at
Catching Cheaters, 75 CoGNrITON 29 (2000); Donald Laming, On the Analysis of Irrational
DataSelection:A Critiqueof Oaksfordand Chater (1994), 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 364 (1996); Mike
Oaksford & Nick Chater, RationalExplanationof the Selection Task, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 381
(1996); Alexander Staller et al., Perspective Effects in Nondeontic Versions of the Wason
Selection Task, 28 MEMORY & COGNMOION 396 (2000).
163. Gigerenzer and Hug argue that, regardless of which theory is chosen to explain
improvement on the selection task, the evidence of such "content effects" on the task is strong
evidence of the domain-specific nature of reasoning. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Klaus Hug,
Domain-Specific Reasoning: Social Contracts, Cheating, and Perspective Change, 43
CoGNrrION 127, 128 n.1 (1992). Gigerenzer and Hug note:
The term "content effect" refers to a percentage of P & not-Q responses in a
"thematic" rule that is substantially larger than the corresponding percentage
in an "abstract", alphanumerical rule such as "Ifthere is aD on one side of any
card, then there is a 3 on its other side." The percentage of P & not-Q responses
in "abstract" rules is typically below 20%. Both thematic and abstract rules are
conditionals of the form "if P then Q."
Id. (citation omitted); id. at 166 ("It is the pragmatics of who reasons from what perspective
to what end (e.g., cheating detection) that seems to be sufficient.").
The general point is that there is no simple and unique division line between
structure and content, or between information relevant and irrelevant to
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Furthermore, performance on tests of statistical reasoning and
calibrations of confidence often improve significantly when decision
problems are presented using frequency formats (e.g., fifty out of
one hundred contract the disease) instead of presenting problems in
terms of single-event probabilities (e.g., fifty percent probability of
contracting the disease).' A dispute between Bayesians and
rational reasoning. What counts as the relevant structure for reasoning about
a domain therefore seems to need a domain-specific theory. Thus we need to
define what the relevant structural properties are-modal operators, prior
probabilities, likelihoods, perspectives, cheating detection, and the like-rather
than to leave this job to one out of many possible logics, usually selected by
convention.
Id. at 168.
164. See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning
Without Instruction:Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 697-98 (1995). Gigerenzer
and Hoftrage assert:
Mathematically equivalent representations of information can entail
computationally different Bayesian algorithms. We have argued that
information representation affects cognitive algorithms in the same way. We
deduced four novel predictions concerning when information formats and menus
make a difference and when they do not. Data from more than 2,800 individual
problem solutions are consistent with the predictions. Frequency formats made
many participants' inferences strictly conform (interms of outcome and process)
to Bayes' theorem without any teaching or instruction. These results were found
for a number of inferential problems, including classic demonstrations of nonBayesian inference such as the cab problem and the mammography problem.
Id. (citations omitted). Mellers and McGraw conclude:
[Ihf one had to select a single form in which to present information, we would
recommend frequencies. With rare events, frequencies facilitate Bayesian
reasoning. If one had to select a single type ofinformation, we would recommend
the short task or, more generally, any type of information that allows people to
visualize nested sets. These types and forms of information help people make
better inferences, although neither one is a silver bullet. Bayesian reasoning is
hard for both experts and nonexperts, and there is plenty of room for additional
improvement.
Barbara A. Mellers & A. Peter McGraw, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning: Comment on
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995), 106 PSYCHOL. REv. 417, 422 (1999). But Lewis and Keren
state:
We suspect that the frequency formats advocated by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
(1995) and the corresponding algorithms they proposed comprise a program
based on operant principles of learningin which underlying cognitive processes
that will lead to a better and deeper understanding remain untouched. Like
previous attempts to overcome cognitive biases and eliminate fallacious
reasoning, the proposals of Gigerenzer and Hoffrage can be characterized by
what Fischhoff termed "mechanical" manipulations. The effectiveness of such
attempts may be more apparent than real.
Charles Lewis & Gideon Keren, On the Difficulties Underlying Bayesian Reasoning: A
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frequentists about the proper normative approach to probability
assessment has been ongoing for some time now. 165 One need not
resolve this normative debate, however, to recognize that singleevent versus frequency formats can lead to significantly different
cognitive behavior. 166 In particular, the incidence of conjunction
errors, expressions of overconfidence, violations of the law of large
numbers, and base-rate neglect have been shown to decrease
Comment on Gigerenzerand Hoffrage, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 411,414 (1999) (citations omitted).
Contra Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, Overcoming Difficulties in Bayesian Reasoning:
A Reply to Lewis and Keren (1999) and Mellers and McGraw (1999), 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 425,
427 (1999) ("[C]ontrary to Lewis and Keren's hypothesis, joint statements alone cannot
account for the beneficial effect of frequency formats.").
Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor point out that frequency formats may not always yield
better judgments than probability formats. They found that the use of a frequency format as
opposed to a probability format for the ratings by psychologists and psychiatrists for
likelihood of future violence and assessed risk of violence did not remove effects based on the
amount of discriminability allowed by the scale (i.e., allowing more discriminability among
smaller probabilities led to lower judged probabilities of future harmful acts, but use of a
frequency format in the response scale did not eliminate this format effect). See Paul Slovic
et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication:The Effects of UsingActual Cases,
ProvidingInstruction,and Employing ProbabilityVersus FrequencyFormats,24 LAW & HUML
BEHAv. 271, 289 (2000). Also, the use of a frequency format response scale "consistently led
to lower estimates of the likelihood of harm for a given case" but also to higher perceived risk.
Id. at 289-90. They conclude that their data does seem to support the proposition that
"thinking with probabilities differs from thinking with frequencies." Id. at 292. They also
argue, however, that frequency formats are not necessarily superior to probability formats
because they may both be susceptible to format effects. Id. Because they see advantages and
disadvantages of both formats for the communication of risk estimates, they sensibly suggest
that multiple formats should be used if possible.
If multiple formats were used in violence risk communication, the biases
associated with any given risk communication format might, at least to some
(unknown) extent, cancel each other out. In addition, the possibility of strategic
behavior in choosing a risk communication format that promoted a favored
policy outcome would be reduced if the risk communicator was instructed to use
multiple formats, rather than to select a single one.
Id. at 294 (footnote omitted).
165. See Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 9, at 228 ("Bayesian and frequentistic
approaches lead to quite different conclusions about the rules for statistical inference, and
statisticians of these persuasions have engaged in running arguments since the early
1960's.").
166. Note more generally that the structure and form of the problem can also greatly affect
performance. See Vittorio Girotto & Michel Gonzalez, Solving Probabilisticand Statistical
Problems:A Matter ofInformation Structure and QuestionForm, 78 COGNITION 247, 267-69
(2001) (finding that the problem representation evoked by the structure and form of the
problem, rather thanphrasingin probabilisticversus frequentistic terms, was mostimportant
to performance, with naive reasoners being able to draw correct inferences in both
probabilistic and frequentistic formats).
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significantly when people are given frequencies as input data or are
asked to estimate frequencies of events as output data. 167 For
example, Cosmides and Tooby report that frequentist versions of a
medical diagnosis base-rate problem elicited high levels of Bayesian
performance over numerous tests---"an average of 76% correct for
purely verbal frequentist versions and 92% correct for a problem
that requires subjects to construct a concrete, visual frequentist
representation"-but nonfrequentist versions of the problem elicited
very low levels of Bayesian performance, with only two percent of
the subjects correctly answering some nonfrequentist versions of the
problem." Humans, and animals in general, seem much more
adept at computing and utilizing frequency information than singleevent probabilities, perhaps because of the advantages attached to
frequency representations rather than proportions or single-event
probabilities. 69
167. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive StatisticiansAfter All?
Rethinking Some Conclusions From the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 58
COGNITION 1, 19-20 (1996) (reviewing research on frequentist representations of conjunction
and overconfidence problems); id. at 22-37 (presenting evidence from frequentist
representations of base-rate problems); Gerd Gigerenzer et al., ProbabilisticMental Models:
A Brunswikian Theory of Confidence, 98 PsYCHOL. REV. 506, 526 (1991) ("We provided
experimental evidence ... showing how changes in the task (confidence vs. frequency
judgment) and in the relationship between task and environment (selected vs. representative
sampling) can make the two stable effects reported in the literature-overconfidence and the
hard-easy effect-emerge, disappear, and invert at will."); Hertwig & Gigerenzer, supranote
157, at 279-92 (presentingevidence from frequentist representations ofconjunctionproblems);
Koehler, supra note 67, at 7-8 (discussing frequentist representations of base-rate problems);
Peter Sedlmeier & Gerd Gigerenzer, Intuitions About Sample Size: The EmpiricalLaw of
Large Numbers, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 33, 45 (1997) ("MThe evidence showed that
(1) frequency distribution problems that are directly comparable to sampling distribution
problems elicit substantially higher percentages of participants who take sample size into
account, with almost no overlap between the distributions of percentages; and (2) frequency
distribution problems not directly comparable to sampling distribution problems result in
participants' generally taking sample size into account."); see also Brase et al., supranote 156,
at 19-20 (summarizing evidence of the importance of frequentist representations, particularly
of whole objects, in Bayesian reasoning problems).
168. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 167, at 58.
169. Brase et al., supra note 158, at 5-6 (discussing why adaptation may have favored
frequency representations). When frequency information is converted into proportions or
probabilities,
the absolute frequencies of the two component events cannot be recovered. As
a result, (a) it is difficult to update the database as one encounters new
instances; (b) the sample size is lost, and with it a basis for indexing how reliable
one's estimate is ... ; (c) more data needs to be stored (including likelihoods and
base rates); and (d) the original data cannot be recategorized to construct novel
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When Leda Cosmides and her colleagues summarize the evidence
from the frequency format experiments, they echo behavioral
decision theorists who emphasize the constructive nature of choice,
but the conclusions drawn differ:
It turns out that human performance in probabilistic reasoning
tasks is remarkably sensitive to the format in which information
is presented and answers asked for. Most experiments that
elicited "nonnormative" performance asked subjects to judge the
probability of a single event (e.g., "What is the chance that a
person who tests positive for the disease actually has it?").
However, many purported biases and fallacies disappear when
people are asked to judge a frequency instead (e.g., "How many
people who test positive for the disease will actually have it?").
... With a frequency format, subjects not only used the base-rate

information, but they used it fully, producing answers that
conform to the strictures of Bayes's rule.
These results suggest that humans, like other animals, have
inductive-reasoning mechanisms that embody certain rational
principles, but that the design of these mechanisms requires
170
representations of event frequencies to operate properly.
In sum, the use of unnatural and unfamiliar formats in
behavioral decision-making experiments is another way in which
the likelihood of finding deviations from rational actor norms is
increased. When judgment and decision making are examined using
more naturalistic or more familiar formats or, in the more specific
Brunswikian sense, using formats where cues have more potential
utility for the organism in its environment, performance often
moves closer to predictions derived from rational actor norms.171
reference classes after the fact, as they become useful.

Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
171. Note that Evans and his colleagues recently questioned the reason for improved
performance on frequency format problems, and they provide "a number of examples where
frequency versions are no easier than the probabilityversions with which they are compared."
Jonathan St. B.T. Evans et al., Frequency Versus ProbabilityFormats in Statistical Word
Problems, 77 COGNITION 197, 211 (2000). They conclude that
our findings cast serious doubts upon the widely cited claim that frequency
formats facilitate correct statistical reasoning in quantitative word problems.
Instead we have shown that the manner of participants' responses to such tasks
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5. Deprivationof Decision Tools
There is another simple way in which behavioral decision
researchers may increase the likelihood of finding non-normative
responses in their experiments-deprive subjects of decision aids
that the experimenters themselves found necessary to derive the
normative answer to the problem at hand. For instance, while some
researchers and subjects may be capable of performing accurate
Bayesian calculations in their heads, researchers no doubt check
their calculations using decision aids. The availability of
instructional texts, calculators, or computers undoubtedly would
make finding the answers to Bayesian problems easier for at least
some subjects-perhaps even a great number.17 2
As Edwards and von Winterfeldt appropriately point out, it is the
availability of adequate time and decision tools, combined with
accuracy motivation, that at least partially explain why the
behavioral decision researchers themselves arrive at normatively
correct answers:
What are the differences between the researchers and their
respondents? Two suggest themselves. One is that the
researchers need to, and do, make the mental effort required to
get the right answers. The other is that, in doing so, the
researchers have access to, and use, whatever intellectual tools

is strongly influenced by subtle variations in the presentation of task
information which make it more or less easy to form a mental representation
helpful to finding the normative solution.
Id. at 212. Thus, as with so much behavioral decision research, the evidence is ambiguous as
to how and why subjects perform better in some experimental settings than others, and it may
ultimately be the case with respect to the frequency versus probability format debate that it
is some factor other than frequency formats that improves performance. See Girotto &
Gonzalez, supra note 166, at 267-72 (discussing possible explanations); Dale Griffin & Roger
Buehler, Frequency,Probability, and Prediction:Easy Solutions to Cognitive Illusions?, 38
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 48, 74 (1999) (noting that many factors, and not just frequency versus
probability formats, affect performance and doubting that an "aggregate frequency approach
to probabilistic reasoning" will turn out to be a "magic pill").
172. Girotto and Gonzalez tellingly refer to "Bayes' cumbersome rule." Girotto & Gonzalez,
supra note 166, at 271. For a primer on Bayes' Theorem see ROBYN M. DAwES, RATIONAL
CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 323-26 (Jerome Kagen ed., 1988). Behavioral decision
theorist Michael Birnbaum provides a Bayesian calculator on-line at http://psych.fullerton.
eduhnbirnbaum/bayes/BayesCalc.htm (last visited Mar. 28,2002).
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they need-including books, calculators, computers,
whatever else the intellectual task requires.'75

and

Too often, behavioral decision theory experiments fail to report
exactly what decision tools, if any, were made available and often
fail to provide much detail about the procedures used during the
experiment (no doubt because of the frequent use of quick questionand-answer surveys used in large classroom settings). Indeed, we
are rarely told whether experimenters will even answer questions
posed by the subjects or how many subjects refused to answer the
questions out of frustration or due to confusion.'7 4 Thus, we are
often left in the dark about what conditions, including what
disadvantages, subjects may be operating under during the studies.
Time pressures and resource limitations may restrict the ability
of the real-world decision maker to rely on decision aids, but to the
extent that decision aids are regularly used in a real-world decision
setting, then performance should be assessed in experiments with
the use of these aids rather than simply based on intuitive judgment

173. Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 9, at 268; see also E.C. POuLTON, BEHAVIORAL
DECISION THEORY: A NEW APPROACH 266-67 (1994) (discussing how insufficient time and
complex mental arithmetic contributes to non-normative responses on certain behavioral
decision theory tasks).
174. Cf. Beach et al., supra note 128, at 52 ("Interpretations of results for word problems
often are weakened further by the lack of unanimity among the subjects about the answers,
correct or otherwise. Many subjects seem mostly to be confused. Indeed, in one study, around
20 per cent of the subjects refused to give an answer at all, claiming that they simply did not
know-subjects such as these usually are not included in the data analyses, so it is difficult
to know how common such non-responding is.") (citations omitted); id. at 54 ("Many of [the
word problems used in behavioral decision theory] are difficult for even sophisticated people
to understand.").
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or mental calculations.' 5 Otherwise, we may obtain an inaccurate
picture of real-world performance. 76
C. Featuresof BehavioralDecision Theory That Limit the
Importanceof the Researchfor the Legal System
Finally, certain features of behavioral decision theory limit its
relevance and importance for the law. Thus, even if it were the case
that experiments in behavioral decision theory found uniform
behavior across all subjects regardless of the experimental situation,
there remain several features of this research that would make
extrapolation to real-world legal settings perilous. These features
may be considered limits on the "external validity" of behavioral
decision research, for they limit the extent to which this research
generalizes to legal settings and the extent to which this research
can establish a connection between irrationality in the laboratory
and irrationality in the legal world. 77
175. The literature on decision aids indicates that people may be reluctant to use
mechanical decision tools in the place of their own judgment. See, e.g., Steven E. Kaplan et
al., The Effects of Predictive Ability Information, Locus of Control, and Decision Maker
Involvement on Decision Aid Reliance, 14 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 35, 47 (2001) ("[Al
common theme emerging from recent decision aid research is that decision makers are
reluctant to relinquish their judgments in favor of decision aids."); Peter Todd & Izak
Benbasat, Inducing Compensatory Information Processing through Decision Aids that
FacilitateEffort Reduction. An ExperimentalAssessment,13 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 91,
103 (2000) ("[Dlecision aids can induce the use of normatively oriented strategies. The key to
inducing these strategies is to make the normative strategy easierto execute than competing
alternative strategies."). Much less work has been performed with respect to the role of simple
decision tools that merely assist with calculations or evaluations and do not interfere with the
decision maker's cognitive control. Use of these simpler decision aids is probably quite
common, and their role in improving performance is worthy of investigation.
176. See W. Edwards & B. Fasolo, Decision Technology, 52 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 581 (2001)
(reviewing decision analysis methods and decision technology that can be used to improve
decision making, including web-based technology). While cost-benefit analysis is susceptible
to errors in input and in the interpretation of outputs, it may help the decision maker focus
on relevant attributes of a decision problem and more systematically identify and weigh
options. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognitionand Cost-BenefitAnalysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059,
1096 (2000) ("Cost-benefit analysis, taken as an inquiry into the consequences of varying
approaches to regulation, is a sensible response not only to interest group power but also to
limited information and to predictable problems in the public demand for regulation.... [A]n
effort to identify costs and benefits can properly inform analysis.") (footnote omitted).
177. "External validity" refers to "the extent to which one can generalize the results of the
research to the populations and settings of interest in the hypothesis." KDDER & JUDD, supra
note 136, at 27. For an overview of external validity issues in behavioral decision-making
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1. Real-World Success Versus Normative Coherence
Implicit in much legal decision theory is the assumption that
errors in the ways in which judgments or decisions are made will
result in sub-optimal outcomes for the decision maker or others (i.e.,
deviations from norms of rational decision making will presumably
result in real-world failure or dissatisfaction). For instance, it has
been suggested that if contracting parties fail to negotiate fully
around initially proposed contract terms because of cognitive
imperfections that give these initial terms a difficult-to-defeat
inertia, then the party preparing the first contract draft may "gain
a powerful advantage in negotiations."' 8 This claim could well be
true with respect to the goal of prevailing in the negotiation, so that
cognitive biases give the original drafter an advantage, but, of
course, it does not necessarily follow that failing to negotiate fully
around the originally proposed terms will leave either of the
contracting parties better or worse off in the long run. The original
terms, supposedly accepted with the assistance of cognitive
imperfections, could well lead to a fair and efficient transaction. The
operation of cognitive imperfections does not guarantee sub-optimal
outcomes in any particular case.
A recent empirical study by legal decision theorists illustrates
well the difficulties in drawing conclusions about real-world success
or failure from performance in the laboratory. The legal decision
theorists Chris Guthrie and Jeffrey Rachlinski, along with Federal
Magistrate Judge Andrew Wistrich, conducted a study designed to
assess whether judges fall prey to certain cognitive biases. 9
Guthrie and his colleagues administered a five-page questionnaire
to approximately 200 magistrate judges attending a federal judicial

research not limited to the typical critique of the subject population, see Ebbesen & Konedni,
supra note 137, at 21.
In the companion paper, I address several individual and situational differences in rational
behavior that further limit the generality of behavioral decision theory and thus can be seen
as additional external validity bounds. See Mitchell, supra note 8.
178. Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1627.
179. Guthrie et al., supra note 18, at 778 ("We report the results of an empirical study
designed to determine whether five common cognitive illusions (anchoring, framing, hindsight
bias, the representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases) would influence the decisionmaking processes of a sample of 167 federal magistrate judges.").
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conference. 80 The questionnaire presented five legal scenarios with
questions about each scenario for the judges to answer.'8 1 One
hundred and sixty-seven judges anonymously completed the
questionnaire in approximately ten minutes or less and allowed
their responses to be used in the study without compensation,
though some of these judges failed to respond to all problems in the
questionnaire."8 2 The fact patterns and questions were designed to
test, in a legal context, five common biases and errors from
behavioral decision theory: bias due to the anchoring and
adjustment heuristic, framing effects, the hindsight bias, bias due
to the representativeness heuristic, and an egocentric bias. 8 3 The
authors of the study report that the judges showed susceptibility to
all five of the cognitive fallacies tested.' 84
180. Id. at 784-87.
181. Id. at 786-87.
182. Id. at 787; id at 791 n.62 (31.1% of the respondents did not fully answer the anchoring
question); id. at 797 n.89 (2.4% did not answer the framing question); id. at 802 n.120 (1.2%
did not answer the hindsight question); id. at 809 n.148 (4.8% did not answer the
representativeness heuristic question); id. at 814 n.181 (7.2% did not answer the egocentric
bias question). Given the ten-minute duration of the study, judicial participants presumably
spent approximately two minutes considering each question and its answer.
183. Id. at 784.
184. Id. ("We found that each of these cognitive illusions influenced the decision-making
processes of the judges in our study. Although the judges displayed less vulnerability to two
of the five illusions than other experts and laypersons, the results show that under certain
circumstances judges rely on heuristics that can lead to systematically erroneous
judgments."); id. at 816 ("Our study demonstrates that judicial decision making, like the
decision making of other experts and laypeople, is influenced by the cognitive illusions we
tested.").
These broad conclusions, drawn from very limited data, exemplify the push within legal
decision theory to reach generalized conclusions about behavior from very limited, aggregate
data. Consider more closely the manner in which the authors reach their conclusion that
judges in general are susceptible to the "cognitive illusions" that they tested in their tenminute question-and-answer survey: (1) The authors assume the improper influence of an
anchor by finding different average damage awards between the anchor and no anchor
conditions even though the anchor is admittedly of some informational value and there is no
objective standard against which to assess the proper size of the award. Id. at 791-93. (2) They
infer individual-level framing effects from between-subjects data (i.e., there is no
demonstration that any individuals actually switched choices between frames) despite the fact
that the majority of subjects made the same choice across conditions (in both framing
conditions a clear majority of respondents favored the "don't settle" option, with 67.5% of all
respondents favoring the "don't settle" choice.). Id. (3) They infer individual-level changes in
probability judgments made in hindsight following exposure to outcome information from
differences in average probability ratings across conditions (i.e., there is no demonstration
that any individual's probability judgment in the absence of outcome information differed
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The authors then contend that cognitive biases in judges "can
compromise the quality of justice that the courts deliver."'85 Thus,
the assumption is made that the violations of formal principles of
rationality -supposedly observed in the judges will likely interfere
from that judgment made in the presence of outcome information). Id. at 802-03. (4) They
treat the failure of some of the judges to obtain the proper result on a seemingly difficult-tocompute conditional-probability problem without anydecision aid as evidence of susceptibility
to the inverse fallacy and biased operation of the representativeness heuristic even though
40.9% of the respondentschose the correct choice and 8.8% chose the next best answer.Id. at
809-I. But see id. at 816 (Qualifying the conclusion somewhat: "Though still susceptible to
framing and the representativeness heuristic, the judges appear less susceptible than other
decision makers to these effects."). (5) They infer a "strong egocentric bias concerning the
likelihood that [thejudgesl would be overturned on appeal" even though the judges were not
asked about future chances of being overturned and their inference was based on a question
that the authors concede could have been accurately answered by a majority of the
respondents given the potentially confusing or ambiguous information being sought by the
question. See id. at 814-15. Judicial participants were given the following statement and
question:
"United States magistrate judges are rarely overturned on appeal, but it does
occur. If we were to rank all of the magistrate judges currently in this room
according to the rate at which their decisions have been overturned during their
careers, [what] would your rate be?"
Id. at 813. The judges were then asked to place themselves into a quartile representing their
relative rate of reversal (e.g., the highest quartile was defined as meaning that "the rate at
which you have been overturned is higher than that of 75% of the magistrate judges in this
room"). Id. at 813-14 & n.180. In other words, respondents were forced to differentiate
between themselves and others even though there may have been very little difference in the
reversal rates between them (indeed, the sentence before the question tells the judges they
are rarely reversed), and it was possible that "the 56.1%of the judges who placed themselves
in the lowest quartile have never been overturned on appeal, which suggests that they really
do belong in the lowest quartile." Id. at 814.
Further, Guthrie and his colleagues-refer in one table (table 4) to the "size of the effect"
observed, and they offer a comparison between the supposed size of the effects found in their
studywith the size of effects found in other studies. Id. at 816-18 tbl.4. It should be noted that
the reported information is not what is typically considered effect size data within social
scientific research and further that no systematic comparison of effect sizes, as might be found
in a meta-analysis, is presented. See Rosenthal & DiMatteo, supra note 93, at 68-70
(describing the basic steps in a meta-analysis); id. at 70-73 (discussing formal effect size
measures); see also APA MANUAL, supra note 69, at 18 (identifying the common statistical
measures of effect size reported within psychological research). The comparisons should be
viewed with great caution because Guthrie and his colleagues do not present effect size
measures, report no systematic procedure for collecting relevant studies, often provide very
little information about the comparison studies, and otherwise did not follow meta-analytic
procedure. Although Guthrie and his colleagues should be commended for reporting some
descriptive statistics and information beyond simply null hypothesis significance testing
results, their presentation of results is potentially misleading and confusing, particularly to
the statistically unsophisticated or to persons unfamiliar with behavioral decision theory.
185. Guthrie et al., supra note 18, at 821.
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with the achievement of justice or whatever other goals the judges
may pursue. No survey was actually reported, however, of what
goals the judges were trying to fulfill in answering the questions in
the survey administered by Guthrie and his colleagues; therefore,
no assessment can be made of whether the conduct of the judges
effectively achieved their desired goals. Indeed, if a judge's goal was
simply to complete the questionnaire as quickly as possible, then
randomly answering the questions may have been the most efficient
route to achieving this goal. Random responses arguably would be
instrumentally, or means-end, rational, 1" but the random responses
probably would result in very little systematic adherence to formal
principles of logic or to any other norm used to derive the
researchers' "correct"answers to the problems. In short, there is no
necessary connection here between the normative errors supposedly
committed by the judges and the success or failure of judges' in
achieving their goals.
What we see happening here is slippage between different
conceptions of rationality, or, more accurately, between different
standards for evaluating the success of behavior-violations of
coherence criteria are being equated with violations of
correspondence criteria." Or, stated alternatively, laboratory
186. Elster provides a means-to-the-end definition of rationality. "Rational choice is
instrumental: it is guided by the outcome of action. Actions are valued and chosen not for
themselves, but as more or less efficient means to a further end." JON ELSrER, NUTS AND
BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 22 (1989) (footnote omitted); see also ROBERT NOZICK, THE
NATURE OF RATIONArI 64 (1993) ("On this instrumental conception, rationality consists in
the effective and efficient achievement of goals, ends, and desires.").
187. Todd and Gigerenzer explain the differences between the two sets of criteria:
One set of criteria that is often used to assess judgments and decisions is the
laws of logic and probability theory. These are often called coherence criteria
because they are primarily concerned with the internal logical coherence of
judgments rather than with how well they help us to make useful decisions in
the real world. Most experimental research programs aimed at demonstrating
the rationality or (usually) irrationality of humans and animals have used
abstract coherence criteria. For instance, many claims that there are systematic
irrational fallacies in human reasoning are based entirely on a violation of some
rule or other of logic or probability.
... The function of heuristics is not to be coherent. Rather, their function is to
make reasonable, adaptive inferences about the real social and physical world
given limited time and knowledge. Hence, we should evaluate the performance
of heuristics by criteria that reflect this function. Measures that relate decisionmaking strategies to the external world rather than to internal
consistency-measures such as accuracy, frugality, and speed-are called
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equated with real-world

An "error" is a judgment of a laboratory stimulus that
deviates from a model of how that judgment should be made.
When this model is normative and rational, the error represents
an incorrect judgment. A "mistake," by contrast, is an incorrect
judgment in the real world, such as a misjudgment of a real
person, and so must be determined by different criteria.
Detection of an error implies the existence of a mistake only
when the process that produces the error also produces incorrect
judgments in real life. Unfortunately, this cannot be determined
by merely demonstrating the error itself, because the same
judgment that is wrong in relation to a laboratory stimulus,
taken literally, may be right in terms of a wider, more broadly
defined social context, and reflect processes that lead to accurate
judgments under ordinary circumstances. 1"
Guthrie and his colleagues used coherence criteria to evaluate the
judges' responses and, from a lack of coherence by some, adjudged
the group of judges systematically biased. They then posited or
assumed that these violations of the coherence criteria are likely to
lead to violations of correspondence criteria. It is easy to understand
why they have done this: With hypothetical cases, there is no way
to test for real-world success, but with real legal cases, there is often
no objective measure of truth or accuracy.18 9 "In the absence of an
correspondencecriteria.
Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, Prcis of Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 23
BEHAV. & BRAiN Sci. 727, 737 (2000) (citations omitted); see also supra note 58.
188. David C. Funder, Errorsand Mistakes: Evaluatingthe Accuracy of Social Judgment,
101 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 75, 76 (1987). Peter Suedfeld provides a similar analysis:
The word "bias" is used as though it were a descriptor, but ... any decision
shown to be wholly or partly influenced by bias is then treated as ipso facto

flawed. "Bias" becomes synonymous with "error," the analyst typically forgetting
that being biased does not necessarily mean that one is wrong either morally or
factually.
Suedfeld, supra note 34, at 436.
189. See Funder, supra note 188, at 76 ("When the study is of social judgment, ... the
criterion problem becomes even stickier. The complexity of most social situations makes any
degree of certainty and precision in the establishment of 'truth'difficult to come by, and the
necessary assumptions are difficult to formulate, much less confirm."); Robert J. MacCoun,
EpistemologicalDilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 723, 725 (1999) ("[In social psychology ... we often lack objective measures of the
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objective criterion of validity, the normative theory of judgment
under uncertainty has treated the coherence of belief as the
touchstone of human rationality."90 The term "cognitive illusion"
(used as a synonym for cognifive bias) is thus unfortunate, as it
implies some "reality" against which to judge the illusion when no
such reality may exist.
Absent a measure of the objective truth or accuracy for the legal
decision or judgment at hand, the best alternative is to assess
whether the participants' responses are likely to have achieved the
participants' own immediate goals, whatever those goals may be.
Guthrie and his colleagues failed to make this alternative
assessment, but without this information it is perilous to assume
that a deviation from the researchers' view of the correct answer is
anything other than an unspoken disagreement between the
researcher and subject about the best way to answer the question:
[There is some sensible reason for most behaviors. Even when
people appear to be making systematically biased judgments or
irrational decisions, it is likely that they are trying to solve some
problem or achieve some goal to the best of their abilities. The
behavioral researcher is well advised to look carefully at his or
her research participant's behavior, beliefs,
and goals to discern
" 19
"the method in the apparent madness.
When this closer scrutiny of behavior is performed, the researcher
may find a goal that the researcher did not expect to find. The
researcher may disagree with this goal, but the subject's attempt to
reach her putative goal rather than the researcher's goal cannot be
'true' state of the sociopolitical environment."); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 124, at 313
("[Oibjective measurements of probability are often unavailable, and most significant choices
under risk require an intuitive evaluation of probability.").
190. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 124, at 313.
191. Hastie, supra note 52, at 659 (citations omitted); see also Koehler, supra note 67, at
13 ("In short, normative claims about data obtained from laboratory studies cannot be made
without understanding how individual subjects represent the tasks and what informational
assumptions they make."); Jack C. Wright & Matthew Drinkwater, Rationalityvs. Accuracy
of Social Judgment, 15 Soc. COGNITION 245, 271 (1997) ("Evidence of irrationality is often
interpreted as implying that ecologically significant errors occur. Yet irrationality need not
indicate inaccuracy, either conceptually or empirically. Our results indicate that the degree
to which people's probability judgments obey normative principles (Bayes' Theorem) may
reveal relatively little about the accuracy of those judgments.") (citation omitted).
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classified as instrumentally irrational unless the researcher takes
a normative stance on what specific end-states should be desired by
her subjects. Such an evaluative normative stance, however, if
phrased at any useful level of specificity, will almost certainly be
controversial (e.g., we may all agree that judges should seek justice,
but that simply begs the question of what is justice).' 92
Laboratory errors repeated in the real world may well lead to
results that the decision maker and others would consider costly or
undesirable, but there is no a priori reason to believe that this
connection will always exist. Thus, a judge in the study by Guthrie,
Rachlinski, and Wistrich who makes judgments and decisions in a
very "irrational" manner in these researchers' view, may reach
results that are much better received by the litigants than a judge
who conducts herself "rationally." In other words, normative
coherence or incoherence alone says nothing about quality of result.
This disjunction parallels the disjunction between procedural and
distributive justice: Just as a court's apparent adherence to fair
procedures does not ensure a distributively just outcome, a court's
use ofrational decision principles does not ensure the best result.' 3
2. IndividualDecisionMaking Versus Group Decision Making
The unit of analysis in the great majority of behavioral decision
research is the individual judge or individual decision maker.' Yet
many important legal judgments and decisions are made by groups
192. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell et al., Judgments of Social Justice: Compromises Between
Equality and Efficiency, 65 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 629 (1993) (empirical study of differing
lay conceptions of social justice).
193. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
DiscretionaryLegal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
DuKE L.J. 703, 790-92 (1994) (discussing the possible manipulation of procedural justice
perceptions to increase acceptance of unfair outcomes).
194. Likewise, psycho-legal research intojury behavior has focused mainly on the behavior
of individual mock jurors. See Monica L. McCoy et al., The Effect of Jury Deliberationson
Jurors'ReasoningSkills, 23 LAW & HUM. BHAV. 557, 558 (1999) ("Traditionally, research on
jurors' cognitive reasoning has focused on the decision-making processes of individual
jurors."). David R. Shaffer & Shannon R. Wheatman, Does PersonalityInfluence Reactions to
JudicialInstructions?Some PreliminaryFindingsandPossibleImplications,6 PSCYHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & LAW 655, 657 (2000) ("In our opinion, perhaps the greatest limitation of mock-trial
simulations is that the vast majority of them attempt to draw inferences from decisions
rendered by nondeliberating mockjurors rather than deliberating mock juries.").
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or after group deliberation (e.g., jury verdicts, appellate decisions,
legislative and administrative enactments, board of director
decisions). Legal decision theorists are thus confronted with two
crucial questions: (1) Are groups more or less prone than individuals
to commit systematic errors in their judgment and decision
making? (2) Does collective consideration of an issue improve
individual decision making? Despite the importance of these
questions, only a small body of research directly addresses them,
and this research yields no clear answers.19 5 Accordingly, individuallevel research findings cannot simply be assumed to apply to grouptype decisions.' 9
The complexity of the issues that arise in a group decision-making
setting counsel against the simple assumption that the quality of
group information-processing will be comparable to that of single
individuals or that group discussions and deliberations will have no
impact on individual behavior. 97 For instance, whereas studies of
195. See Kerr et al., supranote 45, at 713. Kerr and his colleagues note:
The central question of this paper has been, "Which is more likely to make a
biased judgment, individuals or groups?" Our overview of the relatively small
and diverse empirical literature suggested that there was no simple empirical
answer to this question. Even when we restrict our attention to particular bias
phenomena (e.g., framing effects, preference reversals), there was frequently
little consistency in the direction (i.e., sign) and magnitude of observed relative
bias, RB.
Id.; see also id. at 691 ("We have been able to locate fewer than 30 different empirical studies
that directly examined both individual- and group-level biases."); id. at 692 (classifying and
summarizing the relevant empirical studies); Rostain, supra note 12, at 985 ("[W]hether
collective deliberation tends to negate [cognitive bias] effects, which have been primarily
investigated in individuals, is still an open question").
196. An example of legal decision theorists simply assuming that individual-level research
applies to group decisionmaking is found in the works claiming that juries fall prey to the
hindsight bias. See supra note 45.
197. For an example of a group setting affecting individual choices see Tatsuya Kameda
&James H. Davis, The Functionofthe Reference Point inIndividualand Group Risk Decision
Making, 46 OLGANizATIONALBEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 55,71 (1990) (inframing
effect study, "subjects in the group conditions consistently showed riskier personal preferences
than subjects in the individual conditions"). For an example ofgroup judgments differing from
individual judgments see Janet A. Sniezek & Rebecca A. Henry, Revision, Weighting, and
Commitment in Consensus Group Judgment, 45 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUXm DECISION
PROCESSES 66, 66 (1990) (in a price estimation task, "group judgments [were] more accurate
than individual [or revised] judgments"). For an example of the complex pattern of results
that may occur in group versus individual decision-making settings see Linda Argote et al.,
The Base-Rate Fallacy: Contrasting Processes and Outcomes of Group and Individual
Judgment, 46 ORGANiZATIONAL BEHAV. &HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296,308 (1990) ("Thus,
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non-deliberatingmock jurors have generally found that such jurors
have difficulty disregarding inadmissible evidence heard during a
simulated trial when later making decisions, studies of deliberating
mock jurors have found that these jurors do seem to disregard
inadmissible evidence in their decisions made after the deliberations.'98 Furthermore, some research suggests that different
individual jurors process trial information in very different ways,
with some using a simpler approach that seeks to force evidence into
their preferred theory of the case and others processing the
information in a more open-minded way to consider the relative
strength of competing theories or stories.'" It is unwise, therefore,
to assume that any single theory of information-processing can be
applied to all persons in the jury context.
In some cases, group deliberations and collective decision making
moderate bias, in some cases they have no apparent net effect, and
in some cases they amplify bias. Norbert Kerr, Robert MacCoun,
and Geoffrey Kramer, after a review of the extant literature and
with the assistance of computer modeling, identify several factors
it seems that the probability estimates of groups will be more biased than individuals for
cases where the individuating information is informative.., and less biased than individuals
when the individuating information is uninformative.").
198. Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors'
Propensity to DisregardInadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 937 (2000).
London and Nunez report:
Empirical investigations of the influence of inadmissible evidence have generally
focused on individual nondeliberating jurors. Generally, such studies find that
individuals are biased when exposed to inadmissible evidence. However, the
results from Experiments 1 and 2, as well as results from other research,
suggest that jury deliberations may somehow moderate the effect of biasing
factors.... Taken together, the research supports the notion that deliberations
may play an important role in jurors' propensity to disregard inadmissible
evidence.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Davis et al., supra note 45 (discussing differences in verdict
sizes between juror and jury decisions); Schkade et al., supra note 45 (same).
199. See Deanna Kuhn et al., How Well Do Jurors Reason? Competence Dimensions of
Individual Variationin a JurorReasoning Task, 5 PSYCHOL. Sci. 289, 293 (1994) ("[The
results indicate significant individual variation in the manner in which people approach the
juror task. This variation, moreover, is readily conceptualized along a competence dimension;
considering alternatives and reflecting on evidence is clearly more competent than not doing
so."); see also McCoy et al., supra note 194, at 571 ("Overall, the deliberation process does
appear to encourage jurors to make more statements that discount theories (their own and
alternative theories) and make more judgmental supportive statements. According to Kuhn
et al.'s model, these are indicators of thinking in terms of a theory-evidence coordination
model.") (citation omitted).
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that may interact to determine whether groups exhibit more or less
bias relative to that shown by individuals, including: (1) the size of
the group, with increasing group size tending to affect the
magnitude of the bias but not whether bias is likely to appear; (2)
the magnitude of individual biases brought to the group; (3) where
in the decision process individual bias is likely to appear; (4) the
type of bias at issue; and (5) the nature of the group process
involved.2" To arrive at even this complex but manageable set of
factors, Kerr and his colleagues had to assume that the group
process was constant across group and task contexts. When this
simplifying assumption is relaxed, even more possible interactions
arise.20 ' In short, the question of whether group judgments and
decisions tend to be more or less biased than individual judgments
and decisions is enormously complex and defies a simple answer.0 2
Accordingly, legal decision theorists should refrain from simple
conclusions about the similarity of group and individual decisionmaking processes and outcomes.
3. FramingResearch Confounds and Confusions
We previously saw that framing effects are not as prevalent nor
as robust as legal decision theorists suggest.20 ' The legal decision
theorists' portrayal of framing effect research is misleading in
another respect: whereas this research is typically summarized as
revealing that people are risk averse on positively framed problems
and risk seeking on negatively framed problems,2 4 there really is no
single "framing effect." Within the framing effect research, we find
confounds in the methodology of the studies that make the results
200. Kerr et al., supranote 45, at 713.
201. Id. ("Also note that all of these complex (but tractable) patterns assume that in any
given group and task context, group process ... is constant. When we relax this assumption,
many other patterns are possible.").
202. Before leaping to conclusions in this area, one would do well to read the article by Kerr
et al., supranote 45, to gain an appreciation of the great complexity of the relevant issues in
this area. See also Norbert L. Kerr et al., 'When Are N Heads Better (or Worse) Than One?":
Biased Judgment in Individuals versus Groups, in 1 UNDERSTANDING GROUP BEHAVIOR:
CONSENSUALACTION BY SMALL GROUPS 105-36 (Erich H. Witte & James H. Davis eds., 1996);
Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 70-86 (illustrating the context-dependent nature of the answer
to the question of whether individuals or groups appear more biased).
203. See supra section II.A.2.a.
204. See supranote 99.
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difficult to interpret, and we see that the particular ways in which
decisions are "framed" and the substance of these decisions may
make important differences in the results observed. 2 5 Therefore, the
framing effect research resists simplification for policy purposes.
First, as noted above, many people fail to show the loss aversion
effect in standard framing effect studies.2" Second, the framing
research manipulates frames in a variety of ways that lead to
different effects. Levin and his colleagues provide one typology for
classifying the different types of framing manipulations. They show
that framing manipulations may be distinguished based on:
(1) what is framed, (2) what is affected, and (3) how the framing
effect is measured. All of these distinctions are likely to
influence framing effects. In risky choice framing, the complete
set of options differing in risk level is framed either positively or
negatively, and the effect on risk preference is assessed by
comparing the frequency of choice of the risky option in each
framing condition. In attribute framing, a single attribute of an
object or event is framed (labeled) positively or negatively, and
the effect on item evaluation is assessed by comparing
attractiveness ratings for the object or event in each framing
condition. In goal framing, the consequences of a particular
behavior are specified in either positive or negative terms, and
the impact of alternative framing in persuading the decision
maker to engage (or not engage) in that behavior is assessed by
comparing the rate of adoption of the behavior in the two
framing conditions.
Within each framing type, results show substantial consistency. In risky choice framing, a choice shift (but not
necessarily a reversal) typically occurs such that positive frames
205. See Kifhberger, supra note 101, at 46. Kohberger notes:
Our analysis shows that there is no uniform framing effect. The effect sizes in
the data-base are very heterogeneous.... In evaluating framing research, one
has to bear in mind that the framing effect can interact, may be dampened, or
even may be made [to] disappear, by some characteristics other than those
studied here. These may be individual difference dimensions relating to age,
gender, culture, or language. These may also be more general cognitive
dimensions like motivation, emotion, knowledge, perception, memory, and
cognition.
Id.; see also Mandel, supranote 103, at 61-62 (discussing a confound between descriptor and
expected outcome formulations in many gain/loss framing problems).
206. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
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generally enhance risk averse responding relative to negative
frames. In attribute framing, attributes are judged more
favorably when labeled in positive terms rather than negative
terms. And in goal framing, a negatively framed message
emphasizing losses tends to have a greater impact on a given
behavior than a comparable positively framed message
emphasizing gains."°7
Fagley and Kiihberger alternatively classify the framing
manipulation studies by distinguishing between "framing effect"
and "reflection effect" studies. In framing effect studies, the final
outcomes are identical but are simply phrased in positive or
negative terms. For instance, in Kahneman and Tversky's
influential Asian disease problem, 400 people always die under the
program to be evaluated-in the positive frame, the possibility of
saving 200 of 600 people is emphasized, whereas in the negative
frame, the possibility of losing 400 of 600 people is emphasized."' In
reflection effect studies, the outcomes in the gains condition are
different from the outcomes in the losses condition, but the size of
movement relative to the status quo stays constant. Hence, in
reflection effect studies, the focus is on the relative utility or
disutility of equal gains and equal losses (i.e., the research examines
how changing the sign attached to the amount of money or other
quantity at stake affects behavior).2"
As these typologies illustrate, there are a variety of "framing
effects" that may occur. Given these differences, "it should become
apparent that the ...different types of framing effects cannot and
should not be treated the same. Not recognizing the distinctions
leads to unwarranted comparisons that may create unnecessary
confusion."2 10 The underlying cognitive and motivational processes
207. Irwin P. Levin et al., All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical
Analysis ofFramingEffects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUm. DECISION PROCESSES 149,
181 (1998).

208. See Zickar & Highhouse, supra note 82,at 75-76 ("Most framingitems are a variation
on the classic 'Asian disease problem' of Tversky and Kabneman....").
209. See N. S. Fagley, A Note ConcerningReflection Effects Versus Framing Effects, 113
supra note 101, at 206-07 (explaining
PSYCHOL. BULL. 451, 451-52 (1993); Kilhberger et al.,
the contrast between framing and reflection effect studies).
210. Levin et al.,
supra note 207, at 178; see also Parthasarathy Krishnamurthy et al.,
Attribute Framingand GoalFramingEffectsin HealthDecisions,85 ORGANIZATIONALBEHAv.
& HU.

DECISION PROCESSES 382,395 (2001) (reporting research "confirming that the effects
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may differ across types of frame manipulations and comparisons of
results across the different types of frames may lead to confusion.2 1'
Thus, we need to use care when specifying how a law or legal setting
is likely to "frame" choices for legal actors, and we need to use care
in explaining why a certain framing effect supposedly occurred or is
predicted.
Third, it is often difficult to isolate the cognitive or motivational
processes underlying framing effects (as opposed to refection effects)
because of confounded factors in the framing effect studies. In these
studies, "objective (final) and subjective (change) payoff conditions,
levels of payoffs, and levels of probabilities are confounded." 2 It
can be difficult to determine whether the level of payoff, the probabilities associated with choice options, or the objective/subjective
payoff drives behavior. One recent meta-analysis found that greater
efforts need to be made to disentangle the respective influence of
these factors:
The general message of the present meta-analysis is that risk
preferences in [framing effect] tasks depend on framing, size and
type of payoffs, and the probabilities used. The task structure
implies that probability levels, payoff magnitudes, and framing
conditions cannot be independently varied. Disentangling these
factors shows a relatively complicated picture, where different
variables are important.
... [C]ontrolling for possible variables which are relevant to
formal modeling (payoff,probability) does not make the framing
condition superfluous as a predictor. Quite to the contrary,
of positive vs negative framing differ for attributeframing and goal framing").

211. See, e.g., Frisch, supranote 156, at 423 ("The results of the present study suggest that
such endeavors [examining how framing affects experience utility] should be based on a

careful analysis of the different types of framing effects. It is likely that in some cases,
although framing affects decisions, it does not have a corresponding effect on experience.

However, it is quite plausible that other instances of framing effects arise because changes
in frame have an impact on one's experience of the consequences of a decision"); Kiihberger
et al., supranote 101, at 238-39 ("We consider our research to be a first step in distinguishing
two effects which are still empirically and theoretically confounded: separating effects
resulting from presenting gambles with differing signs of outcomes as stimuli (reflection
effect) and effects resulting from phrasing information in a way that induces particular frames
(framing effect).").

212. Kiihberger et al., supra note 101, at 208. The confounds are present only in the
framing effect studies because "to make actual gains look like losses, one has to provide an
initial endowment to lose from." Id.
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framing remains the most important predictor. Thus there is
more to the framing effect than can be captured by the formal
properties of tasks. This should be taken as an invitation to do
more research on framing based on theories which incorporate
factors such as cognitive and motivational processes ...
[Characterization of the framing phenomenon as a "cognitive
illusion" is misleading.213
Finally, the specific content or subject matter of the framing
problems-as opposed simply to changes in the frame of
reference-may exert significant effects on behavior. When human
lives are at stake rather than simply money-particularly when
those lives are within one's own family or one's "in-group" we see
risk-seeking behavior even in the domain of gains.2 14 The size of the
target group may also matter.2 1 5 Whose money is at stake may
matter; for instance, financial planners have been found to be more
careful (i.e., more risk averse in general) with other people's money
than with their own money.2 16 Whether one views the choice as a
213. Id. at 223 (citations omitted).

214. See N. S. Fagley & Paul AL Miller, FramingEffects andArenasof Choice: Your Money
or Your Life?, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 335, 367 (1997)
("[Pleople in thepositive framing condition made more risky choices in the human life arena
than in the monetary arena."); X T. Wang et al., Social Cues and Verbal Framingin Risky
Choice,14J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 12 (2001) ("The framing effects found in Experiment
1 have shown three distinguishable risk-preference patterns. The risk preference of the
participants was (1) clearly risk seeking under both framing conditions in a kinship context,
(2) not significantly different from risk-neutral point under both framing conditions in a
stranger-group context, and (3) risk averse under positive framing and risk seeking under
negative framing in the heterogeneous group contexts where more than half of the
endangered lives were strangers"); see also X T. Wang, FramingEffects: Dynamics and Task
Domains,68 ORGANizATIONALBEHAV. &Hum.DECISIONPROCESSES 145,153 (1996) ("Subjects
were significantly more risk seeking when facing life-death choice problems than facing their
counterpart problems presented in a public property or personal money domain ... , and a
risk-seeking augmenting unidirectional framing effect occurred in the family context....").
215. X. T. Wang has found that both American and Chinese subjects show no framing
effects when target groups are relatively small (ofsize six or sixty) but do show framing effects
when target group size increases substantially, with Americans showing framing effects when
the target group size increases to 600 (the target group size used in standard versions of the
Asian disease problem) and with Chinese showing framing effects only when the target group
size increased to 6000. See X. T. Wang, Domain-Specific Rationality in Human Choices:
Violationsof Utility Axioms and Social Contexts, 60 COGNITION 31, 35-42 (1996).
216. See Michael J. Roszkowski & Glenn E. Snelbecker, Effects of "Framing"on Measures
ofRisk Tolerance.FinancialPlannersAreNotlmmune,19 J. BEnAv. ECON. 237,244-45 (1990)
(findinglittle evidence of experience effects related to risk-taking patterns-with greater risk
aversion in the domain of gains and greater risk seeking in the domain of losses-but finding
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purchase of insurance against loss and, if so, the probabilities and
consequences attached to the possible loss, matter.2 17 Asking
subjects to provide a rationale for their choices can eliminate
framing effects, and attaching a probability of success greater than
two-thirds to the risky option may eliminate risk aversion.218
Changes in the "surface structure" of a framing problem can have
important influences on the "deep structure" (or psychological
representation and importance) of the problem and thus have
important influences on the preferences expressed in response to the
problem.219 These examples merely illustrate
the great content- and
22 °
context-sensitivity of framing effects.

In short, although the framing of choices in terms of losses or
gains may impact the behavior of some people under some
conditions, behavior in such decision settings involves much more
than simply whether an option is phrased positively or negatively
that financial planners were more cautious with clients' money than their own).
217. See Paul J. H. Schoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, An Experimental Study of
InsuranceDecisions, 46 J. RISK & INSURANCE 603, 616 (1979) ("The influence of context was
strong in the insurance question where the low deductible policy was perceived as more
attractive (relative to other policies) than when the same choice was presented in a purely
mathematical fashion without reference to insurance and deductibles. Format and context
effects seem symptomatic of people's tendency to resort to simplifying strategies or to derive
cues from the larger context of the problem."); Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring
Against Probable Small Losses: InsuranceImplications,44 J. RISK & INSURANCE 237, 253
(1977) ("The most striking result of the experiments just described is that people buy more
insurance against moderate- orhigh-probability, low-loss events than against low-probability,
high-loss events.").
218. See Paul M. Miller & N.S. Fagley, The Effects of Framing,Problem Variations,and
Providing Rationale on Choice, 17 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 517, 521 (1991)
("Regarding the conditions under which framing effects are observed, it appears that framing
effects maybe limited to situations where no rationale is requested and where the probability
of success in the risky option is less than 2/3.").
219. See Willem A. Wagenaar et al., Islanders andHostages:Deep and Surface Structures
of Decision Problems, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS,
CONNECTIONS AND CONTROVERSIES, supra note 20, at 552-65 (finding that variations in the
presentation and context of problems and variations within confounding variables, though
changes in the cover story for framing problem, led to significant differences in risk
preferences); see also Herbert Bless et al., Framingthe FramingEffect: The Impact of Context
Cues on Solutions to the 'Asian Disease'Problem, 28 Eut. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 287, 290 (1998)
("W]e observed a reflection effect when the context cue suggested a meaningful psychological
situation, for example a medical decision problem.... This reflection effect was eliminated,
however, when participants were provided with the context cue 'statistical research'.").
220. For additional qualifying examples see the studies summarized in tables 2, 3, and 4
of the paper by Levin and his colleagues. See Levin et al., supra note 207, at 154-57 tbl.2, 16163 tbl.3, 169-71 tbl.4.
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in relation to some psychological reference point. From the
perspective of rational choice theory, formally irrelevant changes in
the presentation of risky choices should not affect behavior so long
as the expected utility stays constant, but we know that gain-loss
framing changes may be psychologically relevant. From the
perspective of behavioral decision theory, we thus should not be
surprised that additional changes in the presentation of framing
problems may be psychologically relevant.2 2 1 Yet the legal decision
theorists seem to treat all framing problems and resultant framing
effects as uniform, indicating that they believe that the
psychological reference point and manipulations of losses/gains
around that reference point are the only psychologically relevant
factors. The precise words used in a law or a contract and the
subject matter of the law or contract, not to mention the
characteristics of the legal actors and characteristics of the larger
social context, may dramatically affect whether and to what extent
different behavioral tendencies (most typically in the form of
different risk preferences) are observed across positive and negative
framings of formally equivalent judgment and choice options. In
short, there is no universal framing effect that can be easily
translated into legal doctrine.
4. Neglect of Systematic Information-ProcessingModes
As discussed previously, legal decision theory is founded on a
predominantly unimodal view of information-processing that emphasizes heuristic processing and transient preference construction
and excludes a deliberative mode of thought that functions by
careful application of normative rules. 2 Given this unimodal view
of thought, it is easy to understand why legal decision theorists
assume systematic cognitive bias and errors in all persons across all
situations: legal decision theorists assume the universality of a
standard set of imperfect mental mechanisms used in all judgment
and decision making.

221. See, e.g., Kihberger et al., supra note 101, at 238 ("Seemingly inconsequential
variations in problem wordings were shown to produce a framing effect, no framing effect, or
a reversal of the framing effect.").
222. See supranotes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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Whether legal decision theorists intend to reject the possibility or
the importance of alternative, nonheuristic means of informationprocessing is unclear, because they do not clearly address this
possibility. The unimodal view of thought subscribed to by the legal
decision theorists seems to be inaccurate or at least incomplete,
however, because it appears that individuals are capable of at least
two fundamentally different forms of information-processing. In
fact, Kahneman and Tversky-whose work serves as the basis for
much of legal decision theory and legal decision theory's emphasis
on cognitive heuristics-posited two forms of reasoning: a natural
assessment, intuitive mode (that relies on cognitive heuristics) and
an extensional, logical mode (that proceeds more algorithmically),
with reasoning occurring most commonly but not only by means of
natural assessments.22 The former mode refers to the heuristic form
of information-processing presumed to lead to systematic biases and
errors, whereas the latter mode refers to a more formalistic and
deliberative form of information-processing less susceptible to the
same kinds of cognitive biases and errors.

223. See Kahneman, supra note 77, at 682 ('lversky and I always thought of the heuristics
and biases approach as a two-process theory. We proposed that intuitive judgments of
probability or frequency are based on 'natural assessments'--that is, of similarity, causality,
affective valence, or past frequency-which are effortless and largely automatic. In the
terminology of the target article, judgment by heuristics is a manifestation of System 1.
However, we also believed that System 2 can override intuitive judgments that conflict with
a general rule-but only if the relevant rule is evoked."); Tversky & Kabneman, supra note
124, at 308-09, 310 (discussing cues that may elicit extensional reasoning instead of natural
assessment-based reasoning); cf id. at 313-14 ("Our studies of the conjunction rule show that
normatively inspired theories that assume coherence are descriptively inadequate, whereas
psychological analyses that ignore the appeal of normative rules are, at best, incomplete. A
comprehensive account of human judgment must reflect the tension between compelling
logical rules and seductive nonextensional intuitions."). Tversky and Kahneman describe the
natural assessment approach as follows:
Our conception ofjudgmental heuristics is based on naturalassessments that are
routinely carried out as part of the perception of events and the comprehension
of messages. Such natural assessments include computations of similarity and
representativeness, attributions of causality, and evaluations of the availability
of associations and exemplars....
The term judgmental heuristic refers to a strategy-whether deliberate or
not-that relies on a natural assessment to produce an estimate or a prediction.
One of the manifestations of a heuristic is the relative neglect of other
considerations. ... Hence, the use of judgmental heuristics gives rise to
predictable biases.
Id. at 294.
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Several psychologists have focused considerable attention on the
issue of the extent to which a single individual may engage in
different types of information-processing at different times (i.e.,
intra-individual variation in reasoning processes) and how exactly
the different systems or modes of thought may interact and be
consciously controlled.22 4 The work of these psychologists suggests
that, instead of always relying on the same cognitive mechanisms
to process information, people sometimes engage in thought
processes more closely approximating normatively rational decision
strategies (which may lead to random errors when people have
insufficient processing resources), whereas at other times people
engage in thought processes utilizing "arational" heuristics (which
typically lead to "good"choices but may be more prone to nonrandom
errors).2 25 Although the specific "dual-process" theories of cognition
224. See Eliot R. Smith & Jamie DeCoster, Dual-ProcessModels in Social and Cognitive
Psychology: ConceptualIntegrationand Links to UnderlyingMemory Systems, 4 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 108, 108 (2000) ("In recent years, researchers working in numerous
areas of social and cognitive psychology have developed models that follow these general lines:
dual-process models, as we label them here. Such models contain three major components.
They provide accounts of how people process in quick-and-dirty fashion, how they process
when willing and able to engage in extensive thought, and what conditions encourage such
effortful processing.") (citation omitted). For introductions to dual-process models in social and
cognitive psychology see Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., TheHistoryofDual-ProcessNotions, and
the Future of Preconscious Control, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 12
(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999); Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two
Systems ofReasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1996). See also Keith E. Stanovich & Richard
F. West, Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?, 23
BEHAv. & BRAIN Sci. 645,658-59 (2000) (summarizing the features common to the two modes
ofinformation-processing in several dual-process models).
225. Sloman describes the two modes of thought in terms of the two views of cognitive error
mentioned earlier-error due to bounded rationality and error due to use of cognitive
heuristics.
Each of these two views of human error suggests a different way to conceive of
the place of normative rules in human thought. Bounded rationality suggests
that people are able to follow rules derived from normative theory, although
their ability to do so is limited by their limited cognitive resources. The natural
assessment approach suggests that thought involves a process in which no rules
of any kind are followed. Evidence can be found for both of these suggestions.
Human thought seems to have two complementary aspects. These aspects have
been distinguished in a variety of ways by a number of theorists over the years.
To take only one example, Reason distinguishes an attentional control mode
from an automatic one, which he takes to be the locus of much human error.
Sloman, supra note 23, at 576 (citation omitted). As Epstein and Pacini note, a long-standing
debate in cognitive psychology concerns whether people process information primarily by
association or by use of rules, and a dual-process approach such as that taken by Sloman
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differ in important respects on their particulars,2 26 they all view
information processing as capable of occurring through two different
modes, with one mode of thought being more systematic, more
effortful, and more rule-governed, and the other being more
automatic, less effortful, and more schema-driven.2
Dual-process models allow both reasoned and heuristic forms of
information-processing to operate in parallel-indeed, the two
modes may interact with one another, at times working well
together and at other times leading to internal conflict. 228 These
models likewise allow judgment and decision-making errors to arise
from different sources and suggest a somewhat more flattering view
of human judgment and decision making than has been dominant
recently.22 9
offers a compromise view:
Cognitive psychologists are divided on whether people are parallel information
processors who operate by associative connections, or whether they operate
according to a more deliberative, rule-based, sequential mode of information
processing. Noting that there is impressive evidence on both sides of the issue,
Sloman has suggested a resolution based on the assumption that people operate
both ways.
Seymour Epstein & Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-ProcessTheories
from the Perspective of Cognitive-ExperientialSelf-Theory, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 224, at 465 (citation omitted).
226. For a sampling of the diverse dual-process models see DUAL-PROCESS MODELS IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supranote 224.
227. See Seymour Epstein et al., Individual Differences in Intuitive-Experiential and
Analytical-RationalThinking Styles, 71 J. PERSONALITy & SOC. PSYCHOL. 390, 390 (1996)
("Psychologists from various persuasions have proposed two fundamentally different modes
of processing information: one that has been variously referred to as intuitive, natural,
automatic, heuristic, schematic, prototypical, narrative, implicit, imagistic-nonverbal,
experiential, mythos, and first-signal system and the other as thinking-conceptual-logical,
analytical-rational, deliberative-effortful-intentional-systematic, explicit, extensional, verbal,
logos, and second-signal system.") (citations and emphasis omitted). To Epstein's listing of
descriptors for the two modes of thought, we may add Sloman's distinction between
associative and rule-based systems. See Sloman, supranote 224, at 4-6.
228. See, e.g., JOHN ST. B.T. EVANS & DAvm E. OvER, RATIONALITY AND REASONING 146
(1996) ("The dual process theory that we now favour is neither a sequential model nor a
conflict model, but rather an interactive model .... The interactive nature of the two processes
lies in the fact that our conscious thinking is always shaped, directed, and limited by tacit,
pre-attentive processes.").
229. Consider, for example, the comments of the social psychologist Philip Tetloclc
Experimental research on judgment and choice casts us, human beings, in a
less-than-flattering light. We fall prey, it has been claimed, to a wide assortment
of errors and biases. We are too quick to draw conclusions about others, too slow
to change our minds, excessively confident in our predictions, and prone to give
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Unfortunately, given the popularity of studying heuristics and
biases, behavioral decision theorists have devoted relatively little
effort to studying the systematic mode of processing and how it
interacts with the heuristic mode. Rather, there has been an
emphasis on the study of the heuristic mode of informationprocessing that may be more common in laboratory settings-in
which quick, intuitive judgments or choices, often on unfamiliar,
difficult, or abstract tasks, are requested, typically in the absence of
feedback or decision aids and without serious consequences for the
actor. 3 0 The result has been the derogation of both the study of a
more systematic mode of thought that all competent adults are
capable of to some extent and the role of motives and affect in
reasoning and choice.23 1
The most immediate impact of this evidence of dual modes of
thought, and the relative neglect of study of the more systematic
mode of thought, is to further bring into question the validity of
too much weight to irrelevant cues (such as sunk costs) and too little weight to
relevant ones (such as opportunity costs). Although this grim portrait has been
qualified by the recent proliferation of dual-process models of judgment and
choice that, in the spirit of Simon, bestow on people some limited capacity to
decide how to decide ... , the dominant emphasis in the last quarter century of
experimental work has clearly been on judgmental shortcomings.
Philip E. Tetlock, CognitiveBiasesand OrganizationalCorrectives:Do Both Diseaseand Cure
Depend on the Politicsofthe Beholder?,45 AeIRN. SCI. Q. 293, 293 (2000) (citations omitted).
230. One example ofcognitive bias that maybe ameliorated by greater cognitive processing
is the overconfidence phenomenon, in which subjects express unwarranted confidence in the
accuracy of their answers to general knowledge or other types of questions. See, e.g., Janet A.
Sniezek et al., The Effect of Choosingon Confidence in Choice, 46 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 264, 279 (1990) (discussing data showing that more serious

cognitive effort on decision tasks resulted in better calibration of accuracy judgments).
Motivation to get the "right answer' may alone not be sufficient to overcome cognitive bias
on mentally taxing tasks, but increased accuracy motivation is likely to improve accuracy on
less-taxing tasks. See Brett W. Pelham & Efrat Neter, The Effect of Motivation of Judgment
Depends on the Difficulty of the Judgment, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 581, 590
(1995) ("T]he research presented in this article indicates that the motivation to judge
accurately can either facilitate or debilitate judgment. In particular, when people's cognitive
resources are heavily taxed, their attempts to make especially accurate judgments may
backfire.... The results of these studies add to a growing list of findings in support of
contextual models of human judgment.").
231. See, e.g., Kahneman, supra note 60, at 145 (discussing shortcomings of much
heuristics and biases research and calling for greater investigation into the robustness of prior
findings and the effects of many important features that may be operative in real-world
settings, such as the effects in sequential rather than isolated choices, the effects of the social
context of choice, and the effects of motivational and emotional factors).
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legal decision theory's assumption that all people systematically
rely on a heuristic and biased mode of thought when making
2
judgments and decisions under conditions of risk or uncertainty.
As with the use of experiments designed to elicit error, the use of
experiments designed to examine primarily the heuristic mode of
thought may lead to an unrepresentative sample of findings
regarding how judgment and decision making occur. The related but
more general significance of dual-process models of cognition for
legal decision theory is twofold: If legal actors are differentially
232. Dual-process models of information-processing also hold immediate importance for
specific areas of legal decision theory. Legal scholars interested in how the law may encourage
or discourage the use and existence of social stereotypes and in how social stereotypes are or
should be taken into account in the law have recently drawn on psychological research on
social stereotyping to inform their work. Some of these scholars treat social stereotypes as
automatic and uncontrollable, occurring through a heuristic mode of thought. See, e.g., Joseph
W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap:Race, Lie Detection,and the Jury,33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 41 (2000)
("Social science research has shown that the effect ofracial stereotypes are so strong that they
can influence the decision making of even the most well-meaning and consciously progressive
individuals. This is not conscious racism, but the effect of stereotyping on the cognitive
processes due to social conditioning that automatically forces the observer to see events in a
certain fashion."); Amy L. Wax, Discriminationas Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1158 (1999)
("Research in cognitive psychology suggests that biases in judgment stemming from
categorical generalizations cannot be reliably manipulated or controlled either by the person
harboring those biases or by outsiders seeking to redesign the decisionmaking process to
reduce such bias. Inherent features of human cognition prevent individuals from detecting or
effectively correcting all but the most egregious biases in their own judgments."); see also
Michael Selmi, DiscriminationasAccident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233,1235-43
(1999) (responding to Professor Wax's article and discussing the concept of unconscious
discrimination). Dual-process models of social cognition suggest that, while social stereotypes
may serve as a default heuristic in much person perception, individuating information may
also be taken into account via a less-automatic processing mode, and this mode may override
the social stereotype arising from the heuristic mode under certain conditions. See Galen V.
Bodenhausen et al., On the DialecticsofDiscrimination:DualProcessesin SocialStereotyping,
in DUAL-PRocEss THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supranote 224, at 271-90 (reviewing and
evaluating dual-process models of person perception specifically in relation to social
stereotypes). The body of research on person perception is quite complex, and questions
remain over the degree of control that individuals may exert over the stereotyping process,
if any. See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping,Prejudice,and Discrimination,in 2 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 9, at 364-75, 385-91 (reviewing evidence of automaticity in
stereotyping and evidence that individuals may have some control over stereotyping). The
dual-process theories of person perception should, at a minimum, be taken into account when
working in this area in order to ensure proper qualifications to one's conclusions. Cf Clark
Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify
Discriminationand Promote CoalitionsBetween "Different"Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
313,442 (2000) (notingdebate withinpsychology about the controllabilityofsocial stereotypes
and biases).
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capable of engaging in rational versus arational modes of thought,
we need to (1) develop a theory of the conditions under which the
rational versus the arational mode of thought is more likely to be
triggered, and in what legal contexts, and for whom and (2)
determine whether active interventions within the legal setting can
trigger the rational mode of thought if the benefits of such
interventions outweigh their costs.
CONCLUSION

Behavioral decision theory does not support the bold claim of
legal decision theorists that all legal actors systematically fall prey
to cognitive illusions when forming judgments and making
decisions. Indeed, most behavioral decision research does not even
address the prevalence or robustness of findings of cognitive bias
and error, thus failing to provide the information that is most
crucial to the application of this research to the legal system.
Moreover, all of the cognitive biases and errors that the legal
decision theorists tout in their attack on the rationality assumption
are based on the responses of only subsets of experimental subjects
under refined experimental conditions. Often a high percentage of
subjects provide the rational response even under the experimental
conditions designed to elicit error, and even higher percentages of
subjects provide the rational response with changes in the
experimental setting that make the decision problems less
confusing, less misleading, or more ecologically valid.
We are left with the question of why the legal decision theorists
have so misunderstood behavioral decision theory. Or, if they have
not misunderstood behavioral decision theory, why they have
presented behavioral decision theory's ambiguous evidence on the
prevalence of irrationality as if this evidence were unambiguous.
Legal decision theorists' misleading and partial portrayal of
research into judgment and decision making may be due to one or
more factors.2"
233. With regard to the partial presentation of research, consider that recent surveys by
Hanson & Kysar, BehavioralismI, supra note 1; Jolls et al., supra note 9; and Korobkin &
Ulen, supranote 4, omit discussion ofmost of the research and issues discussed in this Article
that do not comport with the legal decision theorists' view ofjudgment and decision making
as pervasively and irremediably flawed.
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First, market forces may be driving these scholars to puffery and
exaggeration in their selling of the portrait of human irrationality.
Whereas law and economics scholars market theories of law based
on a model of rational and efficient decision making, the legal
decision theorists market themselves as the law and economics
realists who offer theories of law based on a model of irrational
(but predictably irrational) decision making. In short, blanket
irrationality probably sells better than a nuanced, contextualized
picture of human behavior full of individual and situational
differences in rationality and lacking in cognitive universals.
Second, behavioral decision theorists aid and abet the imprecision
of the legal decision theorists by speaking as if all subjects in all
experiments always commit the same errors, even though the
subjects do not.234 Behavioral decision theorists often fail to specify
clearly the boundary conditions on much of their own work, perhaps
because they typically speak to a psychology audience that is
expected to be aware of the limits on the research. Moreover,
evidence exists of a possible citation bias within psychology that
favors pessimistic accounts of decision making: "[Ilt appears that
reports of good performance virtually have been ignored and that it
is possible that this has had an undue negative influence upon
people's views about the quality of judgment and reasoning." 5 If
234. See Jepson et al., supranote 128, at 495 ("Previous work on inductive heuristics has
left many theorists with the impression that subjects in reasoning experiments behave quite
uniformly."); see also David C. Funder, Gone With the Wind: Individual Differences in
Heuristics and Biases Undermine the Implication of Systematic Irrationality,23 BEHAV. &
BRAIN Sci. 673, 673-74 (2000) (discussing the "attention-getting claim" of the heuristics and
biases researchers that'human cognition [is] characterized by systematic irrationalities" and
how this claim is arguably wrong) (footnote omitted); Lola L. Lopes, The Rhetoric of
Irrationality,1 THEORY& PSYCHOL. 65,75-78 (1991) (discussing how an early, veryinfluential
article by Kahneman and Tversky presented an overly negative view of the use of cognitive
heuristics); id. at 80 ("In the case of the biases and heuristics literature.., one cannot criticize
the message without criticizing the way it is packaged and presented. The view that people
are irrational is real in the sense that people hold it to be true. But the reality is mostly in the
rhetoric.").
235. Beach et al., supranote 128, at 51; see alsoJay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski & Lee Roy
Beach, The CitationBias: Fad and Fashionin the Judgment and DecisionLiterature,39 AM
PsYcHoLOGIsr 75, 77 (1984) (discussing a disparity in scholarly citations that favors
discussion of empirical studies showing "poor" judgment over studies showing "good"
judgment and speculating that this "citation bias" may be due in part to a selective
presentation of supportive evidence by proponents of bias research). But see Richard W.
Robins & Kenneth H. Craik, Is There a Citation Bias in the Judgment and Decision
Literature?, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 225, 242 (1993)
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such a bias exists in the reports of the research, legal decision
theorists, as consumers of this literature, would naturally be left
with a pessimistic but unrepresentative account of human behavior.
Third, the legal decision theorists may themselves have fallen
prey to a cognitive or motivational bias that causes them to ignore
research that conflicts with their views. In fact, the legal decision
theorists' own argument of pervasive, unavoidable biases would
suggest that the partial presentation of behavioral decision theory
is due to the operation of confirmation and disconfirmation biases
(or more generally "myside bias") within the legal decision theorists
themselves: these theorists selectively seek and attend to evidence
supportive of their own views and exclude or discount evidence not
supportive of their views."' If this is true, then legal decision
theorists are in good company, for psychologists have been found
to exhibit a confirmatory bias." This bias explanation is possibly
more flattering than two alternative explanations-ignorance or
deliberate neglect of relevant research.
Fourth, it may be that the legal decision theorists have fully and
fairly evaluated work that brings into question the error and bias
(reviewing Christensen-Szalanski & Beach's 1984 study and finding "empirical support for
a citation-rate disparity [in favor of 'poor judgment' studies that] is modest at best and
possibly unreliable").
236. See BARON, supra note 20, at 195 ("People tend not to look for evidence against what
they favor, and, when they find it anyway, they tend to ignore it. David Perkins has named
these two characteristics 'myside bias.') (citation omitted); BAZERMAN, supranote 25, at 35
("Most of us seek confirmatory evidence and exclude the search for disconfirminginformation
&
") (emphasis omitted); Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A
from our decision process.
DisconfirmationBias in the EvaluationofArguments, 71 J. PERsONALITY& Soc. PSYCHOL. 5,
6 (1996) ("When faced with evidence contrary to their beliefs, people try to undermine the
evidence. That is, there is a bias to disconfirm arguments incompatible with one's position.").
237. Mahoney conducted an experiment to test for confirmatory bias in referees of
psychological research, and he found that "(a) referee evaluations may be dramatically
influenced by such factors as experimental outcome, and (b) interreferee agreement may be
extremelylow on factors relating to manuscript evaluation." Mahoney, supranote 115, at 173.
Mahoney appropriately asks, "[w]ith our vast literatures on information processing and social
psychology, have we assumed that scientists are somehow unaffected by the processes which
appear to be so common in other members of the species?" Id.; see also Jonathan J. Koehler,
The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993) ("In the present study,

even scientists who had a good deal of methodological training and research experience
differentially perceived the quality of scientific research as a function of how well the data
supported their beliefs and how strongly the beliefs were held."). On the general topic of the
biased use of psychological research see MacCoun, supranote 37.

2020

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1907

research and found this critical work to be too lacking in merit to
warrant mention. This explanation seems unlikely, however, given
the quality of this work relative to the quality of the error and bias
research, given its publication in leading peer-edited journals, and
given the raising of cautions by leading behavioral decision
theorists. A final, partial explanation is simply that some of the
research discussed here is relatively new and did not exist at the
time of publication of some of the early legal decision theory articles.
For whatever reason, many legal scholars use insufficient care
and precision in their interpretations and uses of psychological
research on judgment and decision making. Consumers of this
growing literature should thus look very skeptically on the claims
being made and should resist the contention that the cognitivemiser model being offered by these scholars is more complete and
accurate than the rational-actor model. Legal decision theorists
argue that the economic analysis of law is incomplete and incorrect
as a descriptive account ofjudgment and choice and, therefore, legal
policy based on standard economic prescriptions is suspect. Yet in
the end, all that legal decision theory presently offers is a partial
account of human behavior to compete with the partial account
offered by law and economics.23 Some adherents of legal decision
theory acknowledge this status but hope for more.2 39 Progress is
238. This conclusion accords with Professor Cross' appraisal:
Behavioral economics criticizes classical economics for failing to describe the
reality of human behavior, which arguably leads to undesirable policy
prescriptions. Yet one can criticize much behavioral economics for failing to
make accurate descriptive predictions or to produce policy prescriptions that are
demonstrably superior to those of classical economics....
The prevailing battle between law and economics and behavioral economics
is ... misguided. The conventional rational decision-making presumptions of
classic law and economics are amply demonstrated to a degree, but the theory
does not explain all behavior completely. Behavioralism is not so much an
alternative to law and economics as it is a complement. It supplements the
classic model and explains why deviations may occur from the model, but it does
not supplant that model. Both models are valuable only insofar as they explain
actual behavior, and their descriptive validity can be tested empirically, yielding
the knowledge necessary for policy.
Frank B. Cross, In Praiseof IrrationalPlaintiffs,86 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 32 (2000); see also
Hillman, supra note 47, at 718 ("[I]flegal theorists focus too narrowlyon particular behavioral
observations, their analysis will be no more realistic than predictions based on economic
analysis's wealth-maximization precept.").
239. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 9, at 1547 ("We hope that this article will encourage
others to continue the inquiry and research, both theoretical and empirical, that will be
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unlikely, however, so long as legal decision theorists fail to specify
the boundary conditions on their empirical claims and instead settle
for overly broad generalizations about nonrationality to compete
with the economic theorists' overly broad generalizations about
rationality.
Legal decision theorists address important questions. Do our
rules of evidence truly serve the functions we intend? Are there
predictable unwanted biases in how juries and judges award
damages, and, if so, how might these biases be combated? Are
bureaucrats capable of fairly applying cost-benefit analyses?
Research into such questions should of course continue, but more
cautiously and carefully, and the conclusions drawn from empirical
research should be as precise as possible and should be accompanied
by self-critical candor. Just as we should not base our legal rules
and standards on faulty assumptions about the basic rationality of
people, so should we not base reforms of our legal rules and
standards on faulty claims about the basic irrationality of people.

needed to flesh out the behavioral approach for which we have argued here.").

